A blueprint for the fight against Al-Shabaab
On Tuesday, 5 July, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) delivered a speech at Turkey’s SETA Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research. In his remarks, HSM emphasized the need to fight Al-Shabaab in an integrated way, by targeting their military, financial, and ideological capabilities. The president’s address was notable for not just advocating a purely military solution: more troops, more weapons, more operations. Instead, he offered a more holistic strategy, one that seemed to acknowledge that the threat posed by Al-Shabaab owes to more than just their fighting strength.
HSM’s message appeared to be understood by Al-Shabaab as more than just empty rhetoric. After many months of silence, Al-Shabaab’s leader, Abu Ubaidah, issued a defiant rejoinder. He criticised not just Hassan Sheikh but the entire Somali political order for being un-Islamic (due to its failure to implement Sharia law) and the government’s inability to address many of Somalia’s problems, including the disastrous drought that has gripped much of the country.
After several years without any major offensives by Somali or AMISOM (now ATMIS) forces, Al-Shabaab likely senses that the status quo which developed under HSM’s predecessor, Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo, will not hold. Rather than using security forces against political opponents and launching the occasional PR offensive against Al-Shabaab (which the group would quickly reverse), HSM seems determined to regain the initiative. And Al-Shabaab seems to be taking him seriously. Reliable sources confirmed that the group has already started removing critical assets, including logistical capabilities, from some cities under its control. This suggests they anticipate that the government will launch offensive operations in the near future.
At the same time, every Somali president has vowed early in his term to defeat Al Shabaab, with mixed results. How, then, should the government approach the fight with Al-Shabaab this time? Here are a few steps the government can take to put it on a path to win the war against Al-Shabaab.
It will be impossible to defeat Al-Shabaab unless it is a truly joint effort involving Somali federal and state forces working with ATMIS troops and international partners toward a common objective. HSM’s government has already made significant progress in bringing Somalia’s international partners back on-board politically and financially. But, as he pushes for a collective military effort, HSM needs to manage expectation and avoid over-promising and under-delivering. The fight against Al-Shabaab has been going on for 15 years; it will not end anytime soon.
The president must convene a National Security Council (NSC) meeting comprised of FGS and FMS stakeholders to address not just critical security issues but to resolve outstanding political ones as well. Under the previous administration, political disputes undermined any possibility of a coordinated security strategy. The NSC should strive to reach agreement over the National Security Architecture and the Somalia Transitional Plan (STP), including a realistic timeline for their implementation. The discussions should also address the division of labour between FGS and FMS institutions, which should then be codified in legislation passed by Parliament.
Security sector reform – largely moribund since the 2017 London Conference – also needs to be a key part of Somalia’s strategy against Al-Shabaab. The STP, which is already mostly aspirational, will almost certainly fail unless the Somalia Security Forces (SSF) are reformed. The government should also aim to improve its force generation capabilities within six months, but not just in terms of sheer numbers; proper training, equipment, and sustainment are also critical. These new forces should also be positioned in areas where they are needed, rather than based in relatively secure places like Mogadishu.
Tactically, going on offense against Al-Shabaab must be coordinated and multi directional. Otherwise, it is just akin to squeezing a balloon – applying pressure in one direction only shifts things somewhere else. Currently, Al-Shabaab controls 11 districts countrywide and their liberation should be a priority. Recapturing them would reduce Al-Shabaab’s freedom of manoeuvre, decrease its influence over the population (including recruitment), and eliminate the financial revenue the group draws from the large population centres it currently controls.
The last point – targeting Al-Shabaab’s sources of revenue – is essential. Extortion, which the group euphemistically calls taxation, is Al-Shabaab’s lifeline and underpins most of its other capabilities. Among the financial reforms the government must undertake is addressing the issue of ‘threat finance,’ especially money laundering by Al-Shabaab.
Perhaps the great challenge HSM faces in the fight against Al-Shabaab is countering the group’s ideological appeal, much of which draws from the Somali government’s own f laws and weaknesses. Besides trying to get his own house in order, especially in terms of checking Somalia’s rampant corruption, HSM should prioritise preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE), especially among Somali youth and the most marginalised segments of society. A credible grass root campaign against Al-Shabaab, involving elders, clan leaders, religious figures, and defectors, is essential to blunt the popular support the group depends upon. One key aspect of this approach must be to stop people from preferring Al-Shabaab courts over those of the government. But rather than just criminalising the practice, the government must reform its own justice system, in an effort to eliminate corruption and incompetence and make the system more reliable, responsive, and trusted.
Mao Zedong’s dictum about insurgency – “The guerrilla must move amongst the people as a fish swims in the sea” – is true for Al-Shabaab as well. Its members are able to operate in Mogadishu and other areas under government control through a combination of intimidation and anonymity. The government must speed up its national ID card program. The government uses several stand-alone databases, such as one used by the Somali Police Force’s criminal investigation department (CID) and another used by immigration. Combining those databases and linking them with the courts and prison system will reduce Al-Shabaab members’ ability to travel freely both inside and outside the country. There is a similar disconnect in information sharing and collaboration between different government agencies that must be rectified.
The war against Al-Shabaab has been – and will remain – a long one. It is much about ‘hearts and minds’ as it is about bullets and IEDs. For that reason, it requires a whole-of-government approach at the federal and state level as well as with Somalia’s international partners. Hassan Sheikh, like his predecessors, enjoys considerable goodwill and support at this early point in his presidency. It would be to Somalia’s benefit if his soaring words were matched with tangible progress in the fight against Al-Shabaab.
The Somali Wire Team
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