Turkey and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) are rekindling diplomatic relations after over a decade of rivalry driven by their opposing stances on the Arab Spring and political Islam. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s recent visit to the UAE signals a strategic pivot as both nations seek mutual economic and geopolitical benefits. The two sides signed 13 cooperation agreements, with the UAE pledging $5 billion in support for Turkey’s ailing economy and promising $50 billion in future investments. This diplomatic thaw carries significant implications for the Horn of Africa. Both nations hold strong stakes in Ethiopia and Somalia, where their competing interests have previously fueled instability. While the détente raises hopes for greater cooperation in supporting post-conflict reconstruction in Ethiopia and infrastructure development in Somalia, the renewed partnership also risks intensifying rivalries with other regional players, such as Qatar.
Somalia’s capital Mogadishu witnessed a night of intense violence as Al‑Shabaab militants carried out multiple coordinated attacks across at least six locations between 1am and 5am. The primary target was Kaxda police station, which was hit by a VBIED and overrun, leaving the compound flattened and vehicles seized. Simultaneous mortar strikes hit Dar us Salaam, Hawa Abdi, Sinka Dheer, Ceelasha Biyaha, and Carbiska in Dayniile, disrupting reinforcements and creating widespread panic. Analysts suggest the assault was aimed at intimidating key clans, particularly the Sheekhal, amid tense political manoeuvring tied to Somalia’s disputed elections. Dayniile, long an Al‑Shabaab stronghold, remains under heavy militant influence, with the group deeply entrenched in Mogadishu’s political and economic life. The attacks highlight Al‑Shabaab’s growing strength, their control over strategic districts, and their ability to tax businesses, provide local justice, and stage cross‑border operations into Kenya. In rural regions such as Bay, Bakool, and Galguduud, militants have regained territory amid political fragmentation and the sidelining of local anti‑Al‑Shabaab forces like ASWJ. The escalation raises urgent questions over Somalia’s security strategy, the effectiveness of the Somalia Transition Plan (STP), and the future role of AU forces under ATMIS as the country’s security crisis deepens.
Radio has always been the heartbeat of communication in Somalia, blending perfectly with the country’s rich oral traditions and nomadic culture. From colonial-era broadcasts to the golden age under Siad Barre, radio has shaped Somali history, culture, and politics. Iconic stations such as Radio Mogadishu, BBC Somali Service, and VOA Somali Service have informed and connected millions across the Horn of Africa, while ideological outlets like Radio Andalus continue to influence communities. Affordable, portable, and accessible, radio remains the most trusted and widespread medium in Somalia, reaching even the most remote rural areas. One radio set often serves many listeners, making it a shared social experience. Over the decades, radio has been used for cultural preservation, political mobilization, and even international propaganda during the Cold War. In today’s digital age, FM and online streaming have given Somali radio a new life, attracting both older audiences and tech-savvy youth. Despite competition from television, social media, and online news, radio continues to hold its place as Somalia’s primary source of information, entertainment, and cultural storytelling. Discover how radio remains the most enduring and influential communication channel in Somali society.
Somalia’s already discredited parliamentary elections in Galmudug took another dark turn as evidence emerged of a plot to block progressive politician Abdirahman Abdishakur from winning a seat, while paving the way for Abdullahi “Kulane” Jiis a close ally of outgoing President Farmaajo and Fahad Yasin. The scheme aimed to kill two birds with one stone: deny Abdishakur victory and secure parliamentary immunity for regime loyalists implicated in political assassinations and human rights abuses. The Federal Election Implementation Team (FEIT) attempted to position a female candidate, Naimo Hussein Ali, against Abdishakur to exploit the women’s quota and sideline him. Fortunately, Abdishakur won decisively. This strategy was part of a broader Farmaajo plan to move loyal security figures, such as Yasin Farey, acting NISA head and linked to the murder of agent Ikraan Tahliil, into parliamentary seats, shielding them from prosecution while using them to influence the presidential vote.
