China’s strategic footprint in Somalia is growing, marked by a recent symbolic delivery of military aid to the Somali government. While the donation was modest and non-lethal, its significance lies in China’s renewed interest in projecting influence in the Horn of Africa a region critical to global maritime routes and geopolitical rivalry. China was once a strong Cold War ally of Somalia, building infrastructure and providing military assistance. Today, it is Somalia’s largest trading partner, dominating markets from consumer electronics to fisheries. However, Beijing now appears poised for a deeper, more strategic presence. Recent talks hint at the possibility of a Chinese military base in Somalia, a move that would amplify tensions with the US and raise alarms over Taiwan’s diplomatic mission in Somaliland.
Puntland President Abdullahi Sa’id Deni has officially declared his candidacy for Somalia’s presidency, transforming the political landscape and posing a major challenge to incumbent President Mohammed Abdullahi Farmaajo. As a prominent Darood leader, Deni’s entry fragments the Darood vote and makes a first-round Farmaajo victory unlikely. Analysts expect a competitive election, possibly requiring multiple rounds of voting. Deni has been steadily building support across Somalia and abroad. His influence in Puntland is secure, despite recent setbacks such as the Bosaaso crisis. He enjoys strong external backing from Kenya and the United Arab Emirates, with Nairobi serving as a political hub for many opposition candidates. While Farmaajo supporters label Deni a Kenyan proxy, Kenyan officials have stated they prefer to maintain relations with all Somali actors rather than pick sides.
As the war between Russia and Ukraine continues, its ripple effects are hitting Somalia hard. In Mogadishu’s tea kiosks, people follow the conflict closely via BBC Somali, but few fully grasp how this distant war is deepening the country’s domestic crises. Since Russia’s invasion on February 24, fuel prices in Somalia have quadrupled, rising from $0.30–0.45 to $1.20–1.35 per litre. The hike is crippling tuktuk drivers, raising food transport costs, and prompting electricity companies to increase prices. These price shocks are happening alongside Somalia’s worst drought in decades. With rivers running dry and fuel-dependent water trucks struggling to operate, rural areas face worsening water shortages. Farmers who rely on diesel-powered irrigation may halt food production, adding to food insecurity. Russia and Ukraine are major global suppliers of wheat and fertilizers, and disruptions have already affected Somalia’s supply chain. Somalia imports wheat via Egypt, which gets 85% of its wheat from the two warring nations.
Somalia has missed yet another deadline to complete its parliamentary elections, with no new timetable confirmed. As of March 15, only 225 of the required 275 MPs have been elected, and the persistent impasse in Gedo remains the most serious obstacle. Prime Minister Mohammed Hussein Roble has hinted at continuing the process until all seats are filled but has avoided decisive action, especially on the Garbahaarey dispute between Villa Somalia and Jubaland. International frustration is mounting. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken has expanded visa restrictions on Somali politicians, though critics argue such measures have little impact since many already hold foreign passports. Calls are growing for a relocation of the Gedo vote, but Villa Somalia and Roble have rejected this proposal.
Somalia is poised to miss the 30% women’s representation quota in its 2022 parliamentary elections, with only 49 female MPs elected out of 236 so far just 18%. Hitting the quota would require electing 34 more women out of the remaining 39 seats, an impossible target. This marks a setback for women’s rights and inclusivity in Somali politics, despite earlier commitments. Prime Minister Roble attempted to advocate for more female participation, but the absence of legal backing and reliance on clan discretion undermined the efforts. Notably, regions with strong support for Farmaajo Galmudug, South West State, and Somaliland showed high female MP counts. However, critics argue this was a strategic ploy: many of the women elected are inexperienced and closely tied to the outgoing administration, raising concerns that their roles are symbolic and politically manipulated. Further complicating progress is Somalia’s conservative culture, where traditional and religious beliefs often discourage female leadership. Some women candidates were even used to block opposition figures under the guise of gender equity.
