Somali police have intercepted a major shipment of imported prescription opioids at Mogadishu’s Aden Adde International Airport, heightening concerns about rising youth addiction in urban areas. The seized drugs included Tramadol, Pethidine, Pregabalin, and Codeine. Authorities have arrested the importers for interrogation. Drug abuse has long been a challenge in Somalia, with the 1990s marked by widespread misuse of tranquilizers like Rohypnol and Valium, leading to what became known as the “zombie generation.” Today, the growing prevalence of heroin‑based painkillers mirrors that crisis, with soldiers, police officers, and youth among the most affected. Experts link the addiction surge to conflict trauma, unemployment, lack of recreational outlets, and the collapse of Somalia’s cultural scene. Mogadishu’s nightlife is virtually non‑existent, cinemas remain closed due to conservative bans, and public spaces for art, music, and leisure are scarce. Some suggest that recent anti‑khat campaigns may be pushing youth toward more dangerous drugs. Social media is awash with accounts of opioid‑linked deaths, sexual assaults, and criminal behavior. Tackling the crisis will require restricting drug imports, enforcing strict anti‑trafficking laws, raising public awareness, and revitalizing youth engagement through arts, culture, and sports. Without urgent intervention, Somalia risks facing another generation lost to addiction.
The fall of Adan Yabaal in Middle Shabelle marks a major milestone in Somalia’s fight against Al‑Shabaab. After over a decade under militant control, Somali National Army (SNA) troops, supported by Ma’awiisley fighters from Hiiraan and Galgaduud and Daraawish forces from Hirshabelle, liberated the town. Al‑Shabaab’s withdrawal was swift, with militants reportedly taking nearly 1,000 civilians as human shields. Adan Yabaal served as a critical hub for the jihadists, hosting their largest medical facility, a bomb‑making and IED training center, and a strategic logistics base for attacks on Mogadishu. Its loss significantly disrupts Al‑Shabaab’s operations and strengthens government control over vital north‑south routes. President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud hailed the liberation as a decisive blow, though experts caution that holding the town will be challenging. Dense vegetation, favorable terrain for militants, and insufficient local security forces create risks of counter‑attacks. The government’s newly launched national stabilisation plan aims to provide basic services, quick impact projects, and long‑term infrastructure in recovered areas. Donor engagement will be critical to sustaining gains. Without coordinated planning, adequate hold forces, and realistic promises, the victory at Adan Yabaal could be difficult to maintain in the long run, despite its strategic and symbolic importance.
The contest between Sufi and Salafi interpretations of Islam in Somalia is not a recent phenomenon but a centuries‑old struggle between local traditions and imported ideologies. In the 19th century, reformist militants in Bardheere, influenced by Wahhabi thought, sought to ban Sufi rituals, saint veneration, and certain trades. Their rise ended when Sultan of Geledi’s forces destroyed their settlement. Similar ideological clashes resurfaced in the early 20th century with the rivalry between the Salihiya and Qadiriya Sufi orders, leading to the assassination of Sheikh Awes M. al‑Barawi. Colonial administrations, while attempting to modernise education, co‑opted the Sufi establishment through mosque funding and religious patronage. These historical encounters reveal a recurring pattern: local Somali Islamic practices have often prevailed over foreign‑inspired reforms. Today, Salafi‑influenced groups, including Al‑Shabaab, wield far greater resources and media influence than their historical predecessors. While many Somalis reject militant extremism, Salafi‑backed networks often provide more effective services than the federal government, attracting disillusioned youth. The challenge lies in strengthening moderate Islamic voices without associating them too closely with Western political agendas, which risk alienating the very communities they aim to support. This enduring struggle continues to shape Somalia’s religious, political, and social landscape.
Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) has stepped up his frontline engagement, visiting Galmudug and Hirshabelle to show support for the Ma’awiisley campaign against Al‑Shabaab. In a speech at newly liberated Baxdo, HSM emphasized Somalia’s Shafi’i and Ahlu Sunnah wal Jama’ah traditions, challenging the Wahhabi influence that has grown since the 1970s. Shafi’ism, historically dominant in Somalia, blended naturally with Sufi beliefs, promoting pluralism and inclusivity. Wahhabism, in contrast, has pushed a puritanical, exclusivist vision, fueling tensions with Somalia’s Sufi communities. HSM’s stance reflects a broader push for “moderate Islam,” supported by key appointments such as Mukhtar Robow as counterterrorism czar and Farah Abdulqadir as Minister of Education, tasked with reforming Islamic education. This ideological campaign runs parallel to the military offensive against Al‑Shabaab, which sees moderate Islam as a direct threat. While ideological pushback is gaining momentum, tangible reform in education, mosque governance, and legislation will be essential. Moderating Somalia’s religious discourse will be a generational effort requiring constitutional safeguards to protect diversity. By promoting a non‑sectarian Islamic identity, HSM aims to foster a more tolerant and stable Somalia, breaking decades of ambivalence toward extremist narratives.