This week marks one year since outgoing Somali President Mohammed Abdullahi Farmaajo seized an illegal extension of power, defying the constitution and halting the relatively peaceful electoral transitions Somalia had maintained since 2000. His tenure, especially this past year, has been marked by political paralysis, deepening divisions, and dangerous instability. Farmaajo’s rift with Prime Minister Mohammed Hussein Roble fractured the federal government, leaving many regions vulnerable to Al-Shabaab’s resurgence. The jihadist group now operates a shadow government more effective than the Federal Government of Somalia, taxing, providing services, and building loyalty even in nominally government-held areas. Somalia’s foreign policy has become erratic, dialogue with Somaliland is stalled, and the overdue electoral process is mired in irregularities and fraud. Known for his reclusive style, Farmaajo avoids media engagement, often communicating through cryptic Facebook posts that heighten political uncertainty. His social and political missteps such as his cold behavior at a state funeral have raised concerns about his temperament and fitness for leadership. Farmaajo’s presidency, once billed as a strongman’s bid to restore Somali unity, has instead delivered heightened instability, failed governance, and a leadership crisis that threatens the country’s fragile political fabric.
Expired and substandard goods are a common sight in Somali markets and supermarkets, with many traders importing products close to or past their expiry dates to maximize profit. Without effective regulation, low-quality medicines, food, electronics, vehicles, and construction materials flood the market, endangering public health and stifling local production. Although the Somali Bureau of Standards (SoBS) was established in 2020 to oversee quality control, it functions largely as a symbolic institution, offering little real enforcement. Cheap, substandard imports undercut honest traders and drive local farmers and producers out of business. The prevalence of low-quality medicines from abroad has been linked to widespread multi-drug-resistant bacteria, while expired or unsafe food imports contribute to a rise in chronic illnesses such as diabetes, hypertension, and cancer. In the automotive sector, outdated right-hand-drive vehicles dominate the market, despite Somalia’s left-hand-drive traffic rules, while counterfeit electronics labeled as global brands flood shops.
Somalis have long been known as a “nation of poets,” a term popularized by 19th-century English explorer Richard Francis Burton. Oral literature, orature, remains central to Somali culture, shaping history, identity, and political discourse. Poetry, theatrical songs, and proverbs carry deep social and political influence, capable of mobilizing communities toward war or peace. The respected words of skilled poets are highly valued, and their oratorical skill is seen as a measure of intellect and leadership. Anthropologist I.M. Lewis documented how poetry has historically fueled both revenge and reconciliation, reflecting its dual role in Somali society. One striking example of poetic influence is the Guba chain of poems in the 1930s, rooted in the aftermath of the Daraawiish defeat by British forces and the Issaq clan’s rise. Ali Dhuh, a prominent poet, celebrated the Issaq victory, prompting Qaman Bulhan, a fellow Daarood poet, to accuse him of “pastoral hypocrisy” – inflaming clan rivalries while ignoring shared Islamic values. Qaman’s response urged peace, condemning hypocrisy and violence against fellow Muslims. His poem, rich in Somali proverbs, became a timeless lesson in the dangers of inflammatory rhetoric, illustrating how poetry remains a potent force in Somali cultural and political life.
Somalia’s tourism sector has long been treated as a global punchline, typified by a 2004 Economist article mocking the idea of visiting the country. War tourism operators occasionally cater to thrill-seekers, offering heavily guarded tours of Mogadishu’s Lido Beach, Bakara Market, and Daljirka Dahsoon. Even U.S. military figures such as Lt. Gen. Scott Miller have ventured back as “tourists” to revisit sites tied to Somalia’s turbulent history. In contrast, Somaliland enjoys a modest but steady trickle of foreign visitors, thanks to greater stability, attractions like the Laas Geel cave paintings, Hargeisa’s war memorial, and the Hargeysa International Book Fair. However, the mandatory Special Police Unit escort for non-diaspora tourists adds cost and complexity, undermining its image as a safe destination. While there is no official tourism data for Somalia or Somaliland, the potential is vast, with pristine beaches, rich cultural traditions, and emerging hospitality infrastructure in cities like Kismayo, Garowe, and Baidoa. Still, Al-Shabaab’s dominance over rural areas keeps overland tourism unsafe. For now, diaspora-driven travel remains the primary driver of investment in hotels, restaurants, and aviation. With time, improved security could transform Somalia from a perceived war zone into a niche destination for adventurous travelers and cultural explorers.
