Somalia’s political landscape shifted dramatically as Sheikh Adan Mohamed Nur (Adan Madoobe) secured the Lower House speakership with 163 votes, defeating Farmaajo-backed Hassan Abdinoor. Madoobe’s win, alongside Abdi Hashi Abdullahi’s re-election as Upper House speaker, signals waning influence for Farmaajo’s Nabad iyo Nolol party. The elections also made history with Saadia Yasin Haji Samatar becoming Somalia’s first female deputy speaker. The Farmaajo camp’s attempts to disrupt the process, including blocking MPs from entering the venue and even trying to sabotage air conditioning, failed to prevent the opposition’s victories. In a decisive move, Speaker Madoobe asserted authority over security forces until a new president is elected, warning commanders against political interference. This comes amid reports of ongoing efforts by Villa Somalia to exploit disputed Gedo elections to delay the process.
Somalia’s new parliament has elected Sheikh Adan Mohamed Nur, widely known as Adan Madoobe, as Lower House Speaker in a decisive win over his closest rival Hassan Abdinur. Madoobe secured 163 votes to Abdinur’s 89, a commanding victory that reflects his cross-party respect and reputation as a seasoned political figure. His election came after a tense standoff at Mogadishu’s Afisyoone venue, where police loyal to outgoing President Farmaajo initially blocked MPs from entering. Prime Minister Roble intervened, with ATMIS securing the venue and an agreement reached to bar 16 disputed MPs from Elwaq from voting. Madoobe, a veteran politician from the Rahanweyn clan, brings decades of political and parliamentary experience, having served as Speaker and even briefly as President in 2008. Known for his pragmatism and moderate political stance, he is seen as capable of fostering parliamentary cohesion and countering Farmaajo’s influence. His win, coupled with opposition control of both parliamentary chambers, significantly boosts the opposition’s position in the upcoming presidential election. Tactical voting and a key last-minute shift by the Somaliland bloc helped secure his victory. Madoobe’s leadership is expected to focus on constitutional completion, federal strengthening, and a more assertive parliamentary role in governance.
Somalia’s political climate reaches a decisive moment as MPs vote for the Lower House speaker and two deputies, a process seen as a key indicator of the upcoming presidential race. Tensions flared after outgoing President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo’s loyal NISA units raided Villa Hargeisa, attempting to block newly sworn-in Gedo MPs from participating by seizing parliamentary ID cards. Prime Minister Mohamed Hussein Roble countered the move, pledging to release an official attendance list to bypass the obstruction. Security forces remain embroiled in political intrigue, with senior police commanders implicated in the disruption. Reports of MPs being ferried to hotels for alleged cash for votes deals highlight the high-stakes, big-money nature of this election. Opposition forces, buoyed by the Senate’s re-election of Farmaajo critic Abdi Hashi as speaker, see momentum on their side.
The legacy of Kenya’s involvement in Somalia includes unresolved concerns over extremist networks within its own borders. Sheikh Hassaan Mahat Omar, also known as Abu Salmaan, a controversial Kenyan-Somali cleric from Garissa County, has long been accused of fundraising and recruiting for Al-Shabaab. Despite being placed on the UN sanctions list in 2011 and arrested multiple times, he has repeatedly been released without explanation, fueling speculation about protection from powerful political allies. Hassaan, who has preached at the Al-Shabaab-affiliated Masjid-ul-Axmar in Eastleigh, reportedly organised a 2017 fundraising event in collaboration with prominent Somali businessmen, raising $175,000 for Al-Shabaab. Investigations suggest extremist financing channels may be reinvesting into Kenyan businesses, particularly within Eastleigh’s influential commercial networks. This controversy intersects with Kenya’s political landscape, where Somali votes have become strategically important. Senior Kenyan-Somali politicians, some linked to influential families, wield significant sway. Analysts warn of a deepening symbiosis between Salafi clerics, political actors, and business networks, creating blind spots in counterterrorism efforts.
