Since the post-9/11 era, Somalia has transformed into a key arena for geopolitical competition between Gulf powers and other emerging players. While the US and its Western allies have scaled back their assertive foreign policy, countries such as Qatar, Turkey, and the UAE have stepped in, leveraging financial and political influence to secure their interests. Turkey’s 2011 humanitarian entry, Qatar’s financial backing of Somali leaders, and the UAE’s training of Somali security forces reflect a shift from purely aid-driven engagement to transactional politics.
Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed recently hosted Somaliland President Muse Bihi Abdi in Addis Ababa for closed-door talks shrouded in secrecy. While both leaders offered only vague public statements, speculation has centered on a sensitive proposal: Ethiopia’s interest in leasing coastal land near Seylac (Zeila) for a naval outpost. This location, strategically positioned at the meeting point of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, would provide Ethiopia with coveted maritime access. Previous discussions on the matter date back to Abiy’s dealings with former Somali President Farmaajo, but Somaliland resisted due to concerns over the Berbera Port project’s success.
In 2011, Mogadishu was a war-torn city emerging from years of Al-Shabaab control, famine, and destruction. Basic services were non-existent, with only one functioning coffee shop, “The Village,” serving espresso over firewood. Fast forward a decade, and the Somali capital has transformed into a bustling hub with high-rise buildings, restored landmarks, and a thriving café culture. Modern coffee shops equipped with $10,000 machines now cater to a growing middle class, returning diaspora, and young professionals. These venues offer 4G internet, stylish interiors, and an atmosphere where men and women mingle freely—something rare in Somalia’s recent past.
Somalia’s pastoral heritage has long been anchored in kinship networks that provide safety, security, and mutual obligations. These clan-based social contracts, whether patrilineal power structures or alliances of smaller lineages, operate under a stark reality: the strong often seek to dominate the weak, but even submission has limits. This principle is vividly illustrated in the story of Farah Nur, a renowned poet, anti-colonial warrior, and member of the Arab sub-clan of the Isaaq. In the late 19th century, the smaller Arab clan resisted the dominance of the powerful Iidagale, rulers of the Isaaq Sultanate. After enduring repeated abuses, the Arab crowned Farah Nur as their first Sultan. His coronation poem, The Limits of Submission, declared that while compromise had been offered, the Arab could not surrender beyond reason.
Former Somali Foreign Minister Mohammed Abdirizak recently revealed an incident that underscores the erratic nature of Villa Somalia’s foreign policy under former President Farmaajo. In late 2021, Abdirizak secured humanitarian aid from Egypt to address Somalia’s worsening crisis. However, when Egypt arranged for a military aircraft to deliver the supplies, Villa Somalia abruptly requested a civilian plane instead, fearing the optics might alarm Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed amid tensions over the Nile dam. The decision surprised Cairo and led to a personal row between Abdirizak and Somalia’s leadership. Abdirizak, a U.S. national with presidential ambitions, has a long diplomatic career but was no stranger to the complexities of Somalia’s politics. While foreign minister, he championed an anti-Kenya stance, supported Farmaajo’s mandate extension, and promoted “African solutions for African problems” in regional disputes.
The standoff between Puntland President Sa’id Abdillahi Deni and the elite U.S.-trained Puntland Security Forces (PSF) led by General Mohamud Osman Diyaano has exposed deep political and clan divisions in the state. Tensions began in November 2021 when Deni attempted to replace Diyaano with a political ally, sparking fierce resistance from the Bah Dir Rooble subclan of the Osman Mohamud, who claim a sense of ownership over the PSF. The dispute escalated into deadly clashes in Bosaaso, leaving dozens dead and thousands displaced. Mediation efforts by Puntland politicians failed, prompting traditional Majerteen elders to intervene with a six-point demand that went beyond the immediate conflict, including reinstating Diyaano, expelling P&O Ports from Bosaaso, and reallocating state ministries. Deni, facing diminished political support, appeared to embrace the elders’ demands in an effort to defuse tensions. While this temporarily eased the crisis, it left unresolved the deeper issues of clan politics, institutional authority, and governance in Puntland.