As of March 15, Somalia’s parliamentary elections remain incomplete, with only 225 MPs elected out of the required 275. The electoral process, originally slated to conclude by this date, has been derailed by logistical hurdles and political disputes most notably the deadlock in Gedo. Sixteen seats remain unfilled in Garbahaarey due to a long-standing standoff between Jubaland and Villa Somalia. The political feud between President Farmaajo and Jubaland’s Ahmed Madoobe has escalated tensions, with federal forces accused of exerting undue influence in Gedo. With the Islamic holy month of Ramadan fast approaching, there are rising concerns that Somalia may enter the religious period without a fully constituted parliament. Ramadan typically halts political activity, risking further delays and the potential for destabilizing political maneuvers. While discussions have been ongoing, mediation attempts by Prime Minister Roble’s team have failed to produce a compromise. A proposed solution to relocate voting to a neutral town like Elwak was rejected by both Villa Somalia and the Prime Minister himself.
Kenya’s upcoming presidential election carries significant implications for the Horn of Africa, particularly regarding Somalia and the unrecognized state of Somaliland. Raila Odinga, a longtime supporter of Somaliland’s independence, is a frontrunner in the race, making Somali officials in Mogadishu uneasy. Odinga has previously voiced support for Somaliland’s autonomy and strengthened ties by attending high-profile events promoting Kenya-Somaliland cooperation. If elected, Raila may steer Kenya toward greater bilateral engagement with Hargeisa. However, recognition of Somaliland remains unlikely due to the complexities of regional diplomacy and AU policy. Still, Odinga’s influential position within the African Union could provide Somaliland with valuable indirect advocacy. On the commercial front, Kenyan businesses including those linked to the Kenyatta family have shown interest in Somaliland, and Odinga’s leadership could further open these economic doors.
In much of Africa, including Somalia and the Horn, significant segments of public opinion express solidarity with Russia over its invasion of Ukraine. This sentiment draws on historical ties Russia’s support for African liberation movements and its lack of a colonial past and growing anti-Western attitudes. Many African states abstained from the UN resolution condemning the invasion, with some, like South Africa and Algeria, favoring a more “neutral” stance. In the Horn, Russia’s authoritarian model resonates with leaders advocating strong centralized states over liberal federal democracy. Figures like Eritrea’s Isaias Afwerki, Ethiopia’s Abiy Ahmed, and Somalia’s Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo share this centralist vision, seeing elections as potentially destabilizing. This mirrors broader African authoritarian trends, influenced by China and Turkey’s state-led development models.
Somaliland President Musa Bihi Abdi is set to visit Washington, D.C., marking his first trip to the U.S. since taking office in 2017. As Somaliland seeks greater international recognition and deeper ties with global powers, Bihi’s visit comes at a critical geopolitical moment. Though full diplomatic recognition remains unlikely, the trip emphasizes strategic dialogue focused on security, development, and partnership. With ongoing instability in the Horn of Africa including war in Ethiopia and rising extremism in Somalia Somaliland stands out as a relatively stable actor. The territory’s relationship with Taiwan and refusal to align with China or Russia position it as a valuable partner for the U.S. in a time of increased global competition.
Ethiopia is re-engaging with Jubaland in a strategic move to restore its waning influence and address the rising Al-Shabaab threat in Somalia’s Gedo region. In late February, Ethiopian AMISOM commanders met with President Ahmed Madoobe and senior security officials to strengthen cooperation. This marked a notable shift after years of strained relations following Ethiopia’s failed 2019 attempt to coerce Madoobe during a controversial election, which nearly resulted in military confrontation with Kenyan forces in Kismayo. Under Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, Ethiopia abandoned its traditionally balanced Somalia policy, aligning instead with outgoing President Farmaajo. This partisan stance alienated Somali federal states, particularly Jubaland. Abiy’s broader Tripartite Alliance with Eritrea and Somalia, viewed as anti-federalist, intensified tensions further. The deployment of elite Turkish-trained forces to Gedo without Jubaland’s consent only deepened the rift.
