Somaliland’s presidential election, scheduled for November 15, 2022, has been derailed by political, legal, and technical disputes, deepening mistrust among key stakeholders. The impasse stems from unresolved flaws in the electoral system, including the constitutional limit of three political parties. Current party leaders benefit from the system and have shown little interest in reforms, while disputes over the timing of presidential and party license elections have intensified. President Muse Bihi’s proposal to hold party elections before the presidential poll has been rejected by the opposition, which accuses him of seeking an illegal term extension. Rivalry between the ruling Kulmiye party and main opposition Waddani is further inflamed by underlying clan dynamics, with each side wary of losing political dominance. Amid the political deadlock, the Salafi reformist movement Al I’tisaam has gained significant influence, challenging Somaliland’s constitutional democracy and promoting an Islamist political vision that rejects Sufism and mainstream Shafi’i traditions. Its rise, combined with election delays, threatens Somaliland’s stability, governance, and its role as a secure and cooperative regional partner. A political compromise, possibly combining presidential and party elections in a single event, could avert further instability, but it will require rare political maturity and unity of purpose from Somaliland’s leaders.
Remittances are the backbone of Somalia’s economy, providing between 1.3 and 2 billion dollars each year from the Somali diaspora. These funds exceed all humanitarian and development aid combined and support millions of families, many of whom are unemployed. Yet this crucial system is under increasing strain due to stricter compliance with anti money laundering and counter financing of terrorism regulations.Most remittance service providers are small businesses or hawalas, often run by a single person. Complying with complex banking requirements is costly and difficult. International banks, wary of regulatory risks, have increasingly cut ties with remittance companies rather than managing compliance. This has left many providers unable to access the global financial system, especially since most Somalis do not have formal bank accounts and rely on mobile money transfers.The stakes are high. Without access to bank channels, remittance flows risk being driven underground, increasing the likelihood of unregulated and unsafe transfers. With Somalia facing its worst drought in 40 years and global economic shocks from COVID‑19 and the war in Ukraine, access to remittances is more vital than ever. Reforming compliance rules and supporting legal remittance channels would protect this lifeline for Somalia’s most vulnerable communities.
Complex attacks combining multiple weapon systems in coordinated assaults remain one of Al Shabaab’s most effective tactics against both military and civilian targets in Somalia. These operations often begin with explosives to breach perimeters followed by armed assaults intended to cause maximum casualties and disruption. Against military bases attackers may deploy hundreds of fighters while in cities like Mogadishu smaller teams strike high profile civilian sites such as hotels often as suicide missions. Somalia’s elite counterterrorism units including NISA’s Gaashaan the army’s Danab commandos and the police’s Haram’ad SWAT have the skills and equipment to respond but lack a unified incident command. During the Hayat Hotel siege separate chains of command incompatible communication systems and differing tactics delayed a coordinated response echoing similar problems once seen in Afghanistan before adopting the UK gold silver bronze model.
Mogadishu is witnessing a troubling rise in gang activity fueled by drug and alcohol abuse. Once seen as a relatively minor problem compared to terrorism, gang violence is now a serious security concern. Many young Somalis, facing unemployment, poverty, and social marginalization, are turning to drugs, alcohol, and organized criminal groups. These gangs rob businesses, claim territories, and trade stolen goods for drugs, creating a vicious cycle of crime. Authorities have long underestimated the threat, with senior officials dismissing gangs as mere juvenile delinquents. But the Somali Police Force now acknowledges the scale of the problem as serious crimes surge. Some gangs even include members of the security forces, raising fears of infiltration. There are also growing concerns that Al Shabaab could exploit gangs to carry out attacks.
