The Fall of Moqokori – Implications
The loss of Moqokori and Tardo – both ma'awiisley strongholds – in the past week has been a symbolic defeat for the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS). After being won from the insurgents nearly three years earlier by the ma'awiisley – local clan militias raised by communities in Hiiraan and adjacent Middle Shabelle - the loss of these towns is not simply another military setback; it starkly reveals a major political and strategic failure by the FGS. The grassroots Hawaadle clan fighters who held the frontline have been effectively abandoned as Mogadishu quietly shifted focus away from empowering these local forces, sacrificing their local capacity in favour of the Somali National Army (SNA), which is neither capable nor professional, ceding the initiative back to Al-Shabaab.
When President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud took office in 2022, clans in central Somalia mobilised against the insurgents: notably the Hawaadle clan in Hiiraan, Abgaal clan members in Middle Shabelle and Habar Gedir supporting the eastern Hiiraan operations. These ma'awiisley militias, named after their colourful cloth wraps, included local farmers and herders but also many hardened veterans of the 1990s clan militia warfare. By December 2022, bolstered by federal support, weapons and international airstrikes, the government claimed it had regained control of over 200 locations in Hirshabelle and Galmudug, including Al-Shabaab strongholds like Adan Yabaal in Middle Shabelle after 15 years of militant control.
This grassroots counterattack was transformative. The Hawaadle-led ma'awiisley became local heroes, reopening markets and protecting aid convoys. Initially, the federal government embraced them, providing weapons and supporting operations. In fact, within months, federal troops and these militias appeared to carry the offensive's momentum. However, almost as rapidly as they were empowered, the ma'awiisley forces were pulled into a vortex of Mogadishu's politics. Concerns grew among Hawaadle elders that pro-government figures were exploiting their sacrifice for political gain, while clans closer to the president received disproportionate attention and resources. Tensions deepened when Hirshabelle President and Abgaal leader, Ali Gudlaawe, dismissed Hiiraan Governor Ali Jeyte, a prominent Hawaadle figure, in order to curtail Hawaadle influence.
Morale and manpower started to fall, and joint offensives that had scored wins in 2022 went stale. Government attention was fixated on Middle Shabelle, leaving Hiiraan's east "on their own" – especially after Abdullahi Mohammed Ali' Sanbaloolshe' was fired from the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA). Lacking resupply, rotations, or even communications help, the Hawaadle ma'awiisley were left to exhaust ammunition and workforce holding territory and bearing the full weight of Al-Shabaab's recent offensives alone. This type of logistical abandonment quickly turned into tragedy. Cut off from reinforcements, the town of Moqokori fell in a matter of days.
While its loss was already anticipated, the capture was a strategic setback, opening routes for Al-Shabaab to move further into eastern Hiiraan. Moqokori had been one of the first areas taken from Al-Shabaab during the late 2022 campaign; the ma'awiisley maintained control of Moqokori for three solid years, primarily because they were a locally-trusted force. Al-Shabaab's objective is not only territorial – it also seeks to undermine local clan resistance networks like the ma'awiisley, by feeding on wider Hawaadle discontent whilst stoking sub-clan rivalry and divisions. That effort may appear to be succeeding; reports in recent weeks indicate growing tensions/frictions between the Darood Ali and Mohammed Ali sub-sub-clans of the Ali Madahweyne sub-clan of the Hawaadle over the sharing of limited local military resources.
For many in the Hawaadle community, the latest military setbacks and divisions will come as confirmation that the federal government is not a dependable ally. And this sentiment is not confined to Hiiraan alone. The 'Hiiraan fiasco' is a cautionary tale that generates growing resentment towards Mogadishu in much of central Somalia. This isn't the first time such disillusionment has taken place. In 2023, Murusade and other clans in the Galgaduud region were prepared to mobilise against Al-Shabaab, yet received no support from the federal government. Crucially, this experience mirrors a destructive pattern: successive federal offensives have cycled through regions, lacking strategic clarity and sustained commitment. Territory is won, only to be lost again as Villa Somalia shifts focus, leaving its own troops and local allies exposed and unsupported. There have been long-simmering divisions within the Abgaal clan – primarily between the Wa'eysle, Agoonyar, and Wa'buudhan sub-clans – that have fractured the frontline, playing directly into Al-Shabaab's hands. These tensions have been exacerbated by political unrest between the government and opposition leaders over national elections in 2026. The Wa'eysle, HSMs' own sub-clan, have dominated federal resource flows and military resources in the region.
This favouritism bred deep resentment. The Agoonyar, historically aligned with former President Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, found themselves sidelined and starved of weapons and excluded from planning. Most catastrophically, factions within the Wa'buudhan – particularly the Da'ud sub-sub clan, who felt they had lost influence since the warlord era- became fertile ground for Al-Shabaab's recruitment. Offered salaries, local authority, and a chance to settle scores, significant Wa'buudhan factions defected. They didn't just join, they brought invaluable knowledge of territories, clan protocols, and federal weaknesses.
Hiiraan region already resembles an independent administration in all but name. Anger over the perceived abandonment of Moqokori is likely to revive demands to split Hirshabelle and recognise Hiiraan as a standalone federal member state. These demands have been voiced – and quashed – before. But with Villa Somalia now actively pursuing recognition of the Dhulbahante-dominated SSC-Khaatuumo enclave in eastern Sool region as an FMS, while battling to carve the Marehaan portion of Gedo region out of Jubaland, historical Hawaadle sentiment for self-governance will become harder to refuse. Other clans, like the Ogaadeen in ‘Upper Bakool’ region and the Digil-Mirifle of Lower Shabelle and eastern Jubaland may follow suit. Both by accident and by design, Somalia’s ‘federal’ government is eviscerating the viability of federalism in Somalia, tearing up the Provisional Constitution and opening a Pandora's box for more “clantustan” statelets to emerge from the chaos.
The Somali Wire Team
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