Somalia is often ranked among the world’s most fragile states, consistently appearing near the top of the Fragile States Index. While these rankings highlight serious governance challenges, critics argue they perpetuate stereotypes and oversimplify complex realities. State fragility is frequently portrayed through a Western lens, equating governance solely with the presence of a strong central government. In Somalia, however, governance has historically existed without centralized state structures, both in the pre-colonial era and during periods of state collapse. The assumption that building a strong, centralized government will automatically lead to stability overlooks Somalia’s decentralized traditions and federal framework. Since adopting federalism in 2004, Somalia was meant to devolve power to Federal Member States (FMS), but recent years have seen growing centralization, fueling political disputes and undermining governance at the local level.
Somalia’s National Consultative Council (NCC) talks in Mogadishu to resolve the prolonged electoral crisis are teetering on the brink of collapse. Key disputes persist over the creation of a second constituency in each Federal Member State (FMS), leadership of the Federal Electoral Implementation Team (FEIT), security force involvement, and the handling of electoral complaints. Opposition-led Puntland and Jubaland demand halting the vote, overhauling FEIT, and reviewing the two-constituency rule. The deadlock is fueled by an intensifying power struggle between Prime Minister Mohammed Hussein Roble and President Mohamed Abdullahi “Farmaajo.” Rival armed groups loyal to each leader are entrenched inside Villa Somalia, raising fears of violent confrontation. Farmaajo, accused of manipulating the electoral process, is using attrition tactics to outlast opponents, while parts of the opposition show signs of co‑optation.
While many believe that a strong Somali military alone can defeat Al‑Shabaab, history shows most insurgencies end through negotiated settlements rather than outright military victory. Somalia’s conflict with Al‑Shabaab has reached a protracted stalemate, with neither side able to decisively win. The Somali government’s progress largely relies on international support from AMISOM and partners such as the US, UK, and Turkey, while Al‑Shabaab maintains the initiative in many areas. Al‑Shabaab’s resilience stems from three pillars: popular support (coerced or voluntary), significant financial resources, and access to weapons and explosives. Weakening the group requires disrupting these pillars. Strategies include supporting dissident clans, encouraging defections, denying access to population centres, freezing bank accounts, targeting revenue streams, and dismantling IED supply chains. Military measures such as high‑value target operations, reinforcing liberated areas, and forcing Al‑Shabaab to fight on multiple fronts could also degrade its capabilities.
Somalia’s elite, against all sensible and strategic advice, decided decades ago to make Somaliland an electoral constituency, despite the absence of consent and political settlement on the issues of independence and unity. The aim may have been to use the elections to assert Mogadishu’s sovereignty. In the event, the Somaliland vote in the south has become a perennial catalyst that feeds electoral dysfunction in Somalia. It has also become a powerful magnet for “dissidents” from Hargeisa – a motley collection of unionists, political tourists, interlopers and neophytes - all looking to Mogadishu for posts, perks and prestige
The modern story of Somalia tends to be told through the narrow lens of conflict. As the 'poster child' of a failed state, depictions of Somalis have often been reduced to one of piracy and famine, driven by Hollywood films such as Black Hawk Down and Captain Phillips. As such, there has been a tendency to reduce the rich and nuanced Somali culture to one single narrative of chaos and violence – erasing the creativity and humanity of Somalis. Though internecine conflict and political instability have nevertheless dominated the lives of millions of Somalis since the 1990s, the nuance of poetry and art's relationship to these issues can often be overlooked.
In the aftermath of Hamas's 7 October devastating onslaught in southern Israel, Al-Shabaab spied an opportunity. In Jilib, the extremist's de facto capital, operatives were tasked with studying the widely circulated videos of Hamas fighters attacking Israel's military outposts, villages, and a music festival. These operatives, whose role is to monitor and develop weaponry from information gleaned from the internet, were inspired.