Relations between Somalia and Ethiopia have sharply deteriorated since President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud took office. His government is seen as leaning closer to Kenya, a perception reinforced by reopening the Kenyan khat trade which ended Ethiopia’s monopoly. Tensions escalated after a major Al Shabaab incursion into Ethiopia, prompting Addis Ababa to deploy thousands of troops into Somalia and propose a controversial buffer zone. Ethiopia has also bypassed Mogadishu by striking direct security deals with Somali Federal Member States and Somaliland, challenging Somali sovereignty. An equally serious but often overlooked dispute involves water. Ethiopia’s ambitious irrigation and hydropower projects in the highlands have diverted large volumes from the Juba and Shabelle rivers, which supply Somalia’s breadbasket regions. With 90 percent of their flow originating in Ethiopia, these rivers are critical for irrigation and food security, especially during Somalia’s worst drought in decades. March saw the Juba River nearly dry for the first time since 1957. Without treaties governing shared water resources, Somalia lacks leverage to address upstream diversions. Many Somalis believe Ethiopia has exploited Somalia’s political fragility since 1991 to act unilaterally. With no resolution in sight, worsening political friction risks further destabilising the Horn of Africa.
Al Shabaab’s 35 hour siege of the Hayat Hotel in Mogadishu left more than 20 dead and over 100 injured, making it one of the deadliest and longest attacks in Somalia’s recent history. The group’s indiscriminate killing of civilians highlighted its commitment to takfiri extremist ideology, which justifies mass murder as “lawful jihad.” The attack’s brutality, including dismemberment of victims and propaganda videos, underscores the group’s growing nihilism. The choice of target, a modest hotel frequented by ordinary Somalis, shows the militants’ intent to instill fear rather than strike high profile political figures. Security lapses were evident as Al Shabaab had infiltrated the hotel days earlier posing as honey traders, smuggling explosives disguised in containers. On the night of the attack, Somalia’s response was slow and fragmented, with multiple units operating without a unified command. Intelligence warnings, including premature IED detonations days earlier, were missed, raising serious questions about preparedness. The incident has fueled criticism of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s security leadership and increased calls for purging ineffective holdovers from the Farmaajo era. With public confidence shaken, the government faces pressure to restructure its security apparatus, improve coordination, and strengthen counterterrorism operations before another tragedy strikes.
The Somali language, part of the Cushitic branch of the Afro‑Asiatic family, has been central to Somali identity across Somalia, Somaliland, Djibouti, Ethiopia’s Somali Regional State, and northeastern Kenya. Its transformation began in 1972 when the Latin alphabet replaced Arabic script, a milestone achieved by the Somali Language Commission under President Mohamed Siyaad Barre. Literacy campaigns, Somali‑language education, and the Somali Academy of Science and Arts sparked a golden era for Somali literature in the 1970s. Civil war in 1991 shattered these gains, dispersing scholars and weakening institutions. Yet regional support from Djibouti and Ethiopia helped keep Somali literacy alive, culminating in the 2013 creation of the Regional Academy for the Somali Language. Figures like Mohamed Dahir Afrah and poet Mohamed Ibrahim Warsame ‘Hadraawi’ preserved Somali’s literary tradition, with Hadraawi earning renown as the “Somali Shakespeare.” Today, Somali faces unprecedented challenges: English’s dominance in education, diaspora influence, and declining print culture threaten its purity and usage. Younger generations increasingly pepper Somali speech with foreign words, while fewer read classic Somali works. Hadraawi’s passing reminds us that protecting language, literature, and cultural heritage is essential to Somalia’s unity, identity, and nation‑building.
Somalia is in the grip of its worst drought in living memory, with four consecutive failed rainy seasons since 2020 affecting 4.1 million people and displacing more than one million. Forecasts suggest the October‑December deyr rains will also underperform, pushing the country toward an unprecedented humanitarian catastrophe. Combined with conflict, global food price spikes, and the lingering effects of COVID‑19, the crisis is devastating rural livelihoods. President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has made drought response a top priority, appointing Abdirahman Abdishakur Warsame as Special Envoy to coordinate relief efforts and raise global awareness. His advocacy has secured $1.5 billion in aid pledges, but this is less than half of the $3.9 billion the UN says is needed. Meanwhile, over seven million Somalis face acute food insecurity, with famine expected in 17 districts without urgent intervention. Women and children make up over 80% of those displaced, many living in overcrowded, unsanitary IDP camps. Malnutrition and disease are rising sharply. The government has formed a new National Disaster Management Committee to coordinate aid delivery, but donor fatigue and logistical challenges threaten progress.
