Beyond Disarmament: Addressing DDR in Tigray
On 21 November, the next phase of the disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR) of 75,000 Tigray Defence Forces (TDF) soldiers commenced in Mekelle. Over two years have passed since the signing of the Pretoria and Nairobi agreements, with the DDR process intended as one of their central elements, but federally-driven progress to date has been slow. The timing of the next stage is conspicuous-- coming amid a major political schism in Tigray, as the regional security forces remain publicly neutral for the time being. And the process itself remains flawed, with DDR in Tigray occurring in a vacuum absent broader reforms to Ethiopia's unstable security sector.
In March, the Tigray Interim Administration (TIA) revealed that 100,000 former combatants had been demobilised across two phases beginning in July 2023, without the National Rehabilitation Commission (NRC) support. The challenges were sizeable to their demobilisation as the NRC attributed delays to the broader programme to a lack of funding. Still, according to the NRC Commissioner Temesgen Tilahun, the identification and disarmament of over 371,000 ex-combatants across 7 regions of Ethiopia is now complete. The disarming of the TDF's heavy weapons is almost finished, with up to 90% handed over to the Ethiopian National Defence Forces (ENDF) and verified by the African Union's Monitoring, Verification, and Compliance Mission (MVCM). The MVCM will continue to oversee the coming stages of the DDR process to ensure compliance. The national two-year programme has a budget exceeding USD 760 million, with international partners financing USD 60 million and the federal government a further ETB 1bn (roughly USD 7.8 million) for the first phase in Tigray.
More broadly, though, the MCVM has been absent or deficient in multiple aspects of the flawed Pretoria and Nairobi agreements, with disarmament being one of the only elements that has actively been pursued. Achieving progress in the reconstruction of Tigray, sustained federal-regional political dialogue, return of displaced persons, and the withdrawal of non-federal troops from the region have all been severely lacking. The NRC and other bodies, particularly those related to transitional justice and the national dialogue process, have been accused of only paying lip service to their responsibilities to pacify the international community's post-Tigray demands. Partially as a result of these setbacks, Tigray has been left politically paralysed between two nodules of power led by Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) Chairman Debretsion Gebremichael and TIA President Getachew Reda. And the riven politics have further diluted pressure on the federal government to implement the peace accords.
The overwhelming majority of these 75,000 ex-combatants were not regional or federal soldiers prior to the Tigray war but farmers, lawyers, teachers, labourers and other professions. Most of the broader 275,000+ ex-combatants identified by the TDF for DDR are men, 242,000, while 33,319 women have also been put forward for a return to civilian life or integration with regional police. These were fighters mobilised in the hundreds of thousands in the region's mountainous terrain, particularly in the aftermath of the mass human rights violations carried out by the Ethiopian, Amhara, and Eritrean forces.
During the war, the TDF, led by General Tsadkan Gebretensae and General Tadesse Werede, among others, were able to fashion a highly competent and generally professional army, but sustaining such a large military force post-conflict was always going to be untenable. Without a formal DDR process starting that could unlock international funding for pensions and support, the limited budget afforded to the Tigray security forces and TIA could not meet their needs. The psycho-social and financial wants of the varied mix of former combatants and soldiers remain immense, with the task of supporting them back into a still-devastated society further complicated by the lack of any significant economic reconstruction. Subsequently, the commencement of the next stage for the 75,000 former fighters is partially about freeing up money for disabled veterans and those unable to play any future military role. But there is still a need for greater clarity on the plans for their return to civilian life.
With Amhara militia and Eritrean Defence Force (EDF) soldiers still positioned across much of Tigray, the total demobilisation of the highly competent TDF would be dangerous. In September, without warning, ENDF troops withdrew from areas near partially occupied Zalambessa on the Eritrean border, leaving Tigrayan communities even more exposed to the EDF. With Asmara sustaining a major troop presence on the Tigrayan border, directing armaments and supplies to elements of the Fano insurgency, and heightened tensions over the new Eritrea-Egyptian-Somalia Tripartite Alliance, there remains a present danger of another Eritrean-Ethiopian conflict being fought on Tigrayan soil.
Within Tigray, the DDR process has also become part of the broader tussle between the camps led by Getachew and Debretsion. At the opening ceremony in Mekelle, Getachew emphasised the role of the TIA in overseeing the process and framed himself as part of this 'necessary' continuity. Debretsion's faction, on the other hand, with its strong ties to the Tigray security forces, has repeatedly voiced its opposition to the DDR process without the stipulated concurrent withdrawal of occupying Eritrean and Amhara forces. To this end, the recently elected deputy chairman of the TPLF in the contested 14th Party Congress, Amanuel Assefa, said that in line with Pretoria, DDR should only occur upon their expulsion and criticised the TIA for not conducting it "properly." He also stated that ensuring sustainable livelihoods for the ex-combatants was essential. The general acquiescence of Debretsion's TPLF faction to the demobilisation also comes as both sides jostle for favour with Addis for oversight of the TIA. There are growing reports that Getachew could be replaced by the popular-- and non-TPLF member-- General Tadesse Werede at the request of the TPLF 'old guard' faction.
Ideally, the DDR in Tigray and beyond would be implemented as part of a much-broader Security Sector Reform (SSR) programme to restore order and professionalism to the country's myriad forces. The ENDF today is far larger than it was before the Tigray war, but much of the officer class was decimated by the purging of Tigrayans before the conflict and the high casualties inflicted in the fighting. Yet the numbers of rank-and-file have continued to rise amid high attrition driven by the raging conflicts in Amhara and Oromia, with government-affiliated militias and new police and military regiments padding the numbers. This deepening militarisation in Ethiopia is having immense consequences across the country's politics and economy.
Ethiopia led one of the most successful DDR/SSR experiences in living memory in the aftermath of the overthrow of the Derg regime in 1991. Then, it was understood in a post-conflict setting as part of the need for broader political and SSR reform as well as societal support for ex-combatants of the former regime and disarming fighters. Though the 1990s process also had limited financial support, it had clear, unified political objectives, with establishing trust at the forefront. The understandable dearth of trust today-- and the lack of transparency by Addis-- makes this process far more complex. Absent significant political/security reform, in the meantime, greater clarity, more support for reconstruction, and particularly a lasting resolution to the Tigrayan political schism are needed to shepherd the 75,000 ex-combatants out of their painful post-war limbo.
The Ethiopian Cable Team
