As political tensions grow between Ethiopia and Somalia, it’s Al-Shabaab that wins
During a recent visit to the border with Somalia, Mustafa Omer ‘Cagjar,’ the president of Ethiopia’s Somali Regional State (SRS), declared, “To shield this area from terrorist attacks, we will create a security buffer zone [in which there would be no terrorist presence].” Cagjar was addressing members of the paramilitary Liyu Police, who had been engaged in heavy fighting with Al-Shabaab militants during the previous 10 days and repelled a significant incursion deep into Ethiopia by Al-Shabaab forces.
Cagjar’s comments run the risk of backfiring, though, and could potentially worsen the situation on the border. First, issues of territorial integrity belong to federal authorities, specifically the ministries of defence and foreign affairs. Cagjar was going far beyond his remit in calling for a buffer zone, which would almost certainly raise tensions between Ethiopia and Somalia. Second, any attempt to actually implement a buffer zone at the state level could result in more hostility toward state security forces.
Diplomatic hackles have already been raised following the recent cancellation of Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s (HSM) planned visit to Addis Abeba and his subsequent trip to Cairo. In Cairo, Somalia got dragged into the dispute between Egypt and Ethiopia over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). Cagjar’s previous statement on the GERD, combined with more recent ones about establishing a buffer zone, add unneeded uncertainty and volatility as Somalia and Ethiopia chart their relationship going forward under HSM.
Cagjar is familiar with Somalia’s security deficiencies, which make the border a point of vulnerability for Ethiopia. He also understands Somali sensitivities about sovereignty and territorial integrity. In order to prevent Al-Shabaab from engaging in cross-border terrorism, the security services and other state authorities must have a functional working relationship. Politicians like Cagjar need to refrain from interfering in anything that might impair those efforts. Cagjar’s machinations to consolidate his power in the SRS have already made Al-Shabaab’s job much easier.
Similarly, the security forces depend on the goodwill and cooperation of the people who live along the border. Politicians should support residents who firmly stood with the Liyu Police against the recent Al-Shabaab attacks, including by donating food – an especially generous gesture, given worsening food security in the region.
Starting on July 19, Al-Shabaab militants conducted multiple attacks in Somalia’s Bakool and Hiiraan regions, close to the Ethiopian border. The first attacks were on three towns – Aato, Yeed, and Washaqo – in Bakool region where Liyu police units were based. Over a hundred Liyu Police were killed. Regional officials believe the attacks on the Liyu police was intended as a diversion to allow a second force of some 500 Al-Shabaab militants, along with their vehicles, to enter Ethiopia. After they crossed the Ethiopian border, Sahan believes that the Al Shabaab forces intended to cut the main road between Somalia’s Shabelle region and Ethiopia’s Afdheer zone before trying to reach the rugged mountains in the Bale region of Oromo Regional State.
After fighting raged in parts of the SRS on 21-22 July, Cagjar claimed victory over Al-Shabaab, saying that his state security forces, backed by ENDF reinforcements, had repelled the incursion. The ENDF claimed that it killed two senior Al-Shabaab leaders: group’s spokesman, Abdiaziz Abu Mus’ab, and Fuad Mohamed Khalaf (aka Fuad Shongale), a Swedish citizen with $5-million bounty offered by the U.S. State Department, during fighting inside Ethiopia.
At the same time, Al-Shabaab media has been working overtime to highlight their successes and disparage Ethiopian claims of victory. The absence of any independent news organizations in the area makes is nearly impossible to verify either side’s claims. However, on Friday, 29 July, Al-Shabaab attacked Aato for the second time in just over a week. This not only showed their determination but it also cast doubts on Cagjar’s claims that the group had been decisively defeated and cleared from the area. Further undercutting Ethiopia’s claims, Abu Mus’ab – the Al-Shabaab spokesman the Ethiopians claimed to have killed days earlier – gave an interview to an Al-Shabaab-aligned media outlet about the 29 July attack on Aato.
The most concerning thing, of course, is that Al-Shabaab was able to mount a coordinated attack on this scale in the first place. In an interview last week, General Stephen Townsend, the commander of U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), said that due to over a year’s worth of political turmoil in Somalia (diplomatically, he didn’t mention Ethiopia’s own internal divisions). “Al-Shabab got bigger, bolder, stronger,” Townsend said. “So now we’ve got to blunt the initiative that they’ve enjoyed for 15 months or more.” While lauding the Ethiopian forces for their response, Townsend warned that this was likely just the opening salvo in Al Shabaab’s effort to launch more attacks outside of Somalia: “This is not a fluke…I don’t believe this is a one-off.”
To prevent the recurrence of similar attacks in the future, Ethiopia and Somalia need to increase their security cooperation, especially along the border. Rash statements about unilateral plans to create a cordon sanitaire that would affect hundreds of thousands of people along the border are not helpful. They risk achieving the opposite: worsening relations, and therefore cooperation, between the two states. The only party that stands to benefit from a diplomatic quarrel is Al-Shabaab.
The Somali Wire Team
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