The Somali government’s culture of corruption – a clear and present danger
Somalia is currently experiencing the worst drought in a generation. President Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud’s (HSM) foremost priorities seem to be the drought and the return of the missing soldiers from Eritrea. While he is right to put these acute crises at the top of his agenda, the chronic quandary of government corruption also poses an existential threat to Somalia’s security, economy, and society. Perhaps because it has existed for decades, with little change, Somalia’s culture of corruption has become entrenched and generally accepted as unavoidable. This has allowed the government to ignore the problem, even as it perpetuates it. Meanwhile, it is increasingly clear that the impunity with which government officials engage in bribery and looting cannot be separated from other afflictions, which corruption tends to aggravate. For example, some of the taxes and donations intended for the neediest Somalis have been siphoned off by unscrupulous government officials.
Government corruption also perpetuates inequality and creates discontent among poor and marginalized people, which sustains violent extremist organisations such as Al-Shabaab. As Austrian Economist Ludwig Mises famously said, “There is no more dangerous menace to civilization than a government of incompetent, corrupt, or vile men.” Government corruption is an endemic, insidious threat that HSM needs to address immediately.
The recent Somali election was the most corrupt, non-transparent, and expensive one in the nation’s recent history. Many of the elected/selected members of parliament (MPs) pledged their votes to the highest bidder – regardless of who they ultimately cast their ballots for. Additionally, most of these MPs hope to become cabinet ministers in the new administration. Similarly, some senators have recently expressed their interest in government posts, claiming that no law prevents them from entering the cabinet, like their counterparts in the lower house of parliament. Farmaajo, in order to avoid accountability and to discourage the legislative body from a no-confidence motion, had selected most of his cabinet ministers from among house MPs. These ministers then double-dipped when it came to salaries and other perks. To form an effective and accountable government, HSM needs to keep three branches of government separate.
The recent hearing of the FGS House of the People (HoP) Finance Sub-Committee and the federal Minister of Finance, Abdirahman Duale Beyle, shed little light on this issue. Instead of directly answering the committee’s questions, Minister Beyle chose to ridicule the deputy speaker of the HoP, Sa’adiya Yasin Samatar, and gave ambiguous answers about loans provided by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) under President Farmaajo. He couldn’t say if the funds were a loan that required repayment or were instead grants. Previously, when Beyle was summoned to the Auditor General’s office, he refused to appear unless the Attorney General went with him. It suggested that he had something to hide. The Auditor General subsequently accused Beyle of knowingly and intentionally hiring three federal employees who were receiving salaries from another federal institution. And not just salaries; they also received various perks from Ministry of Finance programs.
The HoP didn’t receive three of the last five years’ audited budgets and financial statements for both houses of the legislators, but nevertheless approved an unprecedented $918.7 million budget for the forthcoming year. The HoP Financial Sub-Committee needs to investigate the Ministry of Finance and bring to justice anyone found guilty of any criminal acts or intentional and willful misappropriation of government funds or resources, not proceed with ‘business as usual.'
Somalia’s Federal Member States (FMSs) have hardly been immune from the scourge of official corruption, either. For example, last month, the Puntland Ministry of Health realized that it was missing 300 cartons of Plumpy’Nut, a ready-to-use therapeutic food. The intended recipients were children suffering from severe acute malnutrition. But Puntland failed to protect or deliver this essential life-saving food, which may have cost lives. Not one government employee was disciplined, lost their job, or was criminally charged for this heinous crime.
Since some of the Al-Shabab-controlled areas are not accessible to the aid agencies responding to the drought – for obvious security reasons – many relief agencies opt to send money through mobile money remittance services. In HirShabelle state, a recent report suggested that mobile money remittances intended for drought stricken and internally displaced people (IDP) in Mahaday town, Middle Shabelle region, were mismanaged. In Jubaland’s Gedo region, IDPs on the outskirt of Doolow were dying of starvation while the Farmaajo administration was sending in weapons and ammunition to use against the state security forces.
