As political tensions grow between Ethiopia and Somalia, it’s Al-Shabaab that wins
During a recent visit to the border with Somalia, Mustafa Omer ‘Cagjar,’ the president of Ethiopia’s Somali Regional State (SRS), declared, “To shield this area from terrorist attacks, we will create a security buffer zone [in which there would be no terrorist presence].” Cagjar was addressing members of the paramilitary Liyu Police, who had been engaged in heavy fighting with Al-Shabaab militants during the previous 10 days and repelled a significant incursion deep into Ethiopia by Al-Shabaab forces.
Cagjar’s comments run the risk of backfiring, though, and could potentially worsen the situation on the border. First, issues of territorial integrity belong to federal authorities, specifically the ministries of defence and foreign affairs. Cagjar was going far beyond his remit in calling for a buffer zone, which would almost certainly raise tensions between Ethiopia and Somalia. Second, any attempt to actually implement a buffer zone at the state level could result in more hostility toward state security forces.
Diplomatic hackles have already been raised following the recent cancellation of Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s (HSM) planned visit to Addis Abeba and his subsequent trip to Cairo. In Cairo, Somalia got dragged into the dispute between Egypt and Ethiopia over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). Cagjar’s previous statement on the GERD, combined with more recent ones about establishing a buffer zone, add unneeded uncertainty and volatility as Somalia and Ethiopia chart their relationship going forward under HSM.
Cagjar is familiar with Somalia’s security deficiencies, which make the border a point of vulnerability for Ethiopia. He also understands Somali sensitivities about sovereignty and territorial integrity. In order to prevent Al-Shabaab from engaging in cross-border terrorism, the security services and other state authorities must have a functional working relationship. Politicians like Cagjar need to refrain from interfering in anything that might impair those efforts. Cagjar’s machinations to consolidate his power in the SRS have already made Al-Shabaab’s job much easier.
Similarly, the security forces depend on the goodwill and cooperation of the people who live along the border. Politicians should support residents who firmly stood with the Liyu Police against the recent Al-Shabaab attacks, including by donating food – an especially generous gesture, given worsening food security in the region.
Starting on July 19, Al-Shabaab militants conducted multiple attacks in Somalia’s Bakool and Hiiraan regions, close to the Ethiopian border. The first attacks were on three towns – Aato, Yeed, and Washaqo – in Bakool region where Liyu police units were based. Over a hundred Liyu Police were killed. Regional officials believe the attacks on the Liyu police was intended as a diversion to allow a second force of some 500 Al-Shabaab militants, along with their vehicles, to enter Ethiopia. After they crossed the Ethiopian border, Sahan believes that the Al Shabaab forces intended to cut the main road between Somalia’s Shabelle region and Ethiopia’s Afdheer zone before trying to reach the rugged mountains in the Bale region of Oromo Regional State.
After fighting raged in parts of the SRS on 21-22 July, Cagjar claimed victory over Al-Shabaab, saying that his state security forces, backed by ENDF reinforcements, had repelled the incursion. The ENDF claimed that it killed two senior Al-Shabaab leaders: group’s spokesman, Abdiaziz Abu Mus’ab, and Fuad Mohamed Khalaf (aka Fuad Shongale), a Swedish citizen with $5-million bounty offered by the U.S. State Department, during fighting inside Ethiopia.
At the same time, Al-Shabaab media has been working overtime to highlight their successes and disparage Ethiopian claims of victory. The absence of any independent news organizations in the area makes is nearly impossible to verify either side’s claims. However, on Friday, 29 July, Al-Shabaab attacked Aato for the second time in just over a week. This not only showed their determination but it also cast doubts on Cagjar’s claims that the group had been decisively defeated and cleared from the area. Further undercutting Ethiopia’s claims, Abu Mus’ab – the Al-Shabaab spokesman the Ethiopians claimed to have killed days earlier – gave an interview to an Al-Shabaab-aligned media outlet about the 29 July attack on Aato.
The most concerning thing, of course, is that Al-Shabaab was able to mount a coordinated attack on this scale in the first place. In an interview last week, General Stephen Townsend, the commander of U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), said that due to over a year’s worth of political turmoil in Somalia (diplomatically, he didn’t mention Ethiopia’s own internal divisions). “Al-Shabab got bigger, bolder, stronger,” Townsend said. “So now we’ve got to blunt the initiative that they’ve enjoyed for 15 months or more.” While lauding the Ethiopian forces for their response, Townsend warned that this was likely just the opening salvo in Al Shabaab’s effort to launch more attacks outside of Somalia: “This is not a fluke…I don’t believe this is a one-off.”