Somalia reached a pivotal milestone as its 11th parliament was sworn in on April 14, with 255 members taking their oath in Mogadishu. This development signifies a major step forward in the protracted electoral process, paving the way for speaker elections later in April and a potential presidential election in early May. Yet, the road ahead remains turbulent. Twenty seats are still under dispute, including 16 in Gedo, where elections are now planned for Elwaq instead of Garbahaarey, frustrating the Farmaajo camp. Fahad Yasin, a key figure in Somalia’s intelligence apparatus, is contesting legal challenges to his parliamentary bid, and the Supreme Court is now involved. Parliament's first session was marred by disruption, led by NISA-linked MPs mobilized by Fahad’s ally, Abdullahi Kulane ‘Jiis’. Their protests reflect mounting anxiety as opposition groups push to conclude the election before disputed seats are resolved.
The April 1 fire that destroyed Hargeisa’s Waaheen Market caused an estimated $2 billion in damage, devastating hundreds of businesses and wiping out the livelihoods of countless women street vendors. These women, many of whom migrated to Hargeisa due to drought, form the backbone of the city’s informal sector, selling food, milk, and second-hand clothes to feed their families. Despite generating significant revenue and paying daily taxes, they remain without legal protections, social benefits, or secure market space. The fire has exposed the deep vulnerabilities faced by women in Somaliland’s informal economy. Without business licenses, they are often treated as illegal traders, denied access to finance, and excluded from government support. Aid pledges from the diaspora and international community face political and logistical obstacles, as Somaliland’s unrecognised status limits direct access to funding.
On 29 March, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) officially became the seventh member of the East African Community (EAC), a move celebrated for its trade and infrastructure potential. However, the accession comes against a backdrop of persistent insecurity in eastern DRC, where unresolved rebel activity and regional rivalries threaten stability. President Felix Tshisekedi has sought regional cooperation to combat insurgent groups, but the involvement of neighbouring states also risks heightening tensions. Particularly concerning is the growing presence of the Islamic State in Central African Province (ISCAP), an offshoot of Uganda’s Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), which has recruited fighters from Tanzania, Kenya, and beyond. Since 2019, ISCAP has intensified attacks in North Kivu and Ituri, deploying improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and forging tactical links with Al-Shabaab and IS-Somalia. Recent IED incidents in Uganda and Rwanda underscore the group’s regional threat potential.
The assassination of Somali MP and human rights advocate Amina Mohamed Abdi in Beledweyne on 23 March has raised grave concerns about possible collusion between Somalia’s National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) and Al-Shabaab. Confidential information obtained by Sahan identifies the bomber as Mahamud Abdikadir Kosar, a former Al-Shabaab member who joined the group in 2014. Arrested in 2019 by Jubaland forces, Kosar was later released when federal forces took control and was allegedly recruited into NISA’s elite Duufaan unit, trained in Eritrea. This shocking revelation fuels long-standing suspicions of deep, transactional links between Al-Shabaab and elements within NISA. The bomber’s integration into a high-security paramilitary unit before carrying out a suicide mission suggests systemic infiltration or manipulation. Analysts point to the possibility of political assassinations masked as jihadist attacks, exploiting radicalized operatives for targeted killings.
In early 2022, Somalia entered a deepening crisis fueled by multiple shocks: a fourth consecutive below average rainy season, the Ukraine war’s disruption of food and fuel supplies, and ongoing political paralysis. The Gu rains, vital for 75% of Somalia’s annual rainfall, are delayed and forecasts predict significant deficits, threatening agriculture and pastoral livelihoods. Already, 4.9 million people are affected, 719,000 displaced, and 1.4 million children face acute malnutrition. Somalia’s dependence on wheat imports from Ukraine over 90% compounds the crisis as global grain supplies tighten and prices soar. The UN warns famine could hit parts of southern and central Somalia if rains fail, prices rise further, and humanitarian aid remains inadequate. Despite the looming catastrophe, Somalia’s political elite remain consumed by protracted elections, diverting attention from emergency response. The 2022 Humanitarian Response Plan seeks $1.5 billion, but only 4.4% is funded. Experts urge a unified, state-led drought response to galvanize donor support and avert a repeat of the 2011 famine that killed 260,000 people.
