The Continued Strength of Somaliland's Democracy
Somaliland's elections on 13 November and the weeks since have displayed the maturity and stability of its democracy once again. The manner in which the polls were conducted, the speed and grace with which outgoing President Muse Bihi Abdi conceded, and the absence of any significant disturbances have emphasised its democratic institutional strength-- despite attempts from Mogadishu and elsewhere to undermine the elections. None of the fears surrounding possible violence in the east or what would happen if particular candidates were to lose came to pass. Moreover, the ongoing peaceful transfer of power from Bihi to President-elect Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi 'Irro' further bucks the regional and global trends of democratic backsliding.
There is a strong case to be made that Somaliland has the most developed democracy in the Horn of Africa today, perhaps only behind Kenya. Ethiopia has had just two political transitions since 1990– the violent overthrowing of the Derg regime in May 1991 and the ascension of incumbent Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed in 2018. Sudan's brief experiment with civilian-military rule after the overthrow of Omar al-Bashir in 2019 collapsed under pressure from the now-warring generals, with the destructive civil war ending all likelihood of a democratic dispensation in the near future. Djibouti remains fully under the control of Ismail Omar Guelleh, while Eritrea does not even bother with the veneer of democracy or elections. And to the south, Somalia is embroiled in a destabilising national constitutional and electoral crisis that threatens to engulf the country in further armed conflict. In this light, Somaliland's electoral and democratic successes are the exception-- not the rule.
There can be a brushing off of Somaliland, with its detractors dismissing it as simply a clan enclave with successful democratic elections as a side note. That does a great disservice to the years of consensus-developed progress, and Somaliland's unique hybrid combination of traditional, clan-based politics supporting its democratic institutions. For instance, it was clan elders who helped negotiate the tensions and political agreement between the outgoing Kulmiye party and Waddani after Bihi sought to extend his term over two years ago. While it is by no means perfect, the resilience of Somaliland's politics has been on full display since 13 November as every independent monitoring organisation praised the manner in which the elections were held.
The Somaliland National Electoral Commission (SLNEC) ran a highly professional campaign, which was particularly impressive considering their lack of significant external funding. Scenes of Somalilanders, young and old, men and women, lining up to peacefully exercise their democratic rights, many for the first time, were inspiring. Though more votes were cast on 13 November-- 647,863-- than in the last presidential elections in 2017, where Bihi defeated Irro, the turnout was lower, making up 53% of 1.2 million registered voters. However, this also reflects the efforts made by the SLNEC to expand voter registration across Somaliland. It was also a highly successful election for the participation of women in Somaliland's democracy, with many overseeing the smooth running of polling stations and casting their votes for their preferred candidates. The Nagaad Network-- a coalition of women's organisations in Somaliland-- is now urging Irro to appoint women to senior positions within his cabinet. Still, one lament would be the SLNEC's lack of capacity to oversee money flow from several foreign actors to political parties, which went largely undisclosed.
Though Bihi was regarded by many as a hardline figure when compared to some of his predecessors, he has been magnanimous and publicly at ease with his loss. Some may ascribe that to Irro's sizeable win, securing 63.92% of the vote, but Bihi was already signalling by the following day that he was ready to accept defeat and hand over the reigns of power. It is widely anticipated that the outgoing president will now return to his farm and spend time with his beloved camels. The break from Kulmiye and Bihi could offer the incoming administration a chance to reset relations with Somaliland's east, particularly the disenchanted Dhulbahante communities behind the unitarist SSC-Khaatumo administration. The fighting that erupted in Laas Aanood in early 2023 was likely avoidable, and there were multiple missed opportunities for negotiations with the Dhulbahante before it escalated to the circumstances today. Cooling those tensions through talks will likely be high on Irro's agenda.
Another major and near-immediate opportunity for the incoming Irro administration will be the return of US President-elect Donald Trump to the White House in January 2025. Several authors of the controversial unofficial manifesto of the incoming Trump government, Project 2025, have been handed senior positions in his upcoming administration. Somaliland's explicit name-check in Project 2025, the ad hoc and instinctive foreign policy of Trump, and the probable return of several Somaliland sympathetic officials have raised hopes in Hargeisa that US recognition may be on the horizon. And Irro now has the opportunity to be the president that brings Somaliland's recognition across the line.
The arrival of Irro into Hargeisa's Presidential Palace is more than the shift from Kulmiye to Waddani; it also marks another change in Isaaq sub-clans from majority Habar Awal to majority Habar Yonis. Irro is the first Habar Yonis Somaliland leader in three decades, and will be able to tackle some of the long-standing grievances held by the sub-clan. The administration also has the opportunity to dispel the lingering sentiments that the Habar Yonis are not quite as wedded to the cause of independence as others in Somaliland.
Yet despite the celebration of the successful elections and the democratic environment, there remains a lack of clarity on several contentious issues by the incoming administration-- most notably restarting political talks with Mogadishu and where it stands on the Ethiopia-Somaliland Memorandum of Understanding. We may not have to wait long, however, and will likely learn more about Somaliland's direction with the formation of Irro's cabinet after the inauguration in mid-December. Whether members of the Salafist Al-I'tisaam group will be rewarded will be of particular note, including those from Waddani's allied Kaah party that emerged victorious from the elections. In the meantime, Somaliland's democratic progress and yet another successful transition of power should not be taken for granted in a region increasingly blighted by polarisation, armed conflict, and democratic regression.
By the Somali Wire Team
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