Issue No. 739

From IEDs to Suicide Drones: Al-Shabaab Seeks to Expand Arsenal

In the aftermath of Hamas's 7 October devastating onslaught in southern Israel, Al-Shabaab spied an opportunity. In Jilib, the extremist's de facto capital, operatives were tasked with studying the widely circulated videos of Hamas fighters attacking Israel's military outposts, villages, and a music festival. These operatives, whose role is to monitor and develop weaponry from information gleaned from the internet, were inspired.

For years, Al-Shabaab has been internally reliant and resourceful in its weapon and explosive capacity, building off its origins and links to Al-Qaeda. Through the Mutafaajiraad, the specialist bomb-making sub-division of the much-feared Amniyaat, Al-Shabaab has sought to refine and expand its deployment of improvised explosive devices (IED), and continues to deploy them with devastating consequences. And these remain highly effective, as witnessed in the person-borne IED attack at Mogadishu's Lido Beach in August that left dozens of civilians dead. But the weaponry is changing with the emergence of 'suicide' drones and other ways to wield explosives that Al-Shabaab is seeking to deploy.

It is not just Hamas's weaponry and battlefield tactics that Al-Shabaab is seeking to emulate, but the Yemen-based, Iranian-backed Houthis as well. The Houthis and Al-Shabaab are now in direct contact, with the former having offered training and support to the Somalia-based extremist group earlier this year. Different Houthi delegations have also been dispatched to meet with Al-Shabaab contingents in Lower Shabelle, Middle Juba, and Bay regions in recent months. In turn, it was also agreed that an initial 30 Al-Shabaab operatives would travel to Yemen to be trained by the Houthis.

At the centre of these pilot projects is the development of its drone capacity, moving beyond the surveillance drones that it has sourced from Malaysia and China. Al-Shabaab's head of procurement and trafficking network is Abdullahi Jeeri, who was sanctioned by the US government in 2021 and has extensive reach for procuring weapons and explosive material. Al-Shabaab is looking to develop both suicide drones– those armed with explosives that detonate on impact– as well as armed drones with mounted guns. The extremist group is seeking to establish its artillery to middle-range capacity, an element that the Houthis may be able to help with. On 5 September 2024, Al-Shabaab militants fired 5 projectiles in Mogadishu, with four hitting the Wadajir district and the fifth striking the Aden Adde International Airport. Just over two weeks later, another 6 projectiles hit the airport’s international quarter. In both incidents, the barrage was 107mm rockets, someone called ‘katyusha’ due to their Soviet origin. The origin of Al-Shabaab's supply of 107mm rockets is uncertain, but in May 2023, Ugandan military officials acknowledged its troops lost a 107mm rocket launcher during a militant raid on the Buulo Marer military base in Lower Shabelle. There are also reports that Al-Shabaab is looking to equip itself with paragliders, as Hamas did on 7 October.

In the meantime, Al-Shabaab continues to deploy its tried-and-tested IEDs and mortar attacks across central and southern Somalia. It does not appear to be currently interested in seizing significant territory but is happy to sit back in its rural safe havens and watch the chaos unfold between Mogadishu and Addis. The Somali National Army and the other assorted military and security infrastructure of Somalia are still struggling to respond to a resurgent Al-Shabaab. Military operations remain occasional, and there remains little suggestion that large-scale operations against the jihadists will be renewed in the immediate future.

Aware they are not under pressure, Al-Shabaab has the capacity and the space to develop these weapons, to send their jihadists to Yemen and elsewhere, and to continue consolidating their grip on areas under their control. What is less clear is why Al-Shabaab does not deploy its impressive arsenal on the green zone in Mogadishu. There have been several attacks in recent months in the heavily fortified area of the capital, including the Lido Beach bombing and the more recent shelling of Halane, but it is far less than what Al-Shabaab has the potential to deploy. It is no exaggeration to say that the jihadists could likely end the international presence in the capital if it so desired by ramping up their attacks on Halane, so it begs the question of why they choose not to deploy their full capability. It may be that Al-Shabaab does not want to end the profitable income it enjoys from taxing the life support that the siloed international community depends upon. Whatever the reason, the occasional shell that lands in Halane is no true reflection of the still-expanding military capacity of Al-Shabaab. 
 

By the Somali Wire team