In early November, Al‑Shabaab launched two successful assaults on Qayib, a village in Somalia’s Galgaduud region, within just 17 days. The militants overran Somali National Army (SNA) and Ma’awisley militia positions, seizing weapons, vehicles, and other resources before retreating. Similar tactics were used weeks earlier in Yasoman, Hiiraan region, where Al‑Shabaab ambushed reinforcements sent to reclaim lost positions. These hit‑and‑run raids reveal gaps in the government’s operational strategy, as forces remain focused on holding towns while leaving rural areas and supply routes vulnerable. Without secure supply lines, recently liberated areas risk falling back under militant control, eroding public trust. Analysts warn that to counter this, the SNA and Ma’awisley must increase mobility, leverage local terrain knowledge, and pursue retreating militants to disrupt future attacks. Al‑Shabaab avoids direct confrontation, preferring to overstretch and exhaust government forces. Opening multiple offensive fronts could force the group to concentrate only on its strongholds, such as Jilib. Intelligence‑driven planning, clear objectives, troop rotation, and sustained pressure are key to preventing Al‑Shabaab from regaining momentum. Without a shift in strategy, these recurrent rural offensives could undermine Somalia’s broader counterterrorism gains.
Somaliland is entering a critical political phase as President Muse Bihi’s five-year mandate nears its end and opposition parties reject a two-year term extension as unconstitutional. By December 26, the 10-year licenses of the three official political parties will expire, creating a rare “no-party” democracy. The constitution allows only three political parties, determined every decade through competition among political associations. This year, 12 associations are set to compete, potentially ending the dominance of Kulmiye, Waddani, and UCID, which have long been tied to specific clan interests. The shift could open the door for leaders from underrepresented clans such as the Dhulbahante and Gadabursi, as well as the first woman-led political association in Somaliland. While this presents a unique opportunity to expand political pluralism and reinvigorate democracy, it also poses risks. Without comprehensive electoral reform, the new political landscape could replicate the stagnation and clan-driven politics of the past decade. The National Electoral Commission plans voter registration and possibly presidential elections in 2023, but legal clarity and sequencing remain uncertain. The outcome of this transition will determine whether Somaliland strengthens its democratic institutions or continues under entrenched political patterns.
The COP27 climate summit in Sharm el-Sheikh ended with the creation of a landmark ‘loss and damage’ fund to compensate vulnerable nations for climate-induced disasters. While this represents progress, the conference made little headway on curbing global warming, echoing the limited results of past COP summits such as COP26. Somalia and other developing nations continue to face the harshest impacts of climate change despite contributing the least to global emissions. The Horn of Africa is enduring its worst drought in 40 years, a crisis that underscores the urgency for meaningful climate action. Somalia lacks the resources, technology, and infrastructure to adapt, making international cooperation critical. Yet political divisions, slow implementation of resolutions, and inadequate global commitments continue to hinder progress.
Sexual and Gender-Based Violence (SGBV) remains a serious challenge in Kenya and across the Horn of Africa, where weak justice and healthcare systems limit survivors’ access to justice. In Kenya, 45% of women aged 15 to 49 have experienced physical or sexual violence, while in Somalia, decades of conflict have worsened vulnerability to abuse. Two major gaps hinder progress: the lack of robust forensic investigation and the absence of a strong healthcare ecosystem to support justice processes. Forensic services are vital for securing, analysing, and presenting evidence that can stand in court. However, most SGBV interventions focus heavily on reproductive health, leaving forensic healthcare underfunded. This imbalance reduces the ability of courts to prosecute offenders effectively and undermines survivors’ trust in the justice system. A functional forensic healthcare delivery system could strengthen criminal investigations, empower survivors, and contribute to better governance. This requires trained forensic practitioners who understand SGBV ethics, can operate professionally in crime scenes, and can testify as credible expert witnesses. By investing in forensic capacity, Kenya and the Horn of Africa can address SGBV more effectively and tackle wider human rights violations, ensuring justice is both fair and accessible.
Since the collapse of Somalia’s central government in 1991, access to justice has been a major challenge, leaving a vacuum that Al-Shabaab has exploited. The militant group operates shadow Islamic courts in territories under its control, ruling on land disputes, contracts and criminal cases. These tribunals are perceived by many Somalis as faster, cheaper and less corrupt than official government courts. While government judicial systems often suffer from delays, backlogs and high legal costs, Al-Shabaab’s courts are accessible, free to file cases and enforce rulings swiftly, albeit under a harsh interpretation of Sharia law. Their perceived impartiality, even toward minority clans, has helped them gain acceptance in some government-controlled areas and even among diaspora communities. In contrast, Somalia’s official judiciary is plagued by corruption, political interference and lack of enforcement capacity. Many Somalis, especially in rural areas, turn to Al-Shabaab’s system for swift resolutions. To counter this influence, Somalia’s federal government must reform its judiciary to be transparent, efficient and accessible. Eliminating reliance on militant courts will require significant investment, professional training and a renewed commitment to justice that serves all Somalis equally.
At COP27 in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud delivered a compelling message on the urgent need for global action to combat climate change. Representing one of the world’s most climate-vulnerable nations, he highlighted the devastating impacts of prolonged droughts, famine risk, and resource depletion in Somalia. Despite contributing minimally to global greenhouse gas emissions, Somalia faces rising temperatures projected to reach up to 4°C by 2080, threatening its agrarian and pastoralist livelihoods. President Hassan Sheikh unveiled Somalia’s first Ministry of Environment and Climate Change and launched the Green Somalia Initiative, aiming to plant 10 million trees. He called for industrialized nations to take responsibility for “loss and damage” costs, arguing that those who have benefited most from fossil fuels must assist countries bearing the brunt of climate impacts. While binding agreements on loss and damage remain deferred until 2024, the president emphasized renewable energy opportunities, noting Somalia’s vast solar and wind potential. With only 0.6% of global renewable investment reaching Africa in 2021, Hassan Sheikh urged for greater technology transfer and funding. The outcome of COP27 could shape Somalia’s resilience, energy independence, and fight against climate-driven instability.
Somalia’s security transition under the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) echoes NATO’s experience in Afghanistan, raising concerns about long-term stability. The ATMIS mandate focuses on developing Somali forces and supporting “clear, hold, build” strategies, but history warns of the risks of oversimplifying security reform. In Afghanistan, attempts to create integrated national forces failed in a society where security is inherently local. Somalia faces similar challenges, with clan affiliations dominating politics and security structures. Special forces like Danab and Gorgor have achieved successes, but regular forces lack sustainability without foreign support. As ATMIS prepares to withdraw, experts suggest embracing local realities by formally integrating effective clan militias into Somalia’s security framework. These groups, such as the Ma’awiisley in Hiiraan and Galmudug, have shown strong motivation in fighting Al-Shabaab, driven by existential threats to their communities. A formal mechanism could link these militias to the federal and state governments, enabling rapid mobilization against extremists while reducing reliance on unsustainable national forces. Proper oversight would be essential to prevent inter-clan violence and misuse of arms. Learning from Afghanistan’s failures, Somalia’s security future may depend on blending formal structures with traditional, community-based defense systems.
In 2018, Somalia, Ethiopia, and Eritrea signed a tri‑partite agreement to promote regional peace and security, including a covert plan to send Somali recruits to Eritrea for military training. The National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) oversaw the program, luring thousands of young men with false promises of lucrative, risk‑free work in Qatar for the 2022 FIFA World Cup. Instead, recruits were flown to Eritrea, where they endured harsh conditions, forced labor, and in some cases, deployment to fight in Ethiopia’s Tigray conflict, with reports of heavy casualties. The Somali government denied the program’s existence until outgoing President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo admitted in 2022 that 5,000 recruits had been sent abroad. Since then, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has made repeated trips to Eritrea, promising to bring the soldiers home, but none have returned. Rumors of ransom demands, alleged Qatari funding withdrawals, and ongoing “advanced training” have fueled speculation that the soldiers are effectively hostages. Their eventual return will require significant resources for reintegration, psychological care, and back pay. Meanwhile, families demand transparency, and calls grow for a parliamentary investigation to hold those responsible accountable for one of Somalia’s most troubling military scandals in years.
The recent US mid-term elections highlighted the growing influence of Somali-American women in politics, a phenomenon often referred to as the “Somali wave.” Out of around 40 Somali-Americans elected to various offices, eight were women, many wearing the hijab. Ilhan Omar, re-elected to Congress for a third term, remains the most prominent figure, alongside leaders like Deqa Dhalac, mayor of South Portland, Maine, and newly elected state legislator Mana Abdi. These women serve as powerful role models, inspiring younger Somali and Muslim women to enter public service. Their rise reflects not only personal determination but also the strong, organised nature of Somali diaspora communities, which have leveraged their voting power, fundraising ability, and solidarity to gain political representation. This growing political presence challenges patriarchal traditions and the dominance of conservative clerics within the diaspora, while also showing that Islam and liberal democratic values can coexist. For many Somali-American women, wearing the hijab is not a barrier but a symbol of empowerment, blending faith with modern leadership. The Somali wave signals a cultural and political shift, encouraging a new generation of Somali women to aim for leadership roles in the US, Somalia, and beyond.
The growing political influence of Somali-American women is transforming representation for Muslim women in the United States. In the 2022 midterm elections, nearly 40 Somali-Americans were elected to various offices, including eight women, a record 20 percent. Among them, Ilhan Omar, re‑elected for a third term in Congress, remains the most high-profile figure, joined by leaders like Deqa Dhalac, re‑elected as mayor of South Portland, Maine, and Mana Abdi, newly elected to the Maine state legislature. These victories reflect a strong, organized Somali diaspora community with deep networks of solidarity, grassroots mobilization, and fundraising power. Many of these women wear the hijab proudly, challenging outdated notions that it is a barrier to public service. Their political rise also marks a cultural shift within the diaspora, as more Somali women delay marriage, pursue careers, and challenge patriarchal norms while staying true to their Islamic faith. Their achievements echo Somalia’s own history of strong, trailblazing women and serve as powerful role models for young Somali girls. This “Somali wave” is a turning point for Muslim women’s representation in politics, inspiring future leaders both in the US and globally.
On 29 October 2022, Mogadishu suffered its second‑deadliest terrorist attack when twin car bombs exploded at KM5, Zoobe Junction, killing over 100 people and wounding more than 300. Al‑Shabaab claimed responsibility, underscoring the group’s enduring ability to strike Somalia’s capital despite heavy security presence. With a population of 2.5 million, Mogadishu is Somalia’s political and economic hub — and a prime target for Al‑Shabaab. The city hosts key government institutions, ATMIS forces, and international missions. Yet over 166 IED incidents have occurred since 2020, aided by gaps in coordination among the 18,000 security personnel deployed in the capital. Experts urge a unified approach, including a Joint Command Centre to improve intelligence‑sharing, coordinated planning, and trust between federal, regional, and municipal security agencies. Complementary grassroots measures — such as a “know your neighbour” registration campaign, national ID rollout, and democratic district councils — could enhance situational awareness and accountability while reducing infiltration risks. While Mogadishu’s security challenges cannot be resolved overnight, combining top‑down coordination with community‑driven vigilance offers the best chance to disrupt Al‑Shabaab’s urban networks and protect Somalia’s largest city from future mass‑casualty attacks.
The recent Mogadishu bombings have intensified Somalia’s resolve to defeat Al‑Shabaab. President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, for the first time in years, enjoys widespread political will and public support for the fight. His administration’s counter‑Al‑Shabaab strategy rests on four pillars: military operations, targeting the group’s finances, ideological warfare, and denying it territorial control. Community‑driven uprisings in Hiiraan by Ma’awiisley militias have made rapid gains, pushing militants from key areas. Supported by Somali National Army (SNA) troops and state forces, they have reclaimed more territory in months than in years past. Yet questions remain over sustainability, coordination, and capacity. Al‑Shabaab fighters often retreat to other strongholds, regroup, and launch counterattacks. Experts warn that Somalia needs a “whole‑of‑government” approach — integrating federal, state, clan, civil society, and business stakeholders rather than relying solely on military force. A unified plan for post‑liberation stabilisation, resource mobilisation, and messaging is critical. International partners, while supportive, must provide sustained funding to prevent liberated areas from falling back into militant hands. Al‑Shabaab operates as a network, not a rigid hierarchy. Defeating it will require Somalia to build an equally adaptive and coordinated coalition that can match the group’s efficiency, discipline, and resilience.
The October bombings in Mogadishu underscore a persistent reality: Somalia’s capital remains under constant siege. While it is unclear whether the attacks were planned from rural Al‑Shabaab strongholds or orchestrated within the city, they reflect a centuries‑old pattern of urban vulnerability to rural discontent. Historically, Somalia’s port towns including Mogadishu were fortified to keep out nomadic incursions. From the seventeenth‑century Abgaal entry into Mogadishu, to early 20th‑century Dervish raids, to the looting by moryaan militias in the early civil war, urban centres have repeatedly been targeted during times of political and economic instability. This tension is more than cultural stereotype. It’s rooted in stark economic disparities between ‘cosmopolitan’ town dwellers and struggling rural communities. Urban elites benefit disproportionately from foreign aid, diaspora investment, and control of governance hubs, while rural populations face economic insecurity, displacement, and periodic natural disasters. Al‑Shabaab exploits these grievances, leveraging rural‑urban inequality in its recruitment and propaganda. Meanwhile, Somalia’s booming private security sector represents a modern version of ‘town walls,’ protecting elite assets but deepening social divides. Unless these disparities are addressed, the urban‑rural fault line will continue to be a source of instability, sustaining Al‑Shabaab’s relevance.
In October 2022, Mogadishu was once again struck by tragedy when twin suicide car bombs exploded at Zoobe Junction, killing over 100 people and injuring more than 300. The attack came just weeks after Somalis marked the fifth anniversary of the 2017 Zoobe bombing, the deadliest act of terrorism in Somalia’s history. President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud vowed to crush Al-Shabaab, while ordinary citizens expressed their determination to rebuild. Somali resilience is deeply rooted in history — from the anti-colonial Daraawiish resistance to the volunteer-driven ‘iskaa wax u qabso’ projects of the pre-civil war era. Today, that spirit is alive in initiatives like the Gara’ad seaport in Puntland. Built entirely through local business and community investment, Gara’ad stands as Somalia’s first privately owned port and a model of what Somalis can achieve without heavy foreign dependency. These same grassroots-driven values power citizen militias reclaiming territory from Al-Shabaab in Hiiraan, Galgaduud, and Middle Shabelle — achieving more gains in four months than federal and AU forces did in five years.
Since its founding in 1998, Puntland has relied on indirect, clan-based presidential selection. Efforts by previous administrations to introduce universal suffrage failed, but they laid the groundwork for democratic reform. Building on this, President Sa’id Abdullahi Deni oversaw Puntland’s first one-person, one-vote elections in October 2021 — Somalia’s first democratic vote in over 50 years. The trial elections in Qardho, Eyl, and Ufeyn marked a milestone, with 37,578 voters participating. However, disputes over alleged vote-buying, irregularities, and the lack of a constitutional court exposed the fragility of Puntland’s new democratic structures. Resignations within the Transitional Puntland Electoral Commission (TPEC) and Deni’s prolonged focus on a failed bid for Somalia’s presidency further stalled progress. Now, with Deni’s term ending in January 2024, concerns are mounting over possible term extension, mirroring precedents in other Somali states. For Puntland to realize democratic elections statewide, it must amend its constitution, conduct a census, register voters in all districts, and rebuild trust through clear commitments to timely elections.
In Somalia, politics has long been shaped by Harold Lasswell’s principle of “who gets what, when, and how,” with clan-based asymmetries determining access to power and resources. Historically dominant pastoralist clans secure the lion’s share of jobs, aid, and opportunities, while marginalized agricultural communities like the Digil-Mirifle and Somali Bantu are often left behind. The consequences are stark: in past famines, most deaths occurred among these marginalized groups. Powerful social capital networks within dominant clans ensure resilience, but such support rarely extends to weaker communities. This structural exclusion also distorts humanitarian aid distribution and reinforces cycles of vulnerability. Somalia’s delayed constitutional process and federal structure risk entrenching exclusion if federalism becomes a system of clan-based territorial dominance. Meanwhile, extremist groups like Al-Shabaab exploit resentment against elite monopolies to recruit from marginalized populations. A new, inclusive social contract is urgently needed , one that extends social capital beyond clan lines and protects minority rights. Somali-led dialogue, supported by international partners, can help ensure that federalism, citizenship, and development are rights-based, equitable, and resistant to exploitation by extremist narratives.