Issue No. 803

Two weeks go by, and at least one new maritime agreement on the Somali peninsula has reared its head, with another retaliatory pact to potentially soon follow. The first was between Taiwan and Somaliland, following Hargeisa's Foreign Minister Abdirahman Dahir Osman's visit to Taipei in late July, during which he secured a cooperation agreement between the coastguards of Taiwan and Somaliland. And the inevitable Beijing-Mogadishu response has now arrived, with the Chinese Embassy in Somalia announcing that it has discussed enhancing "cooperation" with the federal government's Coast Guard. As ever, the officials reaffirmed their commitment to "safeguarding national sovereignty and territorial integrity of China and Somalia."

Gedo has long served as a useful barometer for the health of relations between Nairobi, Mogadishu, and Addis. Straddling the tri-border Mandera Triangle, the Mareehaan-dominated region of Jubaland has been a key staging post for Al-Shabaab's continued infiltration into Kenya and Ethiopia for years. And as such, both Nairobi and Addis have a vested stake in Jubaland as a security buffer zone against the jihadists, developing close ties with key political actors within Gedo and the southern Federal Member State-- which they helped co-establish in 2013. Over a decade later, with Hassan Sheikh Mohamud back at the helm in Mogadishu, the focus has returned to Gedo, as he has resorted to a well-known destabilising playbook by attempting —and failing —to wrest the Mareehaan into Villa Somalia's orbit. But amid the government's months-long campaign to destabilise Gedo, including seizing Garbahaarey and Luuq from control of Jubaland to carve out Darood tents for its rigged elections, Addis has remained silent-- until now.

It is now official: Somalia’s National Security Adviser (NSA) Hussein Sheikh Ali, aka “Hussein Ma’alin’ has stepped down. On his X (formerly Twitter) handle, Hussein described himself as “former” NSA. On Sunday evening, the Office of the Prime Minister put out a short statement to say Mukhtar Mohammed Hassan has been appointed acting National Security Adviser. Mukhtar is not well-known and the assumption of many is that he will be a placeholder until a suitable replacement is found. Both Hussein and Villa Somalia remain reticent in explaining what exactly happened and why the changes are being made.

In December 2023, the final elements of the UN Security Council sanctions regime were lifted on the Somali federal government. Mogadishu's celebrations were rapturous, with President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud declaring that Mogadishu could now "purchase any weapons needed" and that "friendly nations and allies" could hand over the "necessary weapons without any limitations or restrictions." After years of lobbying, the final albatross around the neck of the federal government was to be lifted, and the Somali National Army (SNA) handed the heavy firepower required to conquer Al-Shabaab once and for all. Of course, over 18 months on, quite the reverse has happened, with Al-Shabaab having swept across much of central Somalia since February-- despite the glut of Egyptian and Turkish weapons donated to Villa Somalia in the past year. And Puntland's seizure of the MV Sea World, a Comorian-flagged vessel carrying Turkish arms and armoured vehicles last week, has thrown the question of the lifting of the arms embargo back into the open.

In just a handful of days, Sabiid in Lower Shabelle has fallen back to Al-Shabaab, Turkish arms linked to government-aligned arms traffickers were seized off Puntland's coast, and armed clashes erupted in Beledhawo in Gedo between Jubaland and federal troops. With the immediate threat of Mogadishu falling to Al-Shabaab having passed for the time being, Villa Somalia has returned to its favoured agenda, wielding its security apparatus not against the jihadists but against political opposition. Subsequent violence in Gedo, Sanaag, and the collapse of the Lower Shabelle operations are all emblematic of Villa Somalia reverting to its coercive tactics to attempt to forcibly impose its will on the peripheries. But it is losing-- and badly, having entirely failed to learn the lessons of Ras Kamboni in December 2024 when federal troops were routed by Jubaland.

Never, in the history of Somalia's contemporary governance, has so much political goodwill, both domestic and international, been squandered by anyone as President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has done in the past 12 months. In the early morning hours of 16 May 2022, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) was elected as the 10th President of Somalia, marking his second term, following his first from 2012 to 2017. Optimism was high, partly due to his previous experience as president and partly because of the deep unpopularity of his predecessor, Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo, with many relieved that the incumbent had been defeated. However, just over three years later, the outlook in Somalia remains unrelentingly bleak due to HSM's destabilising political agenda.

Somalia remains heavily-dependent on external aid to fund humanitarian and development projects and plug a huge budget deficit to keep the federal state functioning. In 2025, 67% of Somalia's USD 1.32 billion federal budget was funded by external donors. In 2022, Somalia received over USD 2.2 billion in humanitarian assistance, according to figures released by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) – a record high by sub-Saharan standards, but still far below the requirements with climate change distress and armed conflicts continuing to aggravate living conditions for millions of Somalis.

The loss of Moqokori and Tardo – both ma'awiisley strongholds – in the past week has been a symbolic defeat for the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS). After being won from the insurgents nearly three years earlier by the ma'awiisley – local clan militias raised by communities in Hiiraan and adjacent Middle Shabelle - the loss of these towns is not simply another military setback; it starkly reveals a major political and strategic failure by the FGS. The grassroots Hawaadle clan fighters who held the frontline have been effectively abandoned as Mogadishu quietly shifted focus away from empowering these local forces, sacrificing their local capacity in favour of the Somali National Army (SNA), which is neither capable nor professional, ceding the initiative back to Al-Shabaab.