Tensions with Ethiopia threaten Hassan Sheikh’s re-set of Somalia’s international relations
President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) is packing his bags for another trip abroad, this time to Uganda. It will be just the latest leg in his efforts to mend Somalia’s relations with the region, a key part of his “Somalia at peace with itself and the world” policy. Prime Minister Hamza Abdi Barre has been trying to implement the same policy at home, holding consultative meetings with Somalia’s major political stakeholders, ‘Somali heshiis.’ Yet both men’s efforts are facing headwinds.
The priority that HSM has given to international relations – he has spent nearly half of his two-months in office abroad – has impacted the establishment of his own government. The PM, for example, required a 10-day extension to appoint his cabinet. And, when the cabinet was finally announced, it drew a decidedly mixed reaction. While Hamza was lauded for his consultative approach and the inclusiveness of the cabinet, the nomination of former Al-Shabaab deputy commander Mukhtar Roobow (also known as Abu Mansur) as Minister for Religious Affairs, Endowments, and Countering Violent Extremism attracted significant criticism both internally and externally.
Domestically, there are spoilers inside and outside of government who are working to undermine the new administration, seizing on any of HSM’s actual or potential missteps (such as getting caught up in the controversy over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam during a visit to Cairo) and then distorting and amplifying them through social and traditional media. Many of these subversive elements are remnants of former President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo’s government, some of whom fled the country following Farmaajo’s defeat in the May presidential election. Having expatriated millions of dollars abroad – much of it to Kenya – during the past five years, these former officials are working with Farmaajo’s political allies in Kenya to destabilise Somalia.
HSM mended fences with Kenya on a recent visit to Nairobi. One important aspect of the rapprochement was the re-establishment of the trade in khat (miraa) from Kenya to Somalia. Most of Kenya’s khat is grown in Meru County, which has been badly affected since Farmaajo banned Kenyan khat in March 2020. Meru also has over 770,000 registered voters who will be going to the polls tomorrow, so President Uhuru Kenyatta, who is supporting Raila Odinga’s candidacy, has been able to tout this diplomatic success to the advantage of Odinga’s campaign.
Yet there has been a coordinated effort by cartels, likely tied to Farmaajo’s family (his brother had exclusive license to import khat from Ethiopia), to foment and exploit recent disputes among khat vendors in Somalia. While their aims are ostensibly financial – with their monopoly on the khat trade at risk – there also appears to be a diplomatic angle: politicising the khat trade in an effort to sow discord between Somalia and Kenya.
It is also suspected that Abiy Ahmed’s administration in Ethiopia is colluding with Farmaajo’s political allies in Nairobi to undermine the HSM government. Addis wasn’t pleased to see Somalia leaning towards Kenya but it now has additional incentive to create political instability in Somalia and damage the relationship between Kenya and Somalia.
Since Al-Shabaab attacked three towns along the Ethiopian border (Yeed, Washaaqo, Aato) last month as a diversion to allow a separate force of over 1,000 fighters to enter Ethiopia, there has been an Ethiopian military build-up in eastern Somali Regional State (SRS). Ethiopia has every right to defend its border, but some of its recent moves in response to the Al-Shabaab incursion into Ethiopia suggest a more expansionist policy. The SRS president, Mustafe Omer ‘Cagjar,’ said that he wanted to establish a buffer zone in Somalia along the border with Ethiopia that would be free of Al-Shabaab. Any buffer zone would presumably be guarded by Ethiopian forces. And, indeed, yesterday Ethiopia began deploying hundreds of additional troops, with tanks and heavy artillery, to Somalia, under the pretext of fighting Al-Shabaab. Some of these additional troops are now based at Doolow Airport in Gedo region. This might be considered a politically strategic move on the part of the Ethiopian government to keep Gedo under its control. Doing so would greatly set back HSM’s efforts to restore peace among the communities living in Gedo, which have suffered under the ongoing drought.
Senior Ethiopian intelligence and military officials visited Somalia’s border regions – but not Mogadishu – last week. The arrival of South West President Abdiaziz Laftagareen in Addis Abeba on Friday is a harbinger of souring relations between Somalia and Ethiopia. It was one way for Addis to demonstrate its displeasure with Somalia, especially after Roobow’s nomination as minister. Another way was by sending a military delegation led by Lieutenant General Birhanu Bekele, head of military intelligence, to Somaliland on 2 August to discuss security issues with President Musa Bihi and Major General Nuh Ismail Tani, the chief of staff of Somaliland’s armed forces.
HSM’s initial steps to reset Somalia’s international relations were much needed and, so far, have been generally successful. Ethiopia is the notable exception. The concern is that Addis will use its legitimate security concerns as a stalking horse to destabilise the new government, in part by making common cause with Farmaajo loyalists like Laftagareen. It would be unfortunate if the slogan “Soomaali heshiis ah, dunidana heshiis la ah” (“Somalia in agreement with itself and in agreement with the world”) were reversed to “Somali aduunka la heshiis ah iyaduna heshiis ah” (“Somalia in agreement with the world”).
The Somali Wire Team
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