In a bold diplomatic move, Somali caretaker Prime Minister Mohamed Hussein Roble expelled African Union envoy Francisco Madeira for “activities incompatible with his status,” widely interpreted as espionage and political meddling. Madeira, Special Representative of the AU Commission and head of ATMIS, had long been viewed as closely aligned with President Farmaajo and Somalia’s intelligence service (NISA), drawing criticism from the opposition and international observers for partisan behavior. The decision followed a leaked audio recording in which Madeira criticized Somali leaders and aligned himself with Farmaajo’s camp. His comments sparked outrage, confirming suspicions that the AU mission was entangled in Somalia’s political struggles. The directive also exposed deep rifts within ATMIS and Somalia’s own government, as Farmaajo quickly countered Roble’s move, claiming the PM lacked authority.
In the aftermath of the devastating Waaheen Market fire, Somaliland's vulnerability within the international aid system has come under renewed scrutiny. Despite global sympathy and a pledge of $12 million from the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), the reality is more complex. The funds were not Mogadishu's aid, but international development grants long allocated for Somaliland frozen since 2018 when the FGS unilaterally ended the Somaliland Special Arrangement. This decision, driven by fears of undermining federalism, severed Somaliland’s access to direct international assistance. As a result, the region despite its relative peace and stability remains disconnected from international banking, aid systems, and forums for development planning. Hargeisa’s private sector has sustained the economy for decades, but the fire has exposed deep cracks in this self-reliance, particularly the absence of insurance safety nets or accessible global funding.
Somalia's fragile democracy is under severe threat as outgoing President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo and his ally Fahad Yasin attempt to disrupt the final stages of the electoral process. After Fahad Yasin was disqualified from the list of certified MPs, a wave of resistance erupted from the Farmaajo camp, leading to deep fractures within the Federal Electoral Implementation Team (FEIT). The dismissal of dissenting electoral officials by PM Roble has only intensified tensions. Fearing electoral defeat, Farmaajo and Fahad appear to be exploring desperate options including invoking security threats from Al-Shabaab as a pretext to halt the elections, declare a state of emergency, or impose martial law. With South West State President Laftagareen also suspending cooperation with the Prime Minister, political alliances are rapidly shifting. Analysts warn that Somalia may be inching toward another April 2021-style crisis.
On 2 April, a massive fire tore through Waaheen Market in Hargeisa, Somaliland, destroying thousands of shops in the heart of the city’s economy. Fueled by flammable goods and inadequate safety infrastructure, the blaze raged for over 40 hours. Though no lives were lost, the economic damage was staggering estimated at $1.5 to $2 billion. The market supported over 75% of the city’s population through direct and indirect employment, making the fire the worst economic catastrophe in Somaliland’s recent history. Despite heroic efforts by an under-resourced fire department led by Lt-Gen Sawaahil, the incident highlighted long-standing issues lax building regulations, poor wiring, and neglect by municipal authorities. International messages of sympathy poured in, and Somaliland launched a global appeal for support.
Fahad Yasin, once the powerful National Security Advisor to President Farmaajo and the de facto head of Somalia’s NISA, has been dropped from the final list of MPs by the Federal Electoral Implementation Team (FEIT). Though a victory for many hoping to restore credibility in Somalia’s electoral process, fears remain that Fahad could still coerce his way back into parliament. His controversial nomination for the HoP#086 seat in Beledweyne faced rejection after clan leaders alleged the use of a fake elder to legitimize his candidacy. Fahad's history marked by allegations of links to Al-Shabaab, the manipulation of security forces, and targeted political violence makes his removal from parliament both a relief and a warning.
Al-Shabaab's recent infiltration of Aden Adde International Airport the most secure site in Somalia exposed how deeply the jihadist group has embedded itself within the state. Wearing Somali National Army uniforms and aided by complicit insiders, Al-Shabaab militants not only breached a key security zone but also underlined a disturbing truth: the group’s influence has spread into the very heart of the government and society. Beyond traditional terrorism, Al-Shabaab now operates an extensive administrative infrastructure. From census databases and cadastral surveys to property taxation and education oversight, the group is systematising control under the guise of governance. Their growing influence over clan elders, educational institutions, ports, and even social media reflects a parallel authority that increasingly rivals if not surpasses the federal government.
