The war on federalism
On Sunday 15 May, indirect elections will be held in Somalia to elect the new president. The incumbent president, Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed ‘Farmaajo,’ is running for re-election after more than a year since his term was unduly extended. Farmaajo will be remembered for many things but perhaps his most enduring legacy will be the stranglehold he tried to apply to federalism in Somalia.
Farmaajo was one of the signatories of the Tripartite Agreement of 5 September 2018 in Asmara, together with Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and Eritrean President Isayas Afeworqi. We now know that this agreement was made at the expense of the Tigrayans, who were sacrificed to the respective ambitions of the three heads of state. Revenge was certainly one of the components of this agreement but beyond that, it was the very idea of federalism that the signatories intended to kill on that day in Asmara.
While Eritrea has been ruled “as a personal fiefdom for over 30 years,” in the words of long-time Horn scholar Alex de Waal, Ethiopia and Somalia are federal republics. According to the 1995 constitution, Ethiopia is organised into regions established on ethno-linguistic grounds. There are currently 11 regions. In Somalia, on the other hand, the population is relatively homogeneous in terms of language and religion. It is the clans that structure the country socially but especially geographically. Somaliland, which is predominantly populated by the Issaq, seceded from Somalia in 1991, following the “forgotten genocide” against the Issaq between 1987 and 1989. For various reasons, Somaliland is not yet recognised as a sovereign state by the majority of the international community. The sovereignty of nations and the inviolability of borders have been sacrosanct principles for many heads of state but none more so those who fear their populations may exercise their right to self-determination, especially when they have been victims of ethnic cleansing.
Almost as much as Tigray, Somaliland has become a kind of straw man for opponents of federalism in the Horn of Africa. And arguably no one has done more to oppose Somaliland’s independence, and federalism more generally, than Farmaajo. Since his accession to the Somali leadership in 2017, Farmaajo has consistently centralised power in the federal capital Mogadishu at the expense of the federal states. But Farmaajo is hardly an isolated case. Since taking over Ethiopia in 2018, Abiy Ahmed too has been centralising power in the federal capital, Addis Abeba, at the expense of the federal states.
And who is the sponsor, the mentor, of this common authoritarian, anti federal agenda? Isayas Afeworqi, the Maoist leader of Eritrea, who holds all state power in his hands. Isayas has an absolute hatred for the idea of federalism and, more broadly, for all particularisms. Apart from his personal animosity toward the Tigrayans, it is the ethnic federalism put in place by the TPLF, through the EPRDF coalition that came to power in Ethiopia following the end of the Derg, that frightened Isayas to the point of sending Eritrean troops to commit atrocities that will traumatise the Tigrayans for decades.
It is not easy to reconcile Isayas’s idea of Eritrea with the fact that his country’s borders were drawn by Italian occupiers. For such an ardent champion of anti-imperialism, this is more than embarrassing. If Isayas had proposed a constructive project, a vision of a future for Eritreans based genuine concern for his subjects’ well-being, then they might have become a people with shared national aspirations enshrined in the state. But today Eritrea is an open-air prison from which its people seek only to escape. Isayas’s authoritarianism is what links a Tigrigna, an Afar, and a Rashaida living inside Eritrea. And Isayas knows very well that his feet are made of clay. Indeed, to leave space for ethnic identities in Eritrea is to open the door to irredentism. And that is why the Tigrayans are a mortal threat to him. Tigrigna and Tigrayans speak the same language, are mostly Orthodox Christians, and share a common culture dating back thousands of years. It is no coincidence that thousands of people fleeing the regime in Asmara have found refuge in Tigray. The fate of these refugees is now very grim. The Afar of Eritrea, a nomadic population restricted in their movements and deprived of their traditional livelihoods, are demanding a federal system and a new constitution. It was in part to break the ties with their brethren on the other side of the border that Isayas made a deal with some Ethiopian Afar leaders.
It is the fear of irredentism that spurred these three heads of state – Isayas, Abiy, and Farmaajo – in their attempt to band together to destroy federalism – or even any hint of federalism – in their respective countries. Yet federalism, based on the idea of limited, localised autonomy, is one of the only solutions that allow diverse populations divided by language, religion, or culture to live together.
Excessive centralisation often has the opposite effect; in its more extreme forms, it leads to intercommunal conflict and separation. So, before crying balkanisation, perhaps we should try to understand what leads states like Somaliland or Tigray to aspire to autonomy or independence: a sense of identity and solidarity forged in response to attempted eradication and a genuine sense of vulnerability that comes from living next door to their executioners.
The scars that leaders like Farmaajo and Abiy will leave behind, due to their attempts to centralise power and dismantle federalism, will take years to heal. The longer these leaders remain in power, the greater the harm they will cause.