Since emerging from Al‑Ittihad Al‑Islamiya in the 1990s, Al Shabaab has evolved from a small militant faction into one of East Africa’s most dangerous extremist groups. Affiliated with Al‑Qa’ida, it rose to prominence in the mid‑2000s under the Islamic Courts Union before Ethiopia’s invasion forced it into a guerrilla campaign across southern Somalia. Leadership changes, internal purges, and Godane’s 2014 death reshaped the movement, but its resilience has kept it a major security threat. Today, Al Shabaab faces unprecedented challenges. The group recently staged a large‑scale incursion into Ethiopia, signalling its regional ambitions, but military setbacks, botched bombings, and clan‑driven conflicts reveal vulnerabilities. Competition from the Islamic State in Somalia (ISS) for recruits and funding adds pressure, as does the Somali government’s two‑pronged strategy of military offensives and ounter‑extremism policies. The appointment of Mukhtar Roobow as Minister for Religious Affairs has rattled the group, prompting death threats from its leadership. While Al Shabaab remains capable of deadly operations, its current defensive posture offers Somalia a rare opportunity to press its advantage, disrupt recruitment pipelines, and challenge the group’s ideological foundations before it can regroup and expand.
Al Shabaab’s official spokesman, Ali Rage (Ali Dheere), has issued a direct death threat against Somalia’s new Religious Affairs Minister, Mukhtar Roobow, calling him an apostate whose “blood is permissible.” The statement marks the group’s first public reaction to Roobow’s appointment as Somalia’s countering violent extremism chief and signals growing tension between the Somali government and the militant group. In a ten‑minute Facebook video styled like a mosque sermon, Ali Dheere justified the threat with theological arguments, accused Roobow of treachery, and rejected any possibility of talks with the government. His remarks reveal both internal Al Shabaab rivalries and the group’s determination to block reconciliation efforts. Analysts suggest Dheere is bolstering his leadership credentials within the movement by taking a hardline stance against Roobow. The address sheds rare light on Al Shabaab’s mindset, portraying negotiations as betrayal and framing Roobow’s defection as proof of apostasy. It also underscores the group’s fear that Roobow’s government role could undermine its ideological influence. The Hassan Sheikh administration views Roobow as uniquely positioned to counter extremist narratives, but this public threat highlights the volatile intersection of Somalia’s security, politics, and ideology.
President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud is working to repair Somalia’s regional relationships under his vision of “Somalia at peace with itself and the world.” Prime Minister Hamza Abdi Barre is advancing the same approach domestically through consultations with political stakeholders. However, relations with Ethiopia have soured. Addis Ababa is uneasy about Somalia’s improved ties with Kenya, especially the resumption of the khat trade, which disrupts business interests tied to Farmaajo‑linked networks. Ethiopia is also concerned by the appointment of Mukhtar Roobow as Minister for Religious Affairs. Following Al‑Shabaab incursions along the border, Ethiopia deployed more troops, tanks, and artillery into Somalia, raising fears of an expansionist strategy. Observers believe Ethiopia is aligning with Farmaajo loyalists, including South West State President Abdiaziz Laftagareen, to destabilize the new government. Meetings between Ethiopian military officials and Somaliland leaders further hint at Addis Ababa’s shifting political posture. These developments risk undermining Somalia’s fragile diplomatic progress, eroding national unity, and reversing efforts to build stable regional relations.
