After the embargo: The MV Sea World debacle
In December 2023, the final elements of the UN Security Council sanctions regime were lifted on the Somali federal government. Mogadishu's celebrations were rapturous, with President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud declaring that Mogadishu could now "purchase any weapons needed" and that "friendly nations and allies" could hand over the "necessary weapons without any limitations or restrictions." After years of lobbying, the final albatross around the neck of the federal government was to be lifted, and the Somali National Army (SNA) handed the heavy firepower required to conquer Al-Shabaab once and for all. Of course, over 18 months on, quite the reverse has happened, with Al-Shabaab having swept across much of central Somalia since February-- despite the glut of Egyptian and Turkish weapons donated to Villa Somalia in the past year. And Puntland's seizure of the MV Sea World, a Comorian-flagged vessel carrying Turkish arms and armoured vehicles last week, has thrown the question of the lifting of the arms embargo back into the open.
For years, Mogadishu pressed international partners that the very notion of an 'arms embargo' had undermined attempts to modernise the SNA. That was never the case; an influx of heavy weapons could never prove a deus ex machina for the much-corroded and politicised SNA, while the reporting requirements of buying and receiving heavy weapons for Mogadishu were hardly onerous. Indeed, many of the key elements of the embargo had already been lifted in 2013, allowing the federal government to access more advanced military hardware for years. But for a government addicted to foreign largesse, the narrative has always been that just a bit more international support is required and that Al-Shabaab's defeat is always imminent.
In December 2023, however, the UN Security Council maintained Resolutions 2713 and 2714 in place, which emphasised the management of weapons and ammunition at the time, reflecting an enduring concern that Mogadishu was not able to secure its stockpiles. And it certainly has proven itself unable to, not just with Al-Shabaab seizing cache after cache of arms before publicising it on Al-Kataib Media Foundation, but with deserting SNA soldiers also routinely selling off their weapons and ammunition, subsequently accessible in markets dotted around the country. The ubiquity and ease of arms access after three decades of internecine conflict in Somalia is hardly surprising, with senior government officials up and down the country implicated in the smuggling of arms for their own respective clan militias.
Villa Somalia in particular is associated with a coterie of Hawiye arms dealers that have covertly armed Abgaal/Waceysle militias in recent months. Since the lifting of the arms embargo, the federal government has aggressively built up forces loyal to the president-- not the state-- intended to be deployed against any potentially massing opposition in Mogadishu. Even though few requirements were left, the federal government has continued to exploit the country's porous borders and the state's levers to establish these clandestine forces. And while recent injections of advanced Turkish drones and helicopters to be deployed against Al-Shabaab certainly seize the headlines, it has not been the focus of Villa Somalia. Instead, Mogadishu has concentrated on delivering arms and vehicles to proxies in the Gedo and Sool regions as part of its broader destabilising tactics against Jubaland and Puntland, in the name of 'direct democracy.'
But leaving aside the MV Sea World saga, perhaps the best example of how the government has broken its own laws and the remaining arms reporting requirements was the Abudwaaq arms smuggling scandal last July. Then, Libaan Ahmed Hassan 'Shuluq,' another government proxy based in southern Galkacyo and a long-reported aspirant for the Galmudug presidency, was involved in bringing thousands of arms over the border from Ethiopia. Since 2022, the Hawiye businessman has secured millions of dollars in contracts to deliver arms and fuel to the ma'awiisley in central Somalia. But the two trucks ferrying arms intended for Villa Somalia-affiliated militias were hijacked by Mareehaan militia, sending the government into a tailspin and accusing Ethiopia of complicity. And consequently, the National Security Council announced a panicked "total ban" on the import and trade of arms by non-state actors. By several accounts, the nature of the government's own arms deliveries aboard the MV Sea World would be affected by such a ban.
After days of silence, the federal government has now demanded that Puntland release the vessel immediately, insisting that it was all above board and that it "carries legally authorised cargo intended for defence purposes critical to the security and stability of the country." Warning of potential action against the alleged act of "piracy," it appears that Villa Somalia may be gearing up for some form of militarised response. Still, it can bluff and bluster as much as it wants, but it cannot disguise that the federal government only controls a sliver of the country, and that it is unable to compel Puntland to hand over the weapons.