By the Ethiopia Cable Team
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Two days of heavy clashes (3–4 June) in the Somali capital, Mogadishu, between federal troops and opposition-aligned forces have underscored both the fragility of the city’s security environment and the volatility of electoral politics. Although relative calm has since returned to the two hardest-hit districts - Hawl Wadaag and Abdiaziz - and mediation efforts have intensified, tensions remain high, fuelling fears of renewed armed skirmishes. Credible reports of mass clan militia mobilisation on the edges of Mogadishu speak to a conflict that is widening. The militarisation of politics and elite fragmentation over the electoral process have shattered a core assumption: that Somali leaders will ultimately step back from the brink to negotiate a way forward. Consequently, the country is entering a perilous phase in which domestic factions alone cannot resolve the impasse, making neutral, external mediation a necessity.
Puntland President Sa'id Abdullah Deni is unofficially in the race for the federal presidency of Somalia. By most accounts, the regional leader is running again and this explains his re-engagement with Mogadishu after a three-year hiatus. Driven by shifting electoral dynamics, Deni’s decision to re-engage with the centre forces him to confront a radically altered political landscape in Mogadishu. Under President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM), the federal government has rewritten the rules of Somali politics, altering the institutional framework and consolidating executive authority.
On 10 May, the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) unilaterally conducted its contentious 'one-person-one-vote' (OPOV) electoral model in South West State (SWS), directly overriding opposition demands for a negotiated, consensus-based framework. Crucially, the very laws underpinning these OPOV elections are themselves deeply contested: the electoral framework was created following a rushed revision of Somalia’s constitution that many federal member states and opposition groups rejected. The vote, exclusively managed by the National Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (NIEBC), saw localised polling in 13 districts and across 126 poll centres and 276 stations. While 376,212 citizens were registered, actual turnout reached 132,430 voters - a participation rate of approximately 35.2% - with 128,276 valid ballots cast and 4,154 deemed spoilt/invalid. The electoral outcome, unsurprisingly, solidified a decisive mandate for Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s Justice and Solidarity Party (JSP); the governing party secured an absolute majority of 51 out of 95 contested legislative seats, comfortably outpacing its closest rival, Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden’s Ururka Horumarka, which claimed 14 seats.
The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) has effectively entered a 'grey transition' - a deeply fraught and hotly-contested interregnum that could upend decades of state-building and foment greater instability. By utilising the March 2026 constitutional amendments to extend his presidential mandate until May 2027, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) has effectively plunged the fragile Horn of Africa state into a profound period of severe internal strain and legitimacy crisis. This legalistic manoeuvre has roiled domestic politics and put Western partners of Somalia in a difficult spot. If Somalia's Western allies concede to HSM's fait accompli without extracting concessions from him on a negotiated settlement, they are likely to embolden Hassan Sheikh.
Somalia is entering one of the most dangerous political periods in its recent history. An unprecedented convergence of unresolved constitutional disputes, contested electoral arrangements, rising tensions between federal and regional actors, and the growing politicisation of state security institutions has pushed the country towards a potentially destabilising impasse.
A foreign-backed president, a besieged capital city, and a jihadist movement affiliated with Al-Qaeda-- this time not Somalia, but Mali. Late last week, Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), the transnational Salafist-jihadist group in Mali, stormed across much of the country's north, as well as entering Bakamo and assassinating the defence minister. The coordinated offensive-- in conjunction with the Tuareg separatist movement, the Azawad Liberation Front (ALF)-- has left the military junta reeling, and forced the withdrawal of their Russian allies from a number of strategic towns.
Last weekend, the Murusade, a major sub-clan of the powerful Hawiye clan family, staged one of the largest and most colourful coronations of a clan chief in recent memory in Mogadishu. The caleemasarka (enthronement) of Ugaas Abdirizaq Ugaas Abdullahi Ugaas Haashi, the new Ugaas or sultan of the Murusade, was attended by thousands of delegates from all parts of Somalia. Conducted next to the imposing and magnificent Ottomanesque Ali Jim'ale Mosque, on the Muslim day of rest, Friday, the occasion blended the Islamic, the regal and the customary; a restatement of an ancient tradition very much alive and vibrant.
With all eyes trained on the Strait of Hormuz blockades and their geopolitical convulsions, discussions and concerns, too, have risen about the perils of other globalised chokepoints, not least the Bab al-Mandab. The threats to the stability of the Bab al-Mandab, the Gulf of Aden, and the Red Sea may not arise principally from the escalatory logic that the US, Iran, and Israel have been locked in, but the threats posed from collapse and contested sovereignty offer little relief. Off Somalia's northern coastline in particular, it is transnational criminal networks — expressed in smuggling, piracy, and, less visibly but no less consequentially, illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing — that define the character of offshore insecurity. It is this last phenomenon that provides the foundation on which much of Somalia's maritime disorder is built, and which remains the most consistently neglected.
Villa Somalia's triumph in Baidoa may yet turn to ashes. Since the ousting of wary friend-turned-foe, Abdiaziz Laftagareen, in late March, the federal government has ploughed ahead with preparations for state- and district-level elections in South West. Nominally scheduled for next week, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has chosen to reward his stalwart parliamentary ally, Aden Madoobe from the Rahanweyne/Hadaamo, with the regional presidency after some vacillation, naming him the sole Justice and Solidarity Party (JSP) candidate