Somalia’s Prime Minister Hamza Abdi Barre has appointed Mukhtar Roobow “Abu Mansur”, a former deputy leader of Al‑Shabaab who defected in 2013, as Minister for Religious Affairs, endowments, and Countering Violent Extremism. The move has sparked sharp debate at home and abroad.Supporters see it as a bold, pragmatic step toward reconciliation and countering extremist ideology from within. Roobow, once tipped to lead Al‑Shabaab, broke with hardline leader Ahmed Abdi Godane over extremist tactics, clan politics, and theological disputes. He survived multiple assassination attempts before formally defecting, condemning Al‑Shabaab’s violence, and pledging support for the Somali government.Critics, however, fear the ppointment sends the wrong message on accountability and could embolden extremists. Western diplomats remain cautious, while Ethiopia, which arrested Roobow in 2018, worries about its political impact in South West State, a region it considers strategically vital. Roobow’s public denunciation of Al‑Shabaab, including during the aftermath of the 2017 Zoobe Junction bombing where he donated blood to victims, remains a defining moment. His appointment tests Somalia’s approach to reintegration: can former extremists help defeat the ideology they once embraced, or will such moves undermine trust in government?
As the sun rose over Kabul early on Sunday, 31 August, Ayman al-Zawahiri was sitting on his third-floor balcony, waiting for the slight morning chill to burn off. He would have already been up for several hours, rising early for the fajr prayer at 3:30 am. He enjoyed reading alone outside on his balcony in the early morning, something he did most days. This seemingly innocuous pastime would result in his death.
During a recent visit to the border with Somalia, Mustafa Omer ‘Cagjar,’ the president of Ethiopia’s Somali Regional State (SRS), declared, “To shield this area from terrorist attacks, we will create a security buffer zone [in which there would be no terrorist presence].” Cagjar was addressing members of the paramilitary Liyu Police, who had been engaged in heavy fighting with Al-Shabaab militants during the previous 10 days and repelled a significant incursion deep into Ethiopia by Al-Shabaab forces.
The president of the Somali Regional State (SRS) of Ethiopia, Mustafa Omer ‘Cagjar,’ wove a grand conspiracy theory on Amharic TV and radio channels this week. He claimed that Somalia, Egypt and Al-Shabaab were working together to undermine Ethiopia’s Grand Renaissance Dam (GERD).
In the late 1980s, Mogadishu witnessed the rise of one of the most fearsome street gangs, Ciyaal Faay Ali (The Children of Faay Ali). Faay Ali was a single mother who used to hustle to raise her nine children in Mogadishu’s Wadajir district. One street near her house was where the gang members met up and hung out. They gained notoriety as a result of the violence they occasionally meted out to unfortunate victims around Mogadishu. Many Mogadishu residents were seized with fear and gangs such as Ciyaal Faay Ali became a household topic.
On Wednesday, 20 July, Al-Shabaab launched a large-scale attack on a string of villages located along the Somalia-Ethiopia frontier. The militants made deep incursions into Ethiopia and engaged the paramilitary Liyu police – drawn from the Somali Regional State of Ethiopia (SRS) – in what many observers agree was the insurgent group’s most audacious and unprecedented operation since Al-Shabaab took control of south-central Somalia in 2007. The attack has rattled the regional government and alarmed neighbouring states.
On Tuesday, 5 July, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) delivered a speech at Turkey’s SETA Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research. In his remarks, HSM emphasized the need to fight Al-Shabaab in an integrated way, by targeting their military, financial, and ideological capabilities. The president’s address was notable for not just advocating a purely military solution: more troops, more weapons, more operations. Instead, he offered a more olistic strategy, one that seemed to acknowledge that the threat posed by Al-Shabaab owes to more than just their fighting strength.
Somalia is currently experiencing the worst drought in a generation. President Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud’s (HSM) foremost priorities seem to be the drought and the return of the missing soldiers from Eritrea
Yesterday, Somali Twitter was breathless with speculation over who President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) was likely to nominate as prime minister. And while this is a matter of great importance, it is also just one of several pressing issues in front of HSM: drought and debt relief, reconciliation, completion of the constitution, and the war against Al-Shabaab. But there has also been an equally distracting source of palace intrigue recently, one that – like the other crises listed above – HSM needs to move quickly to address.