At the African Union (AU) summit in Addis Ababa, outgoing Somali President Mohammed Abdullahi Farmaajo relished the opportunity for visibility, delivering a speech touting Somalia’s readiness to take over security from AMISOM by 2023 and claiming a clean electoral process, despite evidence to the contrary. Side meetings revealed the real dynamics. Ethiopian PM Abiy Ahmed granted Farmaajo only a brief audience, signaling limited engagement, while Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta avoided a meeting altogether due to years of strained relations. Somali Foreign Minister Abdisaid Muse failed in his push to include language in the final AU communiqué calling for the lifting of the UN arms embargo. Meanwhile, a major summit controversy erupted over Israel’s bid for AU observer status, a push backed by Abiy but strongly opposed by Algeria and South Africa, dominating the proceedings and revealing deep divisions within the AU. Other diplomatic frictions included a controversial AU Peace and Security Council statement praising Eritrea’s regional “contribution.” The summit reaffirmed the AU’s nature as a club of entrenched leaders who protect the status quo. For Farmaajo, it was a reminder that such forums offer more symbolism than substance while allowing him to position himself comfortably among Africa’s authoritarian elite.
Mogadishu, Somalia’s capital, faces numerous challenges, from insecurity and flooding to a rising cost of living. Yet one of its most persistent problems is unmanaged waste. Trash lines the streets, washes into the sea, and fills unmanaged landfills, creating serious public health hazards. Despite the Banadir Regional Authority’s claims of encouraging responsible waste management, the scale of the problem has overwhelmed its capacity. Garbage collection is mostly left to private companies, many of which engage in harmful dumping practices to cut costs, often due to extortion from armed groups and government forces. The city’s only two landfills are already overflowing, contributing to foul air, water contamination, and disease outbreaks such as cholera and malaria. Political patronage worsens the crisis, as Mogadishu’s mayor and deputies are appointed for loyalty, not competence, leaving no real legislation or enforcement on waste management. Corruption, lack of oversight, and rent-seeking prevent effective solutions, while donor interest is minimal unless waste problems affect them directly. With an estimated 2,500 metric tons of garbage generated daily, Mogadishu urgently needs elected leadership, strong institutions, and laws to address its waste crisis. Without decisive action, poor waste management will continue to threaten health, the environment, and urban development.
The global balance of power is shifting toward a new era, the Age of Middle Powers. Rising states in the Middle East and Asia are increasingly projecting military and political influence far beyond their borders, reshaping geopolitics in regions like the Horn of Africa. Turkey’s deployment of combat drones to Ethiopia during the Tigray conflict demonstrated how advanced military capabilities, once limited to superpowers, are now accessible to more states. This “democratization” of high-tech warfare risks fueling arms races and destabilizing fragile regions.
On 8 January, outgoing President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo deployed around 100 federal troops, mainly Turkish-trained Gorgor and Haram’ad paramilitary units, to Beledweyne in Hiiraan region. This move came shortly after HirShabelle President Ali Guudlaawe met with Farmaajo in Mogadishu. Beledweyne is historically volatile, prone to clan conflict, flooding, and political unrest. Critics argue the deployment was politically motivated to disrupt elections and undermine caretaker Prime Minister Mohamed Hussein Roble. Roble, the Minister of Security, and the cabinet were not consulted, violating the National Consultative Council’s agreement. Local leaders believe the move aims to influence the election of 25 Lower House seats in Beledweyne, possibly to benefit Farmaajo allies such as his security advisor Fahad Yasin. The situation is complicated by long-standing clan grievances stemming from the 2020 election of Guudlaawe, an Abgaal, to the HirShabelle presidency, breaking a power-sharing pact that allocated the position to the Hawadle. The troop deployment has heightened fears of violence similar to the 2021 clashes in Guriel, with Hiiraan leaders warning of displacement and insecurity. The troops report directly to Farmaajo rather than the official military chain of command, raising concerns that this is part of a broader effort to consolidate power outside legal structures.
The global balance of power is shifting toward a new era, the Age of Middle Powers. Rising states in the Middle East and Asia are increasingly projecting military and political influence far beyond their borders, reshaping geopolitics in regions like the Horn of Africa. Turkey’s deployment of combat drones to Ethiopia during the Tigray conflict demonstrated how advanced military capabilities, once limited to superpowers, are now accessible to more states.