The tragic assassination of Amina Mohamed Abdi, a trailblazing Somali MP, highlights the deeply rooted challenges and dangers faced by women in Somali politics. Amina began her political career at just 24, overcoming misogynistic ridicule and social barriers to become a powerful voice for justice and accountability. Her death in a targeted Beledweyne attack that killed nearly 50 people raises urgent questions about the forces working to silence women’s political voices in Somalia. Amina’s murder is not an isolated incident. It adds to a disturbing list of female leaders like Almaas Elman, Istarlin Arush, and Ikraan Tahlil who were either assassinated or mysteriously disappeared for daring to challenge entrenched patriarchal and political systems. Critics believe some killings, including Amina’s, may have been politically motivated rather than purely acts of terror.
As Somalia approaches its much-delayed presidential election, outgoing President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo has reignited political tensions with a controversial push to form the Dir, Digil, and Mirifle (DDM) Alliance. Through secret meetings and strategic promises, Villa Somalia is attempting to shift the parliamentary dynamics in his favor. The plan? Install a Hawiye speaker of the Lower House, thereby locking out strong Hawiye contenders from the presidency and tipping the balance toward Farmaajo’s re-election. This move challenges the 4.5 clan power-sharing formula that has governed Somali politics for over two decades. Though flawed, the 4.5 formula has offered a semblance of stability. Farmaajo’s divide-and-rule approach risks tearing apart this fragile balance. Key allies like South West State’s President Laftagareen are spearheading this campaign, hoping to sway newly elected MPs from the DDM communities.
Kenya–Somalia relations have long been influenced by a small but powerful group of Kenyan-Somali elites. While the broader Kenyan public remains largely disconnected from Somali politics, figures like Gen. Mahmoud Mohamed, Yusuf Hajji, and Aden Duale have historically played a central role in shaping Kenya’s policy toward Somalia. From the failed Azania buffer zone project to support for Ahmed Madoobe’s Ras Kamboni brigade, these maneuvers reveal how clan interests and personal networks often trump national strategies. The intervention in Somalia in 2011, catalyzed by kidnappings in Lamu and Dadaab, marked a turning point. Kenya’s military presence deepened, but diplomatic tensions intensified under Somalia’s President Farmaajo. His centralization efforts clashed with Kenya-backed Jubaland leaders, leading to severed diplomatic ties and border tensions.
For years, Mogadishu residents joked about having two governments daytime and nighttime. Today, that distinction has collapsed. Al-Shabaab now dominates both day and night, operating with more control, efficiency, and coherence than the Federal Government of Somalia. Once viewed as insurgents, Al-Shabaab has transformed into a governing force, collecting taxes, delivering services, and controlling territory. The group’s growing influence is not just on the battlefield. It has reportedly infiltrated the highest levels of government. The murder of Amina Mohamed a vocal critic of Fahad Yasin and Farmaajo—by Al-Shabaab has sparked speculation of a covert alliance between Villa Somalia and the militants. Critics and opposition figures are being systematically targeted, blurring the line between insurgency and governance. The attack on Mogadishu’s heavily fortified airport further underscores the deepening crisis. Despite tight security, two Al-Shabaab operatives breached the facility, killing six and revealing glaring lapses in national defense.
Since taking office in 2017, outgoing President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo has pursued a centralization policy, attempting to install loyalists across Somalia’s five Federal Member States (FMS). While he succeeded in South West, Hirshabelle, and Galmudug, he failed in Puntland and Jubaland, where resistance was fierce. The standoff in Jubaland’s Gedo region, particularly in Garbahaarey, has emerged as a flashpoint in Somalia’s current electoral process. Farmaajo’s refusal to recognize the re-election of Jubaland President Ahmed Madoobe and the subsequent deployment of federal forces to Gedo effectively cut the region off from the Jubaland administration. This move has led to fears of an unfair and manipulated electoral process, as the 16 parliamentary seats in Garbahaarey are crucial in selecting Somalia’s next president.