Issue No. 432

Published 29 Jul 2022

Dam breaks on Somalia and ‘GERD conspiracy’

Published on 29 Jul 2022 32:22 min

 Dam breaks on Somalia and ‘GERD conspiracy’

The president of the Somali Regional State (SRS) of Ethiopia, Mustafa Omer ‘Cagjar,’ wove a grand conspiracy theory on Amharic TV and radio channels this week. He claimed that Somalia, Egypt and Al-Shabaab were working together to undermine Ethiopia’s Grand Renaissance Dam (GERD). The outlandish comments, which came in the wake of Al-Shabaab’s attack in his region, have caused consternation in the Horn, to no surprise. They reflect the growing desperation of the beleaguered Somali regional leader. Cagjar has recently lost two pillars of support that kept his regime artificially alive: Somalia’s former President Mohammed Abdullahi Farmaajo; and Farmaajo’s intelligence chief Fahad Yasin. The recent Al-Shabaab incursion has made the situation even graver.

Mustafa Cagjar was speaking to a specific audience that relishes bashing Egypt and is wont to believe any claim that paints Cairo as a malign actor in the Horn. The idea of Egypt working with the Somali militant group Al-Shabaab to destabilise Ethiopia adds another dimension to the conspiracy. Unfortunately, some gullible Ethiopians, especially far right nationalists conditioned to believe the worst about Egypt, are almost certain to imbibe this latest narrative and give it wings.

Earlier this week, Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) returned from a two-day trip to Cairo. At the end of his visit a communique was issued that, in Arabic, contained reference to the two nations’ ‘common understanding’ on the GERD. This is a standard phrase familiar to foreign officials visiting Egypt. Egypt views most relations with the Horn and East Africa through the prism of the Nile and the politics of the GERD. It would be unusual if a communique were issued without any reference to the GERD.

Egypt views Somalia as crucial to its overall Horn of Africa strategy. Historically Somalia was perceived as a key element in Cairo’s military strategy to ‘encircle’ Ethiopia. This strategy assumed that Egypt would, in a conflict situation, move military assets along the Red Sea to Somalia, within striking distance of Ethiopia.

The last five years, under the Farmaajo regime, saw a dramatic deterioration in relations between Somalia and Egypt, however. Cairo and Mogadishu were on opposite sides of Gulf rivalries. Egypt had become part of the Saudi-Emirati axis, while Somalia had moved into the Qatar-Turkey axis. Perhaps for this reason it is best to view Hassan Sheikh’s visit to Cairo at this early stage in his presidency as largely symbolic, designed to demonstrate that the new Somali administration wants to repair relations.

The former Somali spy chief Fahad Yasin posted a message on Somali social media that makes the same allegations that Cagjar has made. But Yasin has gone a bit further. He alleges that Al-Shabaab and Ethiopia’s Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) had a compact that prevented the Somali militants from crossing the border and conducting attacks within Ethiopia. Yasin produced no evidence to support his claims. The notion that the jihadists could have cut a deal with the TPLF, the dominant member of the former Ethiopian ruling coalition the EPRDF, flies in the face of reality.

In the 1990s Ethiopia fought off the militant group Al-Ittihad al-Islami in north central Somalia. In December 2006 Ethiopia invaded Somalia in a bid to crush the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) that was then in control of Mogadishu. Former Prime Minister Meles Zenawi and his government saw Islamism as an existential threat to Ethiopia. The idea that the TPLF saw Al-Shabaab as potential allies to be harnessed to undertake operations anywhere is frankly laughable.

The object of the new propaganda campaign being waged by the defeated Farmaajo party and its regional support network against the new HSM administration is neither about accuracy nor historical revisionism. Their ambition is simply to generate a social media feeding frenzy over false allegations and control the narrative about HSM’s visit to Cairo.

Mustafa, Yasin and the Nabad iyo Nolol (the ex-governing party) simply want to foil a closer working relationship between Addis and Mogadishu. And a climate of crisis in bilateral relations allows Mustafa to maintain his grip on the Somali region of Ethiopia. HSM invited the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) leadership to his inauguration; this gave its leaders greater visibility, as well as opportunities for high-profile meetings. As interpreted back in Jijiga, this was a signal that HSM’s government might favour regime change in the Somali regional state.

Two weeks ago, the Somali president attempted to visit Addis Ababa. He was scheduled to visit Addis after his visit to Djibouti, but his team was informed that Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed was not available for a meeting. The reason put forward was technical, a scheduling conflict. But was Abiy’s unavailability meant to be a political message of some kind, perhaps implying some displeasure with HSM’s early foreign policy moves?

HSM’s trip to Cairo should not be seen as an attempt by Mogadishu to spite Abiy. Ironically, Somalia and Ethiopia have cause for anger and wrangling. Abiy might overplay the meaning of HSM’s Cairo visit and frame it as hostile toward Ethiopia. HSM might interpret both Abiy’s unavailability and the conspiratorial narrative of Mustafa Cagjar as intentions to pursue hostile policies toward Somalia.

The HSM administration may find it beneficial to open quick communications with Addis to set the record straight.

The Somali Wire Team

 

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