The rise of Mogadishu’s street gangs
In the late 1980s, Mogadishu witnessed the rise of one of the most fearsome street gangs, Ciyaal Faay Ali (The Children of Faay Ali). Faay Ali was a single mother who used to hustle to raise her nine children in Mogadishu’s Wadajir district. One street near her house was where the gang members met up and hung out. They gained notoriety as a result of the violence they occasionally meted out to unfortunate victims around Mogadishu. Many Mogadishu residents were seized with fear and gangs such as Ciyaal Faay Ali became a household topic.
At the same time, government services were becoming more and more erratic; in some cases, they ceased to function entirely as civil war loomed in Mogadishu. The police and other security agencies responsible for public safety no longer performed their more routine tasks, including basic foot patrols intended to deter opportunistic criminal activity. But, after civil war broke out in Mogadishu, the violence perpetrated by adults quickly subsumed the comparatively minor violence of a youth gang.
Thirty years later, Mogadishu is experiencing a similar wave of violence from well armed and well-organised gangs. Unlike the Faay Ali group, the current problem of youth gangs involves not just one but several gangs preying upon people across the city. Gang members have murdered, raped, and robbed innocent victims, who are struggling with other forms of insecurity. Most of the attacks occur at night, when people are rushing back home from work or school. That also happens to be when gang members are most likely to be high on drugs or drunk on alcohol.
The gangs emerged in early 2021. Initially, they were small groups of thugs who terrorized tuk-tuk (locally called bajaj) passengers in Mogadishu’s streets. They would rob people of whatever valuables they had on hand, such as electronics and money. The potential to make money through petty robbery attracted more criminals, who were recruited into the gangs. It drew the attention of drug dealers and purveyors of illicit alcohol. Gang members started abusing Tramadol and other painkillers. Meanwhile, Somali security forces have reacted to the situation, but in a counterintuitive way: rogue police officers are reportedly renting out their weapons to the gangs and demanding a share of the proceeds.
As the gangs developed more cohesive identities, they have been fighting each other over territory. Given the volatile mix of violence, drug abuse, and access to more lethal weapons such as firearms, the gangs have quickly moved on from armed robbery to murder and rape.
In the wake of public pressure, the police have since late 2021 been conducting security operations against the gangs, mainly rounding up members and shortly releasing them. Despite the police parading arrested gang members before the media, the suspects are quickly freed before they face trial, most likely after bribing their way out.
As the risk of being robbed at gunpoint – or worse – increases, richer residents have started moving to safer neighbourhoods. The gang violence and criminality are driven by several factors: a youth bulge, economic pressures as the cost of living surges, widespread availability of weapons, corruption (especially within the police and the judiciary), and drug abuse. Somalia’s population is estimated at close to 18 million, and 70% of the total population is youth. A recent survey by Iftin Foundation, a Somali non profit focused on access to education, surveyed 52 universities from 11 towns in Somalia and recorded more than 17,000 graduates. Similarly, in 2020, the Federal Ministry of Education, Culture and Higher Education reported that more than 33,000 students had completed secondary school learning across the country. Unfortunately, all these students will not have a ready job to absorb their skills. They remain susceptible to terrorist recruitment and induction into gangs.
According to the World Bank, Somalia’s unemployment rate is more than 25% as of 2021. Many young people are migrating to the West, Southern Africa, and the Middle East to seek a better life and employment. Those unable to get a job or travel outside Somalia will remain behind staring at a bleak future. This is likely to drive frustration among them, forcing them to use violence in a bid to escape poverty.
Narcotics of all types are also easily available in every corner of Mogadishu. One of these, hash, usually arrives from the Lower and Middle Shabelle regions, hidden in vehicles transporting fruits and vegetables. Other drugs, mainly synthetic, are imported as pharmaceuticals. There is no age limit or restrictions on buying medicine in Somalia, making drugs easily available to users.
Time for the new government to address the root causes of crime rather than the symptoms is now. An immediate grassroots campaign against substance abuse and violence is essential to help deal with the problem from the bottom up. Job creation, especially for youth, has the potential of dimming the lure of instant prosperity offered by gangs.
Hours after parliament gave him 10 more days to finalise his new cabinet, Prime Minister Hamza Abdi Barre early this week met youth representatives as part his political consultations. The issue of unemployment was reportedly one of the subjects for discussion. Barre has promised to lead a team that meets the aspirations of the Somali people. He now has the insight of what youth want. If he fails to take tentative steps to meet their expectations, the Prime Minister could soon realise that delays in forming a new cabinet are the least of his worries.
The Somali Wire Team
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