To prevent the recurrence of similar attacks in the future, Ethiopia and Somalia need to increase their security cooperation, especially along the border. Rash statements about unilateral plans to create a cordon sanitaire that would affect hundreds of thousands of people along the border are not helpful. They risk achieving the opposite: worsening relations, and therefore cooperation, between the two states. The only party that stands to benefit from a diplomatic quarrel is Al-Shabaab.
The Somali Wire Team
Gain unlimited access to all our Editorials. Unlock Full Access to Our Expert Editorials — Trusted Insights, Unlimited Reading.
Create your Sahan account LoginUnlock lifetime access to all our Premium editorial content
Apathy pervades the Djiboutian population. A week tomorrow, on April 10, the country will head to the polls, with President Ismaïl Omar Guelleh seeking a 6th— essentially uncontested — term in office. With his coronation inevitable, his family's dynastic rule over this rentier city-state will be extended once more. But in a region wracked by armed conflict and geopolitical contestation, the ageing Guelleh's capacity to manage the familial, ethnic, and regional fractures within and without grows ever more complicated. And Djibouti's apparent stability is no product of institutional strength, but rather an increasingly fractious balance of external rents and coercive control-- underpinned by geopolitical relevance.
In the 17th century, the Ottoman polymath Kâtip Çelebi penned 'The Gift to the Great on Naval Campaigns', a great tome that analysed the history of Ottoman naval warfare at a moment when Constantinople sought to reclaim maritime supremacy over European powers.
Why have one mega-dam when you can have three more? Details are scarce, but Ethiopia has unveiled plans to build three more dams on the Blue Nile, just a few months after the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) was completed.
Villa Somalia has prevailed in Baidoa. After weeks of ratcheting tensions, South West State President Abdiaziz Laftagareen proved a paper tiger this morning, unable to resist the massed forces backed by Mogadishu. After several hours of fighting, Somali National Army (SNA) forces and allied Rahanweyne militias now control most of Baidoa and, thus, the future of South West. In turn, Laftagareen is believed to have retreated to the protection of the Ethiopian military at Baidoa's airport, with the bilateral forces having avoided the conflict today.
Last October, Al-Shabaab Inqimasin (suicide assault infantry) overran a National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) base in Mogadishu, freeing several high-ranking jihadist detainees and destroying substantial quantities of intel. A highly choreographed attack, the Inqimasin had disguised their vehicle in official NISA daub, weaving easily through the heavily guarded checkpoints dotting the capital to reach the Godka Jilicow compound before blowing open the gates with a suicide car bomb. In the months since, Al-Shabaab's prodigious media arm-- Al-Kataib Media Foundation-- has drip-fed images and videos drawn from the Godka Jilicow attack, revelling in their infiltration of Mogadishu as well as the dark history of the prison itself. And in a chilling propaganda video broadcast at Eid al-Fitr last week, it was revealed that among the Inqimasin's number was none other than the son of Al-Shabaab's spokesperson Ali Mohamed Rage, better known as Ali Dheere.
In early 1987, the commander of the Sudanese People's Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M), John Garang, is reported to have issued a radio order, instructing his field officers to gather children to be dispatched to Ethiopia for military training. Garang's command conveyed the rebels' institutionalisation of a well-established practice of child soldiering; a dynamic that has been reproduced by virtually every major armed actor in Sudan-- and later South Sudan-- since independence. Today, as war has continued to ravage and metastasise across Sudan, few communities and children have been left untouched by the ruinous violence.
The Rahanweyne Resistance Army (RRA) did not emerge from a shir (conference) in October 1995 to defend a government, nor to overthrow it. Rather, the militia —whose name was even explicit in its defence of a unified Digil-Mirifle identity —arose from the ruin of Bay and Bakool in the years prior, and decades of structural inequalities.
War has been averted in Tigray-- for now. In early February, tens of thousands of Ethiopian federal soldiers and heavy artillery streamed northwards, readying themselves on the edges of the northernmost region for seemingly imminent conflict.
The battle for South West—and Somalia's political future—continues apace. With the brittle alliance between South West State President Abdiaziz Laftagareen and President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud having broken down spectacularly, the federal government is pouring in arms and forces to oust the Digil-Mirifle leader. Staring down the barrel of the formal opposition holding three Federal Member States and, with it, greater territory, population, and clan, Villa Somalia is looking to exploit intra-Digil-Mirifle grievances—and convince Addis—to keep its monopolistic electoral agenda alive. But this morning, Laftagareen announced a 9-member electoral committee to hastily steer his re-election, bringing the formal bifurcation of the Somali state ever closer.