“Bring the Ball Back to the Centre” – Clan, Politics and Consensus in Somalia
A powerful caucus of Hawiye clan chiefs is conducting discreet talks with Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud in Mogadishu to defuse Somalia’s worsening political crisis, aggravated in recent weeks by the ongoing Al-Shabaab offensive in the Shabelle Valley and the attempted encirclement of the Somali capital, Mogadishu. The initiative is still in its infancy, the details still somewhat hazy, and there is no guarantee it will succeed, but it does certainly offer a realistic prospect of ending the escalating divisions and political stalemate in Somalia.
One of the most revered chiefs of the Mudulood clan family (which brings together the major Abgaal sub-clans of Wa’eysle, Agoonyar and Wa’budhan) and the chairman of the Union of the Mudulood Clans (Isbahaysiga Beelweynta Beesha Mudulood) Imam Dahir Imam Omar Imam Mohamud, according to informed sources, is the principal driver, and he is supported by other clan chiefs and businessmen from the Abgal sub-clans. The discreet political initiative is aimed to achieve three objectives: repair the widening growing rift within the Mudulood, pre-empt an intra-Abgaal conflict and promote national dialogue between HSM and his opponents to end the political deadlock over elections and constitutional changes.
During a series of talks with the President in Mogadishu in recent days, the Mudulood clan chiefs called on him to “bring the ball to the centre” (kubadda dhaxda ku soo celi) a metaphor associated with the game of football when the referee begins a match by placing the ball at the centre of the pitch or in some instances after a foul or at the start of extra time. In all these instances, the referee takes the ball to the centre and calls on the two teams to start the game from a level playing field. As a political metaphor and in the Somali context it means ‘levelling the playing field’ and fairness. It also has a connotation of political moderation, governing from the centre and consensus.
The mere fact that HSM’s own clan is now demanding that he ‘brings back the ball to the centre’ constitutes a reprimand if not an indictment of the Somali president’s radical electoral and constitution overhaul underway since May 2023, which have deepened Somali divisions and fomented a groundswell of discontent across Somalia. The Mudulood clan chiefs’ intervention is beneficial and adds to the growing domestic and international pressure on the Somali president to change tack and reopen dialogue with opponents to address valid opposition concerns that much of Villa Somalia’s ‘reform’ agenda is intended simply to engineer another term for HSM, create a presidential system, and centralise power in Mogadishu - all without a serious national debate or consensus.
Sources say HSM welcomed the initiative and expressed readiness to talk with the opposition but made no firm commitments. Instead, the president flew to Middle Shabelle for a tour of the “front lines” – ostensibly to boost troop morale and to ‘engage with clan and community leaders’, according to state media. Far from signalling a shift to the political centre, HSM’s visit to an Abgaal enclave, adorned in camouflage fatigues, portrayed him more as a parochial clan warlord. Meanwhile, the ‘front line’ edged ever closer to Mogadishu, as Al-Shabaab fighters continue their advance towards the national capital.
Moreover, if HSM’s whistle stop tour of Middle Shabelle was supposed to rally Abgaal support, it may have had the opposite effect. No notable Abgaal clan leader appeared in photos of his meetings, suggesting an attempt by the president to circumvent pressure from Mudulood heavyweights like Imam Dahir by currying favour with a select group of Abgaal sub-clan chiefs. HSM may also have been trying to undercut growing support amongst his Abgaal kinsmen for former president Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed – a likely candidate in the next presidential elections.
Sheikh Sharif is an astute grassroots politician who commands a significant following in the Abgaal heartland of the Shabelle Valley. He is also a leading critic of HSM whose views are influential within the Mudulood clan family and carry weight at the national level. If HSM tries to impose a rigged version of one-person, one vote (OPOV) elections, or seeks a term extension, Sheikh Sharif’s followers are likely to be among the first to take up arms against him in Mogadishu.
HSM owes his second term in office in large part to Mudulood support and goodwill. The clan is his key primary constituency, even more important than the Dam al-Jadiid Islamist faction that managed his campaign. Sustained pressure from the clan to compromise with his opponents puts the president in a difficult spot. Defying its wishes and ignoring its counsel is tantamount to political suicide.
The Mudulood clan chiefs’ tentative overture should serve as an important reminder of where real power lies and the potent mechanism of traditional checks and balances that can kick into action in times of crises to restore balance and stability.
“Bring the ball back to the centre” is not just a metaphor or a political slogan. It is a Somali traditional paradigm of egalitarian politics and consensus that has guided state-building since 2000.
Hopefully HSM will understand that it means he should rise above the fray to seek accommodation and compromise with his political adversaries – not only among the Mudulood clans but also at a national level. At this time of grave crisis, the president’s place is not playing ‘igu sawiir’ at remote villages on the ‘front lines’: it is down in the trenches, fighting to protect his nation’s political middle ground.
