Issue No. 439

Al-Shabaab – the past in the future 

Since its inception in the 1990s, the Al-Qa’ida-affiliated terrorist group Al-Shabab has gone through many different iterations. Born from Al-Ittihad Al-Islamiyya (AIAI), the group that forged the initial bonds between Al-Qa’ida and Somali jihadists in 1992, Al-Shabaab first surfaced in 2002 as a small, hardcore group of militant jihadists who eschewed non-violent means to establish an Islamic state in Somalia and formed a front with a small group of Al-Qa’ida operatives. Under the banner of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) in 2004, these militants, including Adan Hashi Ayro, Ahmed Abdi Godane, and Ibrahim al-Afghani, openly emerged as a force in Mogadishu and its environs. 

In 2006, Ethiopian forces invaded Somalia and expelled the ICU from Mogadishu. Al-Shabaab transitioned into a guerrilla force and began spreading across southern Somalia. In early 2010, after years of professing their support to Al-Qai’da, Al- Shabaab’s leader, Ahmed Abdi Godane, aka Mukhtar Abu Zubeyr, declared his allegiance to Al-Qa’ida. Years earlier, Al-Qa’ida had pledged its allegiance (bay’ah) to the leader of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (the Taliban), Mullah Mohammed Omar. So, Al-Shabaab was, by extension, pledging allegiance to Mullah Omar as Amir al-Mu’minin – “Commander of the Faithful.”

Despite having been expelled from nearly all major Somali urban centres by African Union forces in 2011-12, Al-Shabaab’s finances and recruiting have improved in the decade since. In 2013, ideological rifts within Al-Shabaab led to major splits and Godane began to purge anyone suspected of disloyalty. Well-known figures such as Hassan Dahir Aweys, Mohamed Sa’id ‘Atom,’ and Mukhtar Roobow ‘Abu Mansuur’ surrendered to the government. Then Godane was killed in a drone strike in 2014. Freed from his erratic leadership, Al-Shabaab entered a period of consolidation under Ahmed Umar ‘Diriye,’ aka Abu Ubaidah. Al-Shabaab has long held supra-national aspirations and the group has been clear about its desire to spread jihad beyond Somalia’s borders. But during the post-Godane period of retrenchment, Al-Shabaab largely remained focused on Somalia. The number of foreign jihadists decreased; it has mainly been those from East African countries who remained.

Late last month, Al-Shabaab mounted one of its boldest actions to date: an incursion into Ethiopia involving around 1,000 fighters. It was an unmistakeable show of strength but it was also a demonstration of the group’s desire to expand outside of
Somalia. A weakened, distracted Ethiopia offered the perfect opportunity to execute this strategy.

The recent killing of Ayman al-Zawahiri in Afghanistan has also offered Al-Shabaab an opportunity to increase its influence within Al-Qa’ida central. But so far it seems that Abu Ubaidah has opted to maintain his focus on the Horn. One reason may be the renewed two-pronged offensive expected to be launched by the new Somali government under Hassan Sheikh Mohamud. Military operations against the group have already begun and are expected to increase, supported by ATMIS and international partners such as the US. Al-Shabaab expected this, but nevertheless appears to have been caught unprepared.

So far, the group’s response has been faltering. Several prematurely exploded IEDs in Mogadishu have recently indicated a degree of disorganisation and ineptness on the part of Al-Shabaab’s mutafaajirat, or bomb-making division. Meanwhile, the ongoing military operations against Al-Shabaab in Hiiraan region and the group’s inability to either mount an effective counterattack or execute a coordinated withdrawal sends another signal that the group is not functioning well.

But of greater concern to Al-Shabaab is likely the expected second prong of the new Somali government’s offensive: a policy shift toward preventing/countering violent extremism (P/CVE). The nomination of Mukhtar Roobow to head the re-vamped Ministry of Religious Affairs, Endowments, and CVE has put Al-Shabaab on the defensive. The group responded with a hastily issued video of spokesman Ali Mohamed Raage (aka Ali Dheere) denouncing Roobow as an apostate and condemning him to death.

Al-Shabaab has taken a few other recent steps. They appear to have brought back some previously marginalised figures, such as Fu’ad Mohamed Qalaf ‘Shongole,’ who had gone dormant for several years but who has a flair for propaganda and fiery oratory. Al-Shabaab has also been trying to foment conflict between clans in areas such as Adaale district in Middle Shabelle, Lower Shabelle, and Hiiraan. This is likely a deliberate attempt to keep the government busy with intercommunal firefighting (dab damis) instead of combating Al-Shabaab.

There is yet another gathering threat that Al-Shabaab faces: the Islamic State in Somalia (ISS). In 2015, an Al-Shabaab leader in Puntland, Abdulqaadir Mumin, declared his allegiance to the Islamic State’s Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. IS had made overtures to Al-Shabaab, but the group remained steadfastly loyal to Al-Qa’ida and the Taliban. In 2017, however, ISS was recognised as an official province (wilayat) by IS’s central leadership.

While ISS has suffered some setbacks since then – not least at the hands of Al-Shabaab – it appears to have been making some recent headway. For the first time, ISS was able to close some sections of Mogadishu’s Bakaara market earlier this year, after threatening to kill any traders who didn’t pay them bribes. More recently, an increasing number of Al-Shabaab members have defected to ISS. Finding itself in competition with ISS for recruits, Al-Shabaab has redoubled its efforts to attract new members from neighbouring countries.

While ISS offers an alternative to disaffected Al-Shabaab, it also holds greater ideological appeal for some of the more hardcore jihadists opposed to Al-Shabaab’s affiliation with Al-Qa’ida and the declared emirate of the Taliban. They believe it is incumbent on them (fard al-‘ayn) to support the notional ‘caliphate’ of the Islamic State instead.

Al-Shabaab faces an unusual number of simultaneous challenges at this time and – so far, at least – their responses inside Somalia have been lacklustre. It may be that they have over-reached. Yet Al-Shabaab has been down but not out many times before and, as their recent assaults on Ethiopia show, it would be a mistake to underestimate their current power and future potential. Either way, the Somali government needs to seize this moment and press its advantage.

The Somali Wire Team