Mohammed Abdullahi Farmaajo is emerging as the frontrunner in Somalia’s upcoming presidential election not because of widespread popularity, but due to strategic manipulation of the electoral process. Backed by Qatar and aided by influential allies like Fahad Yasin, Farmaajo has secured significant support through coercion, spending, and political manoeuvring. His influence stretches across key regions, with solid backing from South West State, Galmudug, Hirshabelle, and parts of the Somaliland bloc. However, his dominance in Gedo, particularly in Garbahaarey, remains hotly contested by Jubaland’s leadership. While his return is not expected to trigger armed conflict, many analysts warn that another term under Farmaajo would stifle political progress and deepen Somalia’s instability. The potential exclusion of votes from Garbahaarey due to logistical delays adds another layer of uncertainty to an already tense process. Key rivals like Abdullahi Deni and Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed present formidable challenges, and alliances could shift rapidly in the lead-up to the final vote.
Somalia’s outgoing president, Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo, recently visited Qatar alongside political ally Fahad Yasin, sparking speculation over Doha’s role in Somalia’s upcoming elections. The trip, held just weeks before Somalia chooses its next leader, is seen as highly unusual in diplomatic practice particularly given Farmaajo’s contested legitimacy after overstaying his constitutional mandate. Analysts suggest the visit was more than symbolic, potentially signaling that Qatar fully supports Farmaajo and Fahad as its preferred candidates. Such endorsement could sway Somalia’s political elite, given Doha’s extensive financial influence in the country. A telling detail emerged when Farmaajo was photographed with a folder labeled “The Somali Republic,” omitting the federal designation hinting at his political ambition to dismantle federalism and restore a centralized state, a vision aligned with regional allies Ethiopia and Eritrea. While unverified reports suggest Washington may be pressuring Qatar to steer Farmaajo away from another term, many analysts believe Doha’s actions point to clientelist regime consolidation rather than leadership change. The visit underscores the complex interplay of foreign influence, Somali political maneuvering, and the high-stakes battle over the country’s governance structure. The outcome could significantly impact Somalia’s political stability and its fragile federal system.
Across the Horn of Africa and beyond, Somalis are redefining economic resilience. Without state subsidies or robust institutional support, Somali entrepreneurs have built thriving enterprises, powering regional growth and lifting millions from poverty. In Somaliland and Somalia, the private sector accounts for the vast majority of GDP, while Somali-owned businesses are making significant inroads into East and Southern Africa. From multi-million-dollar property investments in Kampala to cross-border trade in Kenya, Somalia’s “nation of shopkeepers” ethos has created a transnational economic network. Rooted in a tradition of trade, migration, and adaptability, Somali business success stems from trust-based networks, resource pooling, and a focus on ethical commerce. This collectivist model lowers costs, fosters innovation, and transcends clan divisions. Somali companies are now key players in petroleum, agriculture, retail, and telecommunications, often engaging in corporate social responsibility initiatives that benefit communities.
Adan Adde International Airport in Mogadishu is more than Somalia’s primary air hub – it is a fortified Green Zone hosting embassies, UN agencies, ATMIS forces, and multinational businesses. Despite its strategic role, the airport faces severe security and political challenges. Multiple checkpoints run by NISA create a heavy military presence, but corruption undermines safety as VIPs bypass inspections and officers extort money from civilians. The airport has endured repeated Al-Shabaab mortar attacks and remains vulnerable, with combustible fuel storage and weapons depots on-site. The presence of numerous armed security contractors and overlapping jurisdictions adds confusion and risk. Political rivalries between government agencies, particularly NISA and the police, over control of the airport further strain security coordination.
Somalia’s political elite committed to allocating 30% of parliamentary seats to women, a move celebrated as a step toward gender equality. However, the implementation has raised serious concerns. Evidence suggests that the quota is sometimes weaponized female candidates are strategically fielded to unseat powerful opposition figures rather than to genuinely promote women’s political participation. Recent cases, including those involving Maj-Gen Dahir Adan Elmi “Indho Qarshe” and opposition leader Abdirahman Abdishakur, highlight how the system can be manipulated to influence electoral outcomes. While the proportion of female MPs has grown gradually since 2009, projections indicate Somalia will still miss its 30% target, landing around 25–27%. More troubling is the inexperience of many women elected, with little political background or activism in gender rights. Analysts argue that while numerical representation is important, quality matters just as much. The current ad hoc quota system allows for political exploitation, undermining its intent.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is reshaping global geopolitics and could significantly impact the Horn of Africa. Historian Eric Hobsbawm’s warning of humanity’s “relapse to barbarism” resonates as the world faces renewed large-scale war. Beyond Europe, the crisis threatens global markets crude oil prices have surged, and disruptions in wheat exports from Ukraine and Russia could hit African food security hard. The Horn’s strategic location and fragile political climate make it vulnerable to becoming a new front in Russia-West tensions. Moscow has cultivated close ties with Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Sudan, supplying arms and offering security cooperation. These relationships are bolstered by shared anti-Western sentiment and authoritarian governance models, similar to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s strong-state vision. Somalia and Somaliland have also attracted Russian interest, particularly in energy exploration.
As Somalia’s delayed elections drag on, the country faces an uncertain future. The upcoming presidential vote will determine who inherits a divided nation, fragile institutions, and mounting crises. The new leader’s challenges will be immense from addressing a deepening drought and stalled economy to confronting a resurgent Al‑Shabaab and managing the transition from AMISOM to ATMIS. Urgent institutional reforms remain neglected, while looming Federal Member State elections threaten further instability. The IMF has warned it will suspend financial support if elections are not concluded by May 17, a move that could paralyze government operations reliant on international aid. Security sector reform is critical, yet existing frameworks such as the National Security Architecture and New Policing Model have been ignored.
China has appointed Xue Bing as Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa, with one of his top challenges being Somaliland’s expanding relationship with Taiwan. This partnership, established in 2020 with reciprocal representative offices, has deepened through high-level visits and investment deals, including upcoming oil exploration projects. Beijing has repeatedly pressured Hargeisa to cut ties with Taipei, offering infrastructure aid and development packages in return. Somaliland, however, has resisted, emphasizing its sovereignty and determination to maintain foreign relations on its own terms. China’s lack of debt leverage over Somaliland limits its ability to coerce compliance, leaving Beijing with few options beyond economic or symbolic retaliation. Potential Chinese countermeasures could include supporting Puntland’s claims over disputed Sool and Sanaag regions or expanding fishing and mining activities in contested waters and territories. These moves would likely irritate Somaliland but are unlikely to sever its strategic bond with Taiwan. The dispute underscores shifting geopolitical dynamics in the Horn of Africa, where smaller states like Somaliland can defy major powers, and where Taiwan’s outreach challenges China’s diplomatic dominance in the region.
Somalia’s upcoming political transition faces unprecedented risks as Fahad Yasin, former NISA chief and master political strategist, enters parliament. Known for his vast financial resources and unmatched ability to influence elections, Fahad is now positioned to manipulate the presidential race from within. The next Somali parliament is shaping up to be an auction house, where money, not merit, determines outcomes. With only 60% of Lower House seats filled and key constituencies like Garbahaarey deadlocked, the election process is mired in delays, manipulation, and clan grievances. Four scenarios dominate: further breakdowns in the electoral process; a controversial Farmaajo re-election requiring massive manipulation; Fahad backing a new candidate like Abdulkarim Guled, Hassan Ali Khaire, or Dahir Mohamud Gelle; or the opposition uniting behind a single figure such as Sheikh Sharif, Abdirahman Abdishakur, or Hassan Sheikh.
Fahad Yasin’s election as a Member of Parliament in Somalia marks a turning point in the nation’s political landscape. Once the de facto director of NISA, Yasin has leveraged his strategic alliances, vast Qatari-backed resources, and Islamist patronage networks to emerge as one of Somalia’s most influential power brokers. His rise illustrates a broader shift from traditional clan-based politics toward elite state capture, where political survival is increasingly determined by money, alliances, and external support rather than clan loyalty. While technically from a minority 0.5 clan, Yasin’s financial muscle and ties to Qatar and Turkey have allowed him to bypass Somalia’s entrenched clan hierarchy. His political maneuvering has reshaped parliamentary elections, sidelining clan elders and consolidating power within a small, self-serving elite. This shift risks deepening public mistrust, alienating marginalized clans, and potentially driving some toward Al-Shabaab for influence and protection. If Yasin secures a deputy speaker role, he could play a decisive role in shaping Somalia’s next government and its policies for years to come. However, his dominance raises concerns over democracy, decentralization, human rights, and security sector reform, making his political ascent both a pivotal and controversial development in Somalia’s fragile governance.