The Somali Wire Team
Gain unlimited access to all our Editorials. Unlock Full Access to Our Expert Editorials — Trusted Insights, Unlimited Reading.
Create your Sahan account LoginUnlock lifetime access to all our Premium editorial content
The Horn of Africa's political fate has always been wired to external commercial interests, with its expansive eastern edge on the Red Sea serving as an aorta of trade for millennia. A Greek merchant's manual from the 1st century AD describes the port of Obone in modern-day Puntland as a hub of ivory, tortoiseshell, enslaved people and cinnamon destined for Egypt. Today, as so often quoted, between 12-15% of the world's seaborne trade passes along the arterial waterway, with the Suez Canal bridging Europe and Asia. But well before the globalised world or the vying Gulf and Middle Powers over the Red Sea's littoral administrations, the logic of 'gunboat diplomacy' underpinned the passage over these seas.
At the collapse of the Somali state in the early 1990s, the bloated, corrupt, and clan-riven national army was nevertheless in possession of vast quantities of light weapons. Much of it sourced during Somalia's ill-fated alliance with the USSR and later Western and Arab patrons, government armouries were soon plundered by warring militias across Mogadishu, Kismaayo, Baidoa, and every garrison town as the country descended into chaos, providing the ammunition for the deaths of hundreds of thousands of people.
The Greek philosopher and historian Plutarch recounts that King Pyrrhus of Epirus, after defeating the Romans at Asculum in 279 BC, lamented, "One more such victory over the Romans and we are completely done for." After almost four torturous years, the same might be said for any more supposed 'victories' for the incumbent federal government of Somalia. To nobody's surprise, the constitutional 'review' process undertaken by Somalia's federal government was never about implementing direct democracy after all. It was, as widely anticipated, a thinly veiled power grab intended to centralise political power, eviscerate Somalia's federal system, and extend the term of the incumbent president, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM). And so, at the 11th hour and with less than 70 days remaining in his term of office, HSM declared Somalia's new constitutional text 'complete' and signed it into 'law.'
On 4 March 2026, Somalia's Federal Parliament hastily ratified dozens of controversial constitutional amendments, thus finalising President Hassan Sheikh's tailor-made Constitution. Speaker Aden Madobe has now declared the new revised Constitution effective immediately. In doing so, the speaker and his government have deliberately destroyed the existing social contract agreed upon by the people of Somalia.
Ramadan is known as the 'Month of Mercy', typically characterised by forgiveness and reconciliation within the Islamic world. Not so in Somalia, where Villa Somalia's ruinous push to 'finalise' the Provisional Constitution has taken another grim twist in recent days. The collapse of opposition-government talks on 22 February was inevitable, with Villa Somalia's flippancy evident in the needless arguments over venue and security personnel.
Mogadishu, Somalia’s capital, is home to an estimated four million people and supports a vibrant commercial sector. Yet behind the façade of what appears to be an up-and-coming African capital is the specter of insurgents hiding in plain sight. Although Somalia’s government has had a run of success in the fight against Al-Shabaab over the past year, Mogadishu’s security is highly questionable, as the city’s suburbs have become a safe haven and base of operations for militants. Al-Shabaab is not the only problem. The crisis is deeper. Somalia’s security institutions remain disorganized and corrupt, and Mogadishu’s robust business community is often an accomplice to Al-Shabaab funding.
Where to begin? The Middle East aflame, the Iranian Ayatollah Ali Khamenei killed by an Israeli airstrike, a slew of Gulf capitals and infrastructure under Iranian bombardment, and a war instigated by two powers with no clear end or scope. Few could say they were surprised by the coordinated Israeli-American bombardment of Iran, but the immediacy of its metastasis has been shocking, and the spillover of this war is already stretching from Cyprus down to the Strait of Hormuz. And there are almost too many unknowns to count, from the endgame logic of Washington to the vulnerability of the wounded Iranian regime to the broader reaction of the besieged Gulf.
In the small coastal town of Zeila in Somaliland, the ruins of one of the oldest and finest mosques in the Horn of Africa remain. Years of neglect have taken their toll, with many of the stones that once held up the Masjid al-Qiblatayn —dating back to the 7th century —now integrated into the surrounding houses. But a striking minaret still stands askew, as does an arch with two square windows and a handful of columns. Its name 'al-Qiblatayn' translates as 'of the two Qiblahs', while the mosque once housed two mihrabs as well —one facing Mecca and another facing Jerusalem.
Every four years, Somalia approaches a familiar crossroads. An election nears, deadlines tighten, mandates expire, tensions rise, and once again the nation waits for crisis to decide what leadership could have resolved through foresight and compromise.