Why the fear of Roobow is misplaced
Somali Prime Minister Hamza Abdi Barre this week unveiled Somalia’s new cabinet. The most notable nominee was Mukhtar Roobow “Abu Mansur,” a former deputy leader of Al-Shabaab who defected in 2013, as Minister for Religious Affairs, Endowments, and Countering Violent Extremism. The surprise nomination has elicited mixed reactions. Domestically, many Somalis are hailing it as a bold and positive step by the PM. But some, including supporters of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM), have voiced dismay at Roobow’s appointment, saying it sends the wrong message regarding terrorism and accountability by seeming to give Roobow impunity. Outside of Somalia, the view is equally ambivalent. Western diplomats appear somewhat concerned and unclear as to how to interpret Roobow’s nomination.
“We are all struggling a bit about how to explain the Roobow appointment to HQ, our capitals, without triggering alarm,” a senior Western diplomat told Sahan this week.
Ethiopia, it would seem, has already made up its mind about the HSM government, but it has additional cause for worry. Roobow hails from South West State, a region historically viewed by Addis Abeba as its ‘sphere of influence.’ The Ethiopian military orchestrated Roobow’s arrest in December 2018. They are now worried about the political impact of Roobow’s nomination and its potential to further weaken the beleaguered regional president, Abdiasis Laftagareen, a close ally of Addis. Not coincidentally, an Ethiopian military delegation arrived in Baidoa hours after PM Hamza announced his cabinet.
The heat and furore generated by the Roobow appointment is unfortunate; it partly reflects a generalised ignorance about the man and his politics, and an insufficient grasp of the context. It is also clear the former regime and its supporters intend to play up the issue and frame it as a threat to Somalia’s national security. MPs who represent the Nabad iyo Nolol (N&N) party in Parliament may use Roobow as a card to block parliamentary approval of the new cabinet or as pretext for filibustering.
Mukhtar Roobow (Rahanweyn/Leysan) is one of the founding members of Al-Shabaab. He was actually in line to replace Adan Hashi Ayro as military commander after the latter was killed in 2008. Roobow possessed seniority, theological training, and a large clan constituency. But he was outmanoeuvred by the young upstart Ahmed Abdi Godane, who became Emir. This breach of tradition no doubt contributed to the bad blood between the two. Roobow, a pragmatist and less hard-line than Godane, also openly challenged the extremist doctrine, tactics, and strategy adopted by Godane. The rivalry climaxed in late 2012, leading to internal fighting that eventually compelled Roobow to decamp from Al-Shabaab. For four years he lived in Bay and Bakool, under the protection of his clan. He survived multiple assassination attempts orchestrated by Godane.
The Somali intelligence agency, NISA, and Western intelligence services maintained discreet contact with Roobow. They negotiated the terms for his defection to the side of the Somali government. The Americans were persuaded to drop Roobow’s name from the US Rewards for Justice programme. In 2017, Roobow formally declared that he had left Al-Shabaab and agreed to support the government in combatting the group. Arriving in Mogadishu, he was feted.
In the aftermath of the October 2017 Zoobe Junction truck bomb that killed over 500 people, Roobow appeared in public and made a powerful speech. He denounced Al- Shabaab’s indiscriminate violence and its extremist interpretation of Islam, saying that these were the main reasons why he clashed with Godane and ultimately left the group. Roobow went further and donated blood for the injured victims – to underscore, symbolically, his strong disavowal of Al-Shabaab.
The Mohammed Abdullahi Farmaajo government used Roobow’s defection to tout the “success” of its defectors programme and to reconfigure the politics of South West State. In reality, Mogadishu was conducting parallel secret negotiations with Al-Shabaab, with the backing of Eritrea. Roobow was a mere pawn in a grand scheme to find a settlement with Al-Shabaab. The decision to detain him was a concession to Al-Shabaab, which demanded a shutdown of the high-level defectors programme, perceiving it as a threat. It was not a coincidence that the arrest of Roobow was carried out on the eve of Isaias Afewerki’s first trip to Mogadishu in December 2018.
Roobow languished in detention for over three and a half years. He was denied contact with his family and subjected to all manner of deprivation and ill-treatment. He lived under the constant threat of assassination – at the hands of either NISA or Al-Shabaab. He was at one point poisoned, according to informed sources.
The HSM government is taking an extraordinary leap of faith in Roobow. It believes he can be harnessed as part of its ideological counternarrative project and could prove useful in undermining Al-Shabaab’s influence in Bay and Bakool. There is no certainty, of course, that this bold scheme will work. Much could go wrong. But, from the government’s point of view, it is better to take the risk in order to undermine Al- Shabaab than to put all its hope into a badly faltering counterterrorism strategy.
The controversy over Roobow’s appointment is largely manufactured. The claims about his allegedly unreformed jihadist convictions and extremism are malicious and unfounded. The arguments about accountability for his past crimes are reasonable and understandable, but they can be misleading. Roobow was an outsider within Al-Shabaab and the use of gratuitous violence did not always sit well with him. There is much anecdotal evidence of his moderation. He allowed aid agencies access, worked to release abducted aid workers, mediated clan feuds, and allowed safe passage for officials in towns overrun by Al-Shabaab. The image of a bloodthirsty jihadist commander was always a caricature.
