The Somali Wire

On 26 December 2025, Israel officially became the first country to recognise Somaliland as an independent sovereign state. This decision appears to be connected to the broader geopolitical shifts following the Hamas attack on Israel on 7 October 2023.​ The ensuing conflict saw the Houthis, who control parts of Yemen, launch missiles targeting Israel and disrupt international shipping in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden in solidarity with Hamas.​ This escalation of disturbances in the Red Sea not only poses a significant risk to international oil and merchant shipping but also highlights the increasing integration of the Horn of Africa into the security systems of the Indo-Pacific, the Mediterranean, and the wider Gulf region and Middle East. This integration is driven by intensifying competition for influence over the Red Sea's trade and transit routes. But it is also about competing political visions for the future direction of the Muslim world, between different versions of Islamism and their detractors.

While Villa Somalia and its assorted Arab allies have found success in rallying international opposition to Israel's unilateral recognition of Somaliland last month, it is finding the matter rather more complex at home. In the wake of Israel's bombshell declaration and as Somalilanders took to the streets of Hargeisa to celebrate, protests similarly erupted in Mogadishu, Baidoa, and Dhusamareb in the days after 26 December, with demonstrators waving Palestinian and Somali flags. And yet, while most Somalis are sympathetic to the Palestinian cause, the question of Somaliland recognition-- at least on the political front-- has not rallied the country to the federal government's side.

"Alea iacta est — The die is cast." So spoke Emperor Julius Caesar, before leading his army across the Rubicon to seize power over ancient Rome. Israeli PM Binyamin Netanyahu might have uttered the same words on 26 December 2025, as Israel declared its bombshell recognition of Somaliland, sending a shockwave throughout the region. Framed by Netanyahu as part of the Abraham Accords, Israel's monumental announcement marks the first sovereign state to recognise Somaliland since it declared independence from Somalia in 1991. For a democratic polity that has long battled for a modicum of credit on the global stage, it was little wonder that rapturous celebrations erupted in Hargeisa. But with immediate geopolitical headwinds-- not least motivated by Israel's pariah status for egregious violations of international law in Gaza-- much of the nature of recognition and what comes next has been overshadowed. The work begins now for Somaliland's broader recognition.

To borrow a quote from the Roman author, naturalist, and army commander, Pliny the Elder, "Uncertainty is the only certainty there is", or from the famous unattributed idiom of "in politics, tomorrow is a foreign country." On the eve of 2026, after one of the most torrid years in recent political memory in Somalia, looking ahead to what might come next can be a fool's errand. Nevertheless, it is worth flagging a few of the issues and dates that are likely—or sure—to dominate the coming months for Somalia.

And just like that, 2025 is gradually coming to an end. For Somalia, it has hardly been an uneventful year, but then again, it can rarely be described as 'quiet.' Still, with political jockeying ramping up ahead of the 2026 polls, it is easy to be swept into the maelstrom of news and lose sight of broader trends that have dominated these past months. Principal among them, the centralising, nationalist regime in Mogadishu has pushed Somalia's political settlement ever further towards breaking point, empowering an ascendant Al-Shabaab and setting the stage for a pivotal 2026.

On Tuesday, during a Cabinet meeting, US President Donald Trump launched yet another broadside against Somalia and ethnic Somalis. Referring to Somali immigrants as "garbage," he accused them of "contributing nothing" and "doing nothing but b*tch", saying they should "go back where they came from and fix it." Even for a president infamous for his brashness, these comments are particularly eyewatering.

Tomorrow, 4 December, marks the 31st anniversary of the UN Security Council (UNSC) adopting Resolution 954, which set 31 March 1995 as the deadline for the final withdrawal of UN forces under the United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II). It was a sobering end to the calamitous military intervention in Somalia, with nearly every element of the sprawling, unenforceable mandate left unfulfilled. Flash forward three decades, and the future of today's regional military intervention in Somalia is now in severe doubt, with funding for the African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) still unsourced and Al-Shabaab ascendant on the eve of 2026.

On social media, videos and images of jubilant Jubaland Daraawiish forces celebrating have circulated of late, alongside claims that they were recorded in Jamaame town in Lower Juba. Somali news outlets have similarly declared that Jubaland troops-- backed by Danab special forces-- are now closing in on the town, one of the principal headquarters of Al-Shabaab in southern Somalia. With the broader security auspices across south-central Somalia remaining so grim, it has been gratefully seized upon as some progress against an ascendant Al-Shabaab. Yet much of this is just noise, obscuring the nature of the Kismaayo-directed security operations and airstrikes that have been ongoing since early September in Lower Juba.

In late September, Somaliland's coast guard intercepted a dhow ferrying contraband off the coast of Berbera, arresting two Somali nationals and three Yemenis in the process. But rather than the usual trafficking of arms or migrants through the Gulf of Aden, their cargo was instead 11 cheetah cubs seemingly destined for the Middle East. The animals had been packed into potato sacks, with two of the endangered species dying within 24 hours of being rescued. Tragically, the rescue of these cheetahs-- now in the care of the Cheetah Conservation Fund (CCF)-- was no anomaly, but rather part of a much broader wildlife trafficking crisis.