Responding to the much-delayed Mogadishu statement, Puntland on 24 July cited Articles 19 (2) (b) and (g) of the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea as its justification for taking charge of the stranded vessel. The trigger for the Puntland Maritime Police Force (PMPF) boarding was the apparent presence of several civilians on board MV Sea World, alongside the visibility of armoured vehicles —subsequently revealed to include Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles and armoured personnel carriers. Further, Puntland has asserted that the vessel had entered the conflict theatre against the Islamic State-Somalia-- threatening to compromise the federal member state's sovereignty and security. An investigation by Puntland is now underway, with regional officials having reportedly met members of the UN Panel of Experts/ Sanctions and others to discuss the next steps. Part of the probe is intended to uncover the owners and planned destination of the arms, which may yet take some time. Amidst all this, Garowe — again — has proven itself the more mature actor than Mogadishu.
There are several reasons that the federal government claims that this was a wholly above-board delivery that should be treated with suspicion. First is the purported links with the Somali businessman and arms trafficker, Abdi Nasir Ali Mahamud 'Adoon', sanctioned by the US government for his role in financing the Iranian-backed Houthi militant group, which has developed close ties with both Al-Shabaab and Islamic State-Somalia in Puntland. Moreover, delivering advanced weapons systems onboard a Comorian-flagged civilian cargo ship is highly unusual-- to say the least. Ankara has dispatched plenty of arms to the federal government previously, but these have typically arrived on Turkish military assets rather than on civilian vessels. Further, Comorian-flagged ships have an infamous reputation as a 'shadow fleet,' previously moving sanctioned goods from Russia and Iran, particularly crude oil. Moreover, if this were all legitimate, the federal government could and should have sent out an alert that heavy weapons were stranded off Bareeda-- not stew in silence for 5 days before sending out a furious message. Another bone of contention has been the purported presence of commercial goods on the ship-- with Puntland questioning Mogadishu's assertion that the cargo was partially destined for TURKSOM and unnamed Somali businessmen. Consequently, it has been widely interpreted that these Turkish arms and vehicles were intended for government-aligned militias-- otherwise, why the pretence and skulduggery? There is a suspicion in some quarters that the weapons may have even been destined for SSC-Khaatumo militias in Laas Aanood, possibly to be delivered via Laas Qoray.
Puntland is caught in a sticky situation with Turkish officials having demanded the return of the weapons. Although a close ally of the UAE —a geostrategic opponent of Türkiye— Garowe may eventually decide to hand over the armoured vehicles, even if it secures a propaganda victory for Villa Somalia. It will be understandably concerned, however, that these arms could be deployed against it in Sanaag via the federal government's proxies in Laas Aanood or in Gedo in Jubaland. Further clashes in Beledhawo have already been reported this morning, as well as dozens more troops airlifted to Garbahaarey yesterday as Mogadishu attempts to violently wrest Gedo into its orbit. And it is also hardly in doubt that Garowe could better deploy these weapons than Mogadishu in its counter-terror campaign against Daesh in the Al-Miskaad Mountains and imminent operations against Al-Shabaab to its west. With relations at their worst for years between Puntland and Mogadishu, the Said Abdullahi Deni government will be reluctant to do anything that will further empower the wayward central administration.
And Puntland is not the only actor to raise legitimate concerns. On 19 July, Somaliland's Foreign Minister Abdirahman Dahir Adan once again asserted the polity's opposition to the lifting of the arms embargo, calling for its reevaluation. However, with Somalia serving on the UN Security Council as a non-permanent member for 2025-2026, it is unlikely that the hyper-nationalist Somali government will be inclined to allow such a discussion to be tabled, having already effectively curtailed the UN's political mandate within the country. But it is certainly ironic timing that just on 18 July, yet more UN restrictions were lifted on Somalia-- further easing restrictions and requirements concerning supplying and selling weapons.
Ankara has invested immense amounts of cash, clout and arms in this Mogadishu government, while remaining 'nominally' independent. However, the clandestine nature of these arms deliveries, potentially involving SADAT mercenaries, may signal a more forceful positioning. Yesterday, Somalia's hawkish Defence Minister Ahmed Moallim Fiