End of impregnable Ethiopia
On Wednesday, 20 July, Al-Shabaab launched a large-scale attack on a string of villages located along the Somalia-Ethiopia frontier. The militants made deep incursions into Ethiopia and engaged the paramilitary Liyu police – drawn from the Somali Regional State of Ethiopia (SRS) – in what many observers agree was the insurgent group’s most audacious and unprecedented operation since Al-Shabaab took control of south-central Somalia in 2007. The attack has rattled the regional government and alarmed neighbouring states.
What exactly happened is contested. There are no independent sources able to confirm the details of the intense but largely unverified claims flying around. Sahan analysts believe that over 1,000 Al-Shabaab fighters were involved in the assault on the border villages of Yeed, Aato, and Washaqo. The attacks were synchronised. The first one – a complex attack – targeted a Liyu police post at Yeed. Al-Shabaab detonated a VBIED at the station, shortly followed by a ground assault force. While Liyu police units were engaged in Yeed, two Al-Shabaab units overran the smaller settlements – Aato and Washaqo. Credible reports say Al-Shabaab combatants, using 18 “technicals” and motorcycles, subsequently crossed into Ethiopia. The precise direction in which they are headed is a matter of speculation. One suggestion is that Al-Shabaab intends to disable the main road that connects Somalia’s Shabelle region and the SRS’s Afdheer zone.
A swift response by SRS forces, which called in reinforcements, did manage to check the Al-Shabaab advance. President Mustafa Omer “Cagjar” was shown touring the battlefronts and greeting Liyu officers. In its communications, the SRS government in Jijiga claims to have fended off the assault and “inflicted heavy defeat on the enemy,” saying that it killed 100 Al-Shabaab fighters and taken 63 prisoners.
The fighting is far from over. A new report on Sunday from Hiiraan region says dozens of militants have crossed the border into Ethiopia at Fer-Fer. Reporters have been trying to confirm the new breach but the phone lines to Bulo Burte, Mahaas, and Beledweyne were disabled.
This latest Al-Shabaab offensive appears to be the start of a major, strategic initiative to establish an active combat presence in Ethiopia, probably in the southeastern Bale Mountains, which straddle the boundary between the Somali and Oromo regions. Initial reports suggest that approximately 1,500 Al-Shabaab fighters were involved in last week’s offensive, and although they suffered some tactical defeats, they have achieved some important objectives – the foremost one being to demonstrate, for the first time, that Al-Shabaab is capable of major military operations inside Ethiopia. Reports from the field suggest that some Al-Shabaab units have penetrated as far as 100 km inside Ethiopia and may still be active.
Preparations for this operation have been roughly one year in the making, beginning around the time when Ethiopia’s government appeared to be on the verge of collapse. Several thousand more Al-Shabaab fighters have been assigned to the group’s Ethiopian command, so we are likely to see more clashes in the near future as additional units are committed to the fight.
Al-Shabaab has been trying to establish an operational presence in Ethiopia since at least 2013, when the jihadist ‘Amir’ Ahmed Abdi Godane assigned that responsibility to an Ethiopian Somali commander named Ali Diyaar. But Diyaar proved to be ineffective. As a result, all major Al-Shabaab operations in Ethiopia over the past decade have been conducted by the group’s intelligence wing, the Amniyaad. These included a failed bomb plot against a football stadium in Addis Abeba in 2013 and an attempted suicide bombing of major shopping mall in Addis in 2014 that was disrupted before it could take place.
Al-Shabaab is well aware that the Ethiopian security services have been in disarray since the outbreak of war in Tigray in November 2020. They also know that much of the country’s military is tied down fighting a widening insurgency in Oromia and trying to maintain order in the restive Amhara region. The timing of this operation was probably dictated by the time required to train and equip sufficient fighters, rather than by any proximate cause.
Sahan believes that the situation on the border is very serious. Ethiopia’s domestic unrest makes this an opportune time for Al-Shabaab to strike. The scale of this offensive is probably too great to be contained by local Ethiopian security forces – namely the Liyu police in the Somali and Oromia regions. Unless Addis Abeba can afford to redeploy capable military units from elsewhere in the country, Al-Shabaab may well succeed in establishing a military presence in Ethiopia.
Having a presence in Ethiopia gives Al-Shabaab strategic depth. It can shelter its fighters there. It can better plan and execute attacks inside Ethiopia. It also allows Al-Shabaab to radicalise and recruit aggrieved Ethiopian Muslim youths. In recent years, the Somali terrorist group has been broadcasting its messages in Afaan Oromo – in addition to Kiswahili – as part of its ambition to expand its tentacles across the wider Horn region.
For 15 years, Ethiopia has succeeded in effectively inoculating itself from the Al-Shabaab menace. The Liyu police were central to that defence. But Mustafa Cagjar eviscerated the Liyu police and roiled the politics of SRS in a bid to consolidate his power. Al-Shabaab is now capitalising on the resulting disarray.
The era of an impregnable Ethiopia has ended.
The Somali Wire Team
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