Corruption even seeped into the Ministry of Religion and Endowments during this year’s annual Hajj. The ministry awarded Hajj contracts to travel agents connected to senior ministry officials. This kind of corruption – misusing resources intended to allow Somalis to fulfill one of the five pillars of Islam – shows the depth of moral degradation caused by government corruption. Additionally, Somaliland – with an estimated population over four million – was appropriated only 350 slots out of the 5,206 given to Somalia by Saudi Arabia.Somaliland’s Ministry of Religious Affairs protested against Mogadishu’s action but its complaints were ignored. Somaliland, in response, decided to boycott this year’s Hajj.
In most Somali branches of government, whether at the federal or the state level, the desire for personal and political gain all too often trumps civil servants’ obligations to the citizenry they are supposed to be working for. According to Transparency International’s 2021 Corruption Perceptions Index, Somalia was tied with Syria in second-to-last-place (which, admittedly, was a minor improvement from the year before, when it was tied for last place). Every year, millions of dollars of tax collected from poor people and donor funds for development are misappropriated and looted through any number of corruption schemes: unnecessary travel reimbursements, double-dipping salaries, unbidden procurement practices, and the hiring of well connected family members. HSM and his administration urgently need to tackle the malignant cancer of corruption. An excellent place to start is the selection of the ministerial cabinet and new security sector leadership.
The Somali Wire Team
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Two days of heavy clashes (3–4 June) in the Somali capital, Mogadishu, between federal troops and opposition-aligned forces have underscored both the fragility of the city’s security environment and the volatility of electoral politics. Although relative calm has since returned to the two hardest-hit districts - Hawl Wadaag and Abdiaziz - and mediation efforts have intensified, tensions remain high, fuelling fears of renewed armed skirmishes. Credible reports of mass clan militia mobilisation on the edges of Mogadishu speak to a conflict that is widening. The militarisation of politics and elite fragmentation over the electoral process have shattered a core assumption: that Somali leaders will ultimately step back from the brink to negotiate a way forward. Consequently, the country is entering a perilous phase in which domestic factions alone cannot resolve the impasse, making neutral, external mediation a necessity.
Puntland President Sa'id Abdullah Deni is unofficially in the race for the federal presidency of Somalia. By most accounts, the regional leader is running again and this explains his re-engagement with Mogadishu after a three-year hiatus. Driven by shifting electoral dynamics, Deni’s decision to re-engage with the centre forces him to confront a radically altered political landscape in Mogadishu. Under President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM), the federal government has rewritten the rules of Somali politics, altering the institutional framework and consolidating executive authority.
On 10 May, the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) unilaterally conducted its contentious 'one-person-one-vote' (OPOV) electoral model in South West State (SWS), directly overriding opposition demands for a negotiated, consensus-based framework. Crucially, the very laws underpinning these OPOV elections are themselves deeply contested: the electoral framework was created following a rushed revision of Somalia’s constitution that many federal member states and opposition groups rejected. The vote, exclusively managed by the National Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (NIEBC), saw localised polling in 13 districts and across 126 poll centres and 276 stations. While 376,212 citizens were registered, actual turnout reached 132,430 voters - a participation rate of approximately 35.2% - with 128,276 valid ballots cast and 4,154 deemed spoilt/invalid. The electoral outcome, unsurprisingly, solidified a decisive mandate for Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s Justice and Solidarity Party (JSP); the governing party secured an absolute majority of 51 out of 95 contested legislative seats, comfortably outpacing its closest rival, Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden’s Ururka Horumarka, which claimed 14 seats.
The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) has effectively entered a 'grey transition' - a deeply fraught and hotly-contested interregnum that could upend decades of state-building and foment greater instability. By utilising the March 2026 constitutional amendments to extend his presidential mandate until May 2027, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) has effectively plunged the fragile Horn of Africa state into a profound period of severe internal strain and legitimacy crisis. This legalistic manoeuvre has roiled domestic politics and put Western partners of Somalia in a difficult spot. If Somalia's Western allies concede to HSM's fait accompli without extracting concessions from him on a negotiated settlement, they are likely to embolden Hassan Sheikh.
Somalia is entering one of the most dangerous political periods in its recent history. An unprecedented convergence of unresolved constitutional disputes, contested electoral arrangements, rising tensions between federal and regional actors, and the growing politicisation of state security institutions has pushed the country towards a potentially destabilising impasse.
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