Somalia’s recent history is soaked in blood. There are many figures in Somali politics and institutions who committed atrocities equal to or worse than Roobow’s. They walk the streets, serve in parliament, or are embraced as venerable elders. Unless there is a system to hold everyone accountable, it makes no sense to single out Roobow.
Donors and partners of Somalia have an opportunity to support Somalia as it embarks on a novel approach to undermine the terrorist group responsible for two decades of deadly conflict. To sow doubt and prevaricate at this early stage is unhelpful.
The Somali Wire Team
Gain unlimited access to all our Editorials. Unlock Full Access to Our Expert Editorials — Trusted Insights, Unlimited Reading.
Create your Sahan account LoginUnlock lifetime access to all our Premium editorial content
Last April, General Sheegow Ahmed Ali-- once the highest-ranking military officer hailing from the Somali Bantu-- died in ignominy in a Mogadishu hospital. A senior commander who had previously spearheaded operations in south-central Somalia, Sheegow had been summarily sentenced to 10 years in prison in 2023 for operating a militia in the capital. His death-- mourned widely and protested in Mogadishu and Beledweyne-- returned the spotlight to the pernicious issues of discrimination in the Somali National Army (SNA).
The Horn of Africa's political fate has always been wired to external commercial interests, with its expansive eastern edge on the Red Sea serving as an aorta of trade for millennia. A Greek merchant's manual from the 1st century AD describes the port of Obone in modern-day Puntland as a hub of ivory, tortoiseshell, enslaved people and cinnamon destined for Egypt. Today, as so often quoted, between 12-15% of the world's seaborne trade passes along the arterial waterway, with the Suez Canal bridging Europe and Asia. But well before the globalised world or the vying Gulf and Middle Powers over the Red Sea's littoral administrations, the logic of 'gunboat diplomacy' underpinned the passage over these seas.
At the collapse of the Somali state in the early 1990s, the bloated, corrupt, and clan-riven national army was nevertheless in possession of vast quantities of light weapons. Much of it sourced during Somalia's ill-fated alliance with the USSR and later Western and Arab patrons, government armouries were soon plundered by warring militias across Mogadishu, Kismaayo, Baidoa, and every garrison town as the country descended into chaos, providing the ammunition for the deaths of hundreds of thousands of people.
The Greek philosopher and historian Plutarch recounts that King Pyrrhus of Epirus, after defeating the Romans at Asculum in 279 BC, lamented, "One more such victory over the Romans and we are completely done for." After almost four torturous years, the same might be said for any more supposed 'victories' for the incumbent federal government of Somalia. To nobody's surprise, the constitutional 'review' process undertaken by Somalia's federal government was never about implementing direct democracy after all. It was, as widely anticipated, a thinly veiled power grab intended to centralise political power, eviscerate Somalia's federal system, and extend the term of the incumbent president, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM). And so, at the 11th hour and with less than 70 days remaining in his term of office, HSM declared Somalia's new constitutional text 'complete' and signed it into 'law.'
On 4 March 2026, Somalia's Federal Parliament hastily ratified dozens of controversial constitutional amendments, thus finalising President Hassan Sheikh's tailor-made Constitution. Speaker Aden Madobe has now declared the new revised Constitution effective immediately. In doing so, the speaker and his government have deliberately destroyed the existing social contract agreed upon by the people of Somalia.
Ramadan is known as the 'Month of Mercy', typically characterised by forgiveness and reconciliation within the Islamic world. Not so in Somalia, where Villa Somalia's ruinous push to 'finalise' the Provisional Constitution has taken another grim twist in recent days. The collapse of opposition-government talks on 22 February was inevitable, with Villa Somalia's flippancy evident in the needless arguments over venue and security personnel.
Mogadishu, Somalia’s capital, is home to an estimated four million people and supports a vibrant commercial sector. Yet behind the façade of what appears to be an up-and-coming African capital is the specter of insurgents hiding in plain sight. Although Somalia’s government has had a run of success in the fight against Al-Shabaab over the past year, Mogadishu’s security is highly questionable, as the city’s suburbs have become a safe haven and base of operations for militants. Al-Shabaab is not the only problem. The crisis is deeper. Somalia’s security institutions remain disorganized and corrupt, and Mogadishu’s robust business community is often an accomplice to Al-Shabaab funding.
Where to begin? The Middle East aflame, the Iranian Ayatollah Ali Khamenei killed by an Israeli airstrike, a slew of Gulf capitals and infrastructure under Iranian bombardment, and a war instigated by two powers with no clear end or scope. Few could say they were surprised by the coordinated Israeli-American bombardment of Iran, but the immediacy of its metastasis has been shocking, and the spillover of this war is already stretching from Cyprus down to the Strait of Hormuz. And there are almost too many unknowns to count, from the endgame logic of Washington to the vulnerability of the wounded Iranian regime to the broader reaction of the besieged Gulf.
In the small coastal town of Zeila in Somaliland, the ruins of one of the oldest and finest mosques in the Horn of Africa remain. Years of neglect have taken their toll, with many of the stones that once held up the Masjid al-Qiblatayn —dating back to the 7th century —now integrated into the surrounding houses. But a striking minaret still stands askew, as does an arch with two square windows and a handful of columns. Its name 'al-Qiblatayn' translates as 'of the two Qiblahs', while the mosque once housed two mihrabs as well —one facing Mecca and another facing Jerusalem.