Why Hussein Moalim Resigned
It is now official: Somalia’s National Security Adviser (NSA) Hussein Sheikh Ali, aka “Hussein Ma’alin’ has stepped down. On his X (formerly Twitter) handle, Hussein described himself as “former” NSA. On Sunday evening, the Office of the Prime Minister put out a short statement to say Mukhtar Mohammed Hassan has been appointed acting National Security Adviser. Mukhtar is not well-known and the assumption of many is that he will be a placeholder until a suitable replacement is found. Both Hussein and Villa Somalia remain reticent in explaining what exactly happened and why the changes are being made.
It is officially unclear whether Hussein was pushed or whether he jumped. The dominant media view is that he voluntarily resigned in protest at the murky events surrounding the seizure by Puntland of MV Sea World and the escalating row and recriminations since. The former NSA is believed to have been upset that top Villa Somalia officials, the president, his chief of staff and NISA (National Intelligence and Security Agency) chief Mahad Salad blindsided him over the shipment. Even the Defence Minister Ahmed Moalim Fiqi was caught unawares, according to media sources. But there is more to the resignation than just the simplistic view of a disgruntled senior official resigning in protest at being ‘kept in the dark’ over a dubious arms shipment by a powerful circle of advisers around HSM.
Rumours of Hussein’s growing discontent have been around for some time. Appointed to the post in May 2022, he was widely perceived as an experienced security official, having served in NISA during President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s (HSM) first term. Hailing from the Murusade/Abakar, and the Daljir wing of the current coalition, Hussein sought to revamp and professionalise the Office of the National Security Adviser. He hired dozens of young well-educated people, created new departments, fought hard to elevate the Office of the NSA as the pre-eminent agency to centralise, coordinate and drive national security policy. His professionalisation and modernisation drive was supported by a number of Somalia’s key donors, especially the UK government. Up until then, multiple security offices in the Federal Government of Somalia with often same or overlapping mandates duplicated effort or undercut each other, creating bad blood. The Security Advisory Unit at the Prime Minister’s Office, for example, competed with the NSA for relevance and donor funding.
Somalia’s President has a penchant for creating parallel structures of influence and power, often undercutting established offices and officials. A flurry of security-related appointments in the last two years seemed primarily designed to clip Hussein’s wings, starve him of funds and render his office powerless. One big appointment, especially that of the new defence adviser to the president in March 2025, was widely interpreted as eclipsing Hussein’s role. The former NSA did himself little favours however. Hussein cannot escape blame for contributing to the incoherent and clumsy policymaking since 2022. His incautious public remarks about defeating Al-Shabaab and that the insurgency was on the back foot all turned out to be hot air. His over-optimistic prognosis about the Somali National Army and its capacity to take over FOBs from African peacekeepers, as well as his inability to negotiate a realistic timeline for the exit of ATMIS troops, all demonstrated his defective understanding of the security dynamics.
Hussein is praised for two key policy achievements – the lifting of the UN arms embargo and the review and amendment of the National Security Architecture (NSArch). The former process has been underway for years and Hussein cannot, justifiably, claim full credit. Nor has it proven a particularly wise decision, since the country has since been flooded with arms and ammunition of questionable provenance. The NSArch in its current iteration is on the whole a bad document that gutted previous agreements on a ‘federated’ security arrangements and reinforces the centralising mechanisms, structures and mindset at the root of Somalia’s chronic security problems. Hussein’s relations with federal states were consequently exceedingly poor, partly because he ignored the sound policy advice of promoting a layered security system, one that resourced the federal states to create robust Daraawiish forces to hold recovered territory and enforce law and order.
The last one year had seen the complete defanging of the NSA and the sidelining of his office. Frustrated by his diminishing influence and superfluous status, his exit comes as no surprise. It is difficult not to be empathetic to some of Hussein’s woes. But in the final analysis he cannot be absolved of responsibility for Somalia’s deepening security mess. He helped author it.
The Somali Wire Team
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Two days of heavy clashes (3–4 June) in the Somali capital, Mogadishu, between federal troops and opposition-aligned forces have underscored both the fragility of the city’s security environment and the volatility of electoral politics. Although relative calm has since returned to the two hardest-hit districts - Hawl Wadaag and Abdiaziz - and mediation efforts have intensified, tensions remain high, fuelling fears of renewed armed skirmishes. Credible reports of mass clan militia mobilisation on the edges of Mogadishu speak to a conflict that is widening. The militarisation of politics and elite fragmentation over the electoral process have shattered a core assumption: that Somali leaders will ultimately step back from the brink to negotiate a way forward. Consequently, the country is entering a perilous phase in which domestic factions alone cannot resolve the impasse, making neutral, external mediation a necessity.
Puntland President Sa'id Abdullah Deni is unofficially in the race for the federal presidency of Somalia. By most accounts, the regional leader is running again and this explains his re-engagement with Mogadishu after a three-year hiatus. Driven by shifting electoral dynamics, Deni’s decision to re-engage with the centre forces him to confront a radically altered political landscape in Mogadishu. Under President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM), the federal government has rewritten the rules of Somali politics, altering the institutional framework and consolidating executive authority.
On 10 May, the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) unilaterally conducted its contentious 'one-person-one-vote' (OPOV) electoral model in South West State (SWS), directly overriding opposition demands for a negotiated, consensus-based framework. Crucially, the very laws underpinning these OPOV elections are themselves deeply contested: the electoral framework was created following a rushed revision of Somalia’s constitution that many federal member states and opposition groups rejected. The vote, exclusively managed by the National Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (NIEBC), saw localised polling in 13 districts and across 126 poll centres and 276 stations. While 376,212 citizens were registered, actual turnout reached 132,430 voters - a participation rate of approximately 35.2% - with 128,276 valid ballots cast and 4,154 deemed spoilt/invalid. The electoral outcome, unsurprisingly, solidified a decisive mandate for Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s Justice and Solidarity Party (JSP); the governing party secured an absolute majority of 51 out of 95 contested legislative seats, comfortably outpacing its closest rival, Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden’s Ururka Horumarka, which claimed 14 seats.
The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) has effectively entered a 'grey transition' - a deeply fraught and hotly-contested interregnum that could upend decades of state-building and foment greater instability. By utilising the March 2026 constitutional amendments to extend his presidential mandate until May 2027, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) has effectively plunged the fragile Horn of Africa state into a profound period of severe internal strain and legitimacy crisis. This legalistic manoeuvre has roiled domestic politics and put Western partners of Somalia in a difficult spot. If Somalia's Western allies concede to HSM's fait accompli without extracting concessions from him on a negotiated settlement, they are likely to embolden Hassan Sheikh.
Somalia is entering one of the most dangerous political periods in its recent history. An unprecedented convergence of unresolved constitutional disputes, contested electoral arrangements, rising tensions between federal and regional actors, and the growing politicisation of state security institutions has pushed the country towards a potentially destabilising impasse.
A foreign-backed president, a besieged capital city, and a jihadist movement affiliated with Al-Qaeda-- this time not Somalia, but Mali. Late last week, Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), the transnational Salafist-jihadist group in Mali, stormed across much of the country's north, as well as entering Bakamo and assassinating the defence minister. The coordinated offensive-- in conjunction with the Tuareg separatist movement, the Azawad Liberation Front (ALF)-- has left the military junta reeling, and forced the withdrawal of their Russian allies from a number of strategic towns.
Last weekend, the Murusade, a major sub-clan of the powerful Hawiye clan family, staged one of the largest and most colourful coronations of a clan chief in recent memory in Mogadishu. The caleemasarka (enthronement) of Ugaas Abdirizaq Ugaas Abdullahi Ugaas Haashi, the new Ugaas or sultan of the Murusade, was attended by thousands of delegates from all parts of Somalia. Conducted next to the imposing and magnificent Ottomanesque Ali Jim'ale Mosque, on the Muslim day of rest, Friday, the occasion blended the Islamic, the regal and the customary; a restatement of an ancient tradition very much alive and vibrant.
With all eyes trained on the Strait of Hormuz blockades and their geopolitical convulsions, discussions and concerns, too, have risen about the perils of other globalised chokepoints, not least the Bab al-Mandab. The threats to the stability of the Bab al-Mandab, the Gulf of Aden, and the Red Sea may not arise principally from the escalatory logic that the US, Iran, and Israel have been locked in, but the threats posed from collapse and contested sovereignty offer little relief. Off Somalia's northern coastline in particular, it is transnational criminal networks — expressed in smuggling, piracy, and, less visibly but no less consequentially, illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing — that define the character of offshore insecurity. It is this last phenomenon that provides the foundation on which much of Somalia's maritime disorder is built, and which remains the most consistently neglected.
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