In December 2021, the UN Security Council extended the mandates of international naval missions combating piracy off Somalia’s coast including Operation Atalanta, Combined Task Force 151, and NATO’s Operation Ocean Shield but only for three months. Somalia’s UN envoy argued piracy has been absent for over four years and suggested it was time to end these missions. However, this overlooks a pressing maritime threat: illicit arms trafficking. Multiple U.S. Navy interdictions in 2021 and early 2022 seized fishing vessels and dhows carrying thousands of weapons, including rocket launchers, machine guns, and explosives precursors like urea fertilizer.
AFRICOM has declared Somalia’s Al-Shabaab as al-Qaida’s largest, wealthiest, and most active global affiliate, attributing its growing power to reduced counterterrorism pressure and political dysfunction. In response, Somalia’s Federal Government (FGS) and the African Union (AU) unveiled the African Union Transitional Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), a rebranded version of AMISOM, aiming to defeat Al-Shabaab within two years. ATMIS proposes intensified offensive operations, advanced weaponry, and greater security responsibilities for Somali forces. However, critics argue the plan rests on unrealistic assumptions, ignoring Somalia’s deep political divisions and the FGS’s track record of deploying elite forces for political repression rather than counterterrorism.
Bakaara Market, Mogadishu’s economic heart, has survived decades of state collapse, warlord rule, and civil war through resilience and pragmatic adaptation. For years, traders focused solely on securing their businesses, paying “taxes” to whichever group held power. Today, however, that survival model is under extreme pressure. Traders now face simultaneous extortion from four entities: Somalia’s Federal Government (FGS), Al-Shabaab, the Islamic State (IS), and the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA). Recently, IS, notorious for brutal executions, has entered Mogadishu’s taxation racket, forcing businesses to pay hefty fees or face violent retribution. Several major importers and wholesalers have already been ordered to close for non-payment.
Ahmed Abdi Kariye “Qoorqoor” became president of Galmudug in February 2020 after a contested election, raising cautious hopes for reconciliation and stability. Those hopes quickly faded. Qoorqoor’s administration clashed with the Sufi militia Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama (ASWJ), a key force against Al-Shabaab, dissolving it and forcing its leaders into exile. This left communities vulnerable, and Al-Shabaab seized the opportunity to expand across Galmudug, cutting key roads, extorting airlines, and encroaching on Dhusamareeb. Poorly planned military campaigns failed to halt the militants, as government forces lacked leadership, supplies, and strategy.
Over the past decade, Turkey has emerged as one of Somalia’s most influential international partners. What began as humanitarian assistance during the 2011 famine evolved into a multifaceted relationship driven by trade, education, health, and strategic investments. Turkey has become Somalia’s largest diplomatic and commercial partner, opening its biggest embassy in Mogadishu and managing the city’s airport and port through Turkish conglomerates. Turkish products, medical services, and education opportunities are widely favored by Somalis, helping Turkey cultivate soft power and goodwill. However, this deepening relationship is not without criticism. While Somali imports from Turkey reached nearly $273 million in 2020, exports to Turkey were under $5 million, signaling a stark trade imbalance. Critics argue that Turkish companies like Albayrak and Favori LLC have reaped massive profits, with Somalia reportedly losing billions in potential revenue. Some view Turkey’s involvement in Somali politics particularly its support for ex-President Farmaajo as prioritizing regime stability over democratic progress.
Somalia’s Council of Ministers has officially reversed the 2017 decision by then President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo to classify the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) as a terrorist organization. The original designation was widely seen as political cover for the controversial extradition of ONLF commander Abdikarim Muse “Qalbi Dhagax” to Ethiopia an act that badly damaged Farmaajo’s image as a pan-Somali nationalist. Prime Minister Mohamed Hussein Roble, who met Qalbi Dhagax in 2020 to apologize for his extradition and the ban, led the push to rescind the designation, calling it “meaningless and detestable.”
Former Somali intelligence chief Fahad Yasin recently published a self-congratulatory op-ed touting his tenure at NISA as a period of modernization and restored capability. While he expanded the agency’s reach, recruited more agents, and strengthened military intelligence units, critics argue these upgrades primarily served Villa Somalia’s political agenda rather than national security. NISA’s armed units, often loyal to Fahad, were deployed to intimidate opposition figures, seize control of key installations, and operate with impunity. Under his leadership, NISA controversially recruited ex-Al-Shabaab operatives without thorough vetting, integrated extremists into senior positions, and implemented questionable “counter-infiltration” strategies that failed to weaken the insurgency.