Another interview with Fahad Yasin: admit nothing, deny everything, make counteraccusations
Yesterday, Somali Twitter was breathless with speculation over who President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) was likely to nominate as prime minister. And while this is a matter of great importance, it is also just one of several pressing issues in front of HSM: drought and debt relief, reconciliation, completion of the constitution, and the war against Al-Shabaab. But there has also been an equally distracting source of palace intrigue recently, one that – like the other crises listed above – HSM needs to move quickly to address.
Beginning last week, two former National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) directors general, Fahad Yasin and his successor, Yasin Farey, released what seemed to be premeditated and coordinated interviews with friendly, softball media outlets. A milquetoast interview of two former officials (even if one is a sitting MP) wouldn’t normally send shockwaves across the political space and garner so much media attention and outrage. But this is just part of a broader effort at reputation laundering and trying to hobble the new administration with disinformation to evade an accurate accounting of the Farmaajo years.
Yassin Farey, a newly-elected MP from Galmudug state, was formerly the acting NISA director general following Fahad Yasin’s removal from the position. In an interview with the internet-based TV channel SMS-TV, Yassin mainly spoke about his eight-month tenure as NISA chief. He discussed the case of Ikran Tahlil, a former NISA agent whose disappearance and presumed murder Yassin is suspected to have been involved with. Yassin mentioned in the interview that Ikran Tahlil was like any other agent killed in the line of duty. Yet he could not offer a clear explanation of her disappearance or how she died. In response to a question about who killed Ikran, he simply said, “the terrorists [Al-Shabaab] killed her after they kidnaped her.” Yassin also briefly discussed the thousands of Somalis sent to Eritrea for military training, stating that they had been NISA recruits rather than drawn from the Somali National Army (SNA), adding the cryptic comment, “the Eritrea trained soldiers’ file was special and was handed over to the new president.”
Yassin also answered several questions relating to accusations of mismanagement and abuse of power – including the reported meddling by NISA agents during the parliamentary selection process – while he was the acting head of the agency. He evinced little understanding of NISA’s statutory authorities and appeared to view it as simply an extension of the presidency. Yassin denied ever having been affiliated with any Salafist groups such as Al-I’tissam b’il Kitaab or its ideological predecessor, Al-Itihaad Al-Islaam (AIAI). He ended the interview with a hint of contrition – or what could be interpreted as a confession – requesting that the public forgive any crimes that may have been committed under his leadership at NISA.
Fahad Yasin’s interview with another internet-based TV outlet, Galyan Media, has been serialized, released in segments apparently to draw media attention away from the new administration as it takes initial steps to clean up the mess left by the previous administration, in which Fahad played a central role.
Fahad spoke about his childhood upbringing and his membership in both AIAI and AlI’tissam. He briefly discussed his role running NISA (Fahad was acting head of NISA for 10 months prior to being formally appointed DG in August 2019, meaning he effectively ran the agency for nearly three years). Like Yassin Farey, Fahad was self-congratulatory and, with no apparent irony, cited clearing out foreign influence and interference in NISA as one of his main achievements. Fahad also spoke about FGS interference in FMS elections. But he skipped over the FMSs whose presidents he helped install as regime loyalists – Galmudug, South West State, Hirshabelle – and instead discussed Puntland and Jubaland. Fahad was particularly scathing of Jubaland’s relationship with Kenya and called state president Ahmed Madoobe a “cancer in Somali politics.”
In another interview segment, released this week, Fahad addressed the matter of Ikran Tahlil. His narrative diverged significantly from Yassin Farey’s. Fahad claimed she was merely a jobseeker and was never part of NISA. He also offered a much more specific – and inflammatory – explanation of her disappearance and death: a cabal consisting of caretaker PM Mohamed Hussein Roble, Deputy Information Minister Abdirahman Al-Adala, and newly appointed NISA DG Mahad Mohamed Salad (who, at the time, was an MP from Galmudug) had Ikran abducted and handed her over to Mahad Karate, Al-Shabaab’s head of intelligence, who had her killed. It was a false-flag operation intended to tarnish NISA’s image and, by extension, Fahad himself, as Roble fired him nearly three months after Ikran went missing.
Fahad also tried to implicate Roble in the death of Hirshabelle MP Amina Mohamed Abdi, who was the target of an Al-Shabaab suicide bombing in March. Fahad mentioned that Roble “knows the killers.” Continuing his ad hominem attacks, Fahad suggested that it would be a crime for NISA agents to share classified information with Mahad Salad, saying he is unqualified to lead NISA and, implicitly, a threat to Somalia’s national security.
Asked about criticisms that NISA had grown too close to Al-Shabaab under his leadership, with many inadequately vetted Al-Shabaab defectors joining NISA, Fahad said it was necessary to work with the defectors as a way of getting information and securing Mogadishu. Concerning Somali forces in Eritrea, Fahad contradicted Yassin Farey, claiming it was an internal SNA matter and had nothing to do with NISA, even though the armed forces chief General Odowa Yusuf Rage has denied that the troops sent to Eritrea were his.
Yassin Farey and Fahad Yasin’s interviews occurred amid an aggressive social media campaign by Nabad iyo Nolol (N&N) supporters. Their collective intent appears to be equal parts whitewashing the history of former President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo’s five-year term and trying to undermine and sabotage the new Hassan Sheikh administration. The endgame may be to try to avoid accountability by flooding the political space with a constant stream of lies and invective. After all, men like Yassin Farey and Fahad Yasin know – in some cases literally – where the bodies are buried and could easily implicate their former boss. Sparing them from having to testify under oath is critical not just for their own political futures but for Farmaajo’s as well. And, based on the farcical effort to thank Farmaajo for ending corruption in Somalia by building him a mansion and a “presidential library,” Farmaajo appears determined not to cede the political field anytime soon.
The Somali Wire Team
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