Somaliland's elections on 13 November and the weeks since have displayed the maturity and stability of its democracy once again.
On 21 November, the next phase of the disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR) of 75,000 Tigray Defence Forces (TDF) soldiers commenced in Mekelle. Over two years have passed since the signing of the Pretoria and Nairobi agreements, with the DDR process intended as one of their central elements, but federally-driven progress to date has been slow.
The rupturing of the Jubaland-federal relations was a long time coming, part of the broader political and constitutional crises that have pushed Somalia's settlement to a near-breaking point in recent months.
In April 2024, the US Department of State's Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor released its annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices. Its section on Somalia begins, "There were no significant changes in the human rights situation in Somalia during the year."
In April, the French naval frigate Floréal, operating under the EU Naval Force’s Operation Atalanta, intercepted massive drug shipments off Somalia’s coast, seizing nearly 1,400 kg of heroin and other narcotics valued at over €50 million. These busts expose a troubling evolution in East Africa’s maritime threats. Once dominated by piracy, the region’s coastal waters are now a conduit for heroin, methamphetamine, and hashish smuggled from Pakistan through the so-called "Smack Track" to Europe. The traffickers often linked to extremist groups highlight the growing convergence of criminal and ideological actors. Former pirate financiers appear to have shifted toward more lucrative and less risky maritime trafficking. Intelligence suggests that violent extremist organizations (VEOs), including Somalia’s Al-Shabaab and affiliates in Kenya, Mozambique, and the DRC, use these smuggling routes for logistics, funding, and recruitment. Tanzania’s porous coastline, particularly areas like Tanga and Mtwara, has become a hub connecting VEOs to transnational crime. As analysts trace the fluid but dangerous connections between criminal and extremist networks, regional security is at risk. Operation Atalanta now plays a dual role disrupting piracy and curbing illicit financial flows.
In 2022, the Hiraal Institute reported that Al‑Shabaab was collecting nearly as much in taxes as Somalia’s federal government about USD 15 million per month. With tax revenue standing at just 4.4% of GDP, the lowest in Africa, Somalia faces a major challenge in funding reconstruction, security, and essential public services after decades of conflict. Despite this, Somalia has made steady progress in domestic revenue mobilization over the past decade, introducing new tax policies, updating revenue laws, and automating parts of the collection process. These reforms have simplified tax compliance, improved efficiency, and strengthened the foundation for state‑building.
Sahan Research recently celebrated its 10th anniversary, marking a decade of impactful research, analysis, and policy recommendations on governance, security, and human security across the Horn of Africa. Founded by Matt Bryden, the late Abdirahman Osman Raghe, and Emmanuel Deisser, Sahan has grown into a respected regional and international partner, known for its in-depth field research and forthright analysis. Over the years, Sahan has been supported by distinguished leaders such as Minister Hussein Halane, Ambassador Mahboub Maalim, Khaire Raghe, and Rashid Abdi, alongside hundreds of researchers, analysts, writers, and advocates who have contributed to its mission. While its work has occasionally challenged stakeholders, Sahan values open dialogue and mutual learning.
Since President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud took office in 2022, Somalia has intensified efforts to defeat Al‑Shabaab through a coordinated three‑pronged strategy targeting military, financial, and ideological fronts. Militarily, the Somali National Army (SNA), supported by ATMIS forces and local clan militias, has reclaimed key Al‑Shabaab strongholds such as those in Hirshabelle. Financially, the government is working to cut off funding sources by tracking financiers, sympathisers, and supporters. The third pillar of the campaign focuses on the ideological battle against extremism. The government has engaged Somali religious leaders and scholars from across the country and diaspora to counter Al‑Shabaab’s distorted interpretation of Islam. Recently, the Federal Government hosted a conference to establish a Somali Scholars Council aimed at uniting clerics in rejecting the extremist “Khawarij” ideology.
Somalia’s push to join the East African Community (EAC) has entered a critical stage, with the EAC Secretary General confirming a verification mission scheduled for late January. This marks Somalia’s third application for membership, after previous bids in 2012 and 2019 failed due to insecurity and governance challenges. The EAC treaty sets membership criteria including good governance, rule of law, human rights observance, geographical proximity, and a functioning market economy. Somalia shares borders and longstanding business ties with EAC states, particularly Kenya, and has a large diaspora within the region. Membership could grant Somali citizens visa-free travel, East African passports, and tax-free access to regional markets. Somalia offers strategic and economic potential, with Africa’s longest coastline, rich fishing grounds, major shipping routes, and significant untapped mineral resources. However, the country’s weak production capacity, reliance on foreign aid, and ongoing insecurity remain key obstacles.
Somalia’s recent tax increases on khat have sparked protests by women traders and renewed debate over who benefits from the lucrative trade. Khat, also known as miraa or chat, is a mild narcotic widely consumed in Somalia, with up to 75% of men regularly chewing the leaves. Since the reopening of Somalia’s borders to Kenyan-grown khat in July 2022, exports have surged to 50 tonnes per day. However, rising taxes, opaque commissions, and alleged “informal” levies have driven prices up sharply, squeezing small traders and consumers. A viral video by Somali influencer Wasiirka Caddaaladda revealed that while Kenyan farmers sell khat for around USD 3 per kilogram, by the time it reaches Somali distributors, the price has climbed to USD 16 due to transport, official taxes, and brokers’ commissions. Distributors then sell it to street traders for USD 35–40, with claims that politically connected individuals capture up to 40% of profits.
Somalia’s stability is under constant threat from interconnected challenges, including resource conflicts, livelihood insecurity, volatile food prices, natural disasters, socioeconomic fragility, armed conflict, and weak governance. These internal pressures are compounded by external geopolitical dynamics, making it critical to integrate climate-sensitive programming into all sectors. Applying a climate lens allows policymakers and practitioners to better understand and respond to the complex interplay of climate, security, and development challenges in Somalia. Recent UN-sponsored research highlights the need for integrated strategies that deliver both climate resilience and peace. This means climate security should not be siloed within peacebuilding efforts but embedded across humanitarian, development, peace, and security programming. In Somalia, climate stressors exacerbate natural resource disputes, famine risks, and territorial control struggles, demanding greater coordination and data-sharing.
When President Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud (HSM) was elected in May, Somalis hoped for a shift in politics, stronger security, and a rapid response to the ongoing drought. His campaign slogan, Somalia at peace with itself and with the rest of the world, raised expectations. Since then, HSM’s government has seen mixed success in addressing pressing national issues. In South West State (SWS), the Speaker of the Federal Parliament facilitated talks between President Abdiaziz Laftagareen and political rivals in an effort toward reconciliation. However, tensions persist, with political violence in Baidoa resulting in civilian deaths. The relationship between Puntland and the federal government has also deteriorated, with Puntland President Said Abdullahi Deni suspending cooperation until disputes over the constitution, security, and power-sharing are resolved.
On 15 December 2022, the US Senate approved the National Defense Authorisation Act (NDAA) for fiscal year 2023, which President Joe Biden signed into law on 23 December. Spanning 1,772 pages, the NDAA dedicates seven pages to Somalia and two specifically to Somaliland, signalling increased US defense-related engagement with the region. Although the Act explicitly states that it does not confer recognition of Somaliland as independent, it includes measures to provide direct assistance to Somaliland and monitor whether aid from the US State Department or USAID is withheld by Somalia’s federal government. The Act highlights Somaliland’s relative stability and strategic potential, notably the port of Berbera, which could host a US naval base. Such a base would reduce reliance on overcrowded Djibouti and prevent rival powers, including Russia, from gaining access to the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.
In his New Year address, Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud pledged to advance constitutional review, improve governance, and strengthen Somalia’s development trajectory. Despite decades of political instability, Somalia’s economy, driven by livestock exports, diaspora investment, and resilient entrepreneurship, has managed to function. However, the benefits remain unevenly distributed, with the wealthy and well-connected reaping most gains while social development, healthcare, education, and environmental conservation lag behind. Somalia’s political landscape remains dominated by fragmented sovereignties and self-interest among elites, undermining inclusive governance. Hybrid governance structures combining elected authorities, clan elders, religious leaders, business figures, and informal brokers deliver some services but often exclude women and minorities. Opportunities exist for cooperation when constituencies align on shared needs such as education, health, and professional development.
The recently concluded US-Africa Leaders Summit, hosted by US President Joe Biden, brought together African heads of state and senior officials for a three-day dialogue aimed at strengthening US-Africa relations. The summit addressed a wide range of issues, including economic engagement, democracy and human rights, health security, food security, climate change, and peace and security. Since the last summit in 2014, Africa has faced numerous challenges from the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russia-Ukraine conflict to escalating armed insurgencies, political instability, and unprecedented climate change impacts. Against this backdrop, African leaders sought to deepen cooperation with the US while also balancing relationships with other global powers such as China, Russia, and India.
The Somali town of Laas Anood has erupted in deadly protests following the killing of prominent opposition blogger Hadraawi. Over a week of violent demonstrations and a harsh security crackdown by Somaliland forces has left around 40 people dead, most of them civilians. The unrest has deepened tensions between Somaliland and Puntland, raising fears of potential armed conflict in the disputed Sool and Sanaag regions. The causes of the killings remain unclear, with both targeted and random attacks reported against security personnel, clan elders, business leaders, and activists. While Somaliland authorities allege a “third force” is trying to destabilise the region, Puntland voices express concern over the unrest’s potential to radicalise local populations and fuel separatist movements such as the proposed SSC (Sool, Sanaag, Cayn) state.
Somalia is enduring its worst drought in 40 years, displacing millions and putting the nation on the frontline of climate insecurity. While famine has been narrowly averted, rising temperatures, extreme weather events, and environmental degradation continue to intersect with Somalia’s fragile social, political, and economic systems, threatening peace and human security. To address this challenge, advanced conflict modelling tools like the UN Environment Programme’s Strata platform combine environmental, climate, and socio-political data to identify potential instability hotspots. However, Somalia’s lack of a centralised data institution limits its ability to collect and analyse the vast information needed for accurate forecasting. Local, grassroots-level data – such as rural food production, land use, firewood collection patterns, and soil moisture – is critical to understanding and predicting climate-related insecurity.
Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) has achieved significant battlefield gains against Al‑Shabaab (AS), with the group facing some of its most severe setbacks in years. However, a surge of complex attacks in Mogadishu is undermining these advances and raising serious questions about the effectiveness of Somalia’s security sector. Recent assaults, including the deadly Villa Rays Hotel attack near the presidential palace, highlight security lapses, potential infiltration, and insufficient vetting of personnel within key institutions. Critics point to the retention of top security commanders from the previous Farmaajo administration, despite their controversial past roles, as a key obstacle to reform. HSM’s transfer of Mogadishu’s law‑enforcement functions from the Somali Police Force to the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) has not yet improved stability, instead creating confusion and accountability gaps.
On 27 November 2022, Al‑Shabaab (AS) militants carried out a deadly attack on the Villa Rosa Hotel in Mogadishu, located near the presidential palace. Despite heavy security, the attackers managed to breach the area, allegedly aided by insiders within government ranks. Investigations revealed that Somali National Army (SNA) officers and other state officials had facilitated the militants’ operations, including passing explosives-laden vehicles through checkpoints and enabling attackers to access highly secured facilities such as Mogadishu’s airport and military training centres. Reports indicate that AS supporters are embedded in various sectors, including security forces, justice systems, prisons, banks, and telecommunications. In some cases, imprisoned AS operatives have coordinated attacks using smuggled mobile phones and financial services. The group’s infiltration extends to offering cheaper court services, undermining the legitimacy of state institutions.
Meteorologists have confirmed the emergence of a rare triple dip La Niña. This is the third consecutive year of unusually cool sea surface temperatures in the central and eastern Pacific Ocean and only the third occurrence since records began in 1950. While La Niña typically brings heavy rains to Australia, it often causes drought in East Africa by disrupting the Intertropical Convergence Zone (ITCZ). The current La Niña is being compounded by a persistent negative Indian Ocean Dipole (IOD), a rare back-to-back occurrence since reliable records began in 1960. A negative IOD shifts warmer waters eastward toward Australia, intensifying rainfall there but worsening drought in East Africa. Climate scientists warn that climate change may make both negative IOD and La Niña-like conditions more frequent. This could lead to more extreme and prolonged droughts. In Somalia, Kenya, and Ethiopia, the late arrival and poor performance of the 2022 deyr rains threaten an unprecedented fifth consecutive failed rainy season. Humanitarian agencies warn that the March to May 2023 long rains could also underperform, increasing famine risks. Urgent early action is needed to mitigate the growing humanitarian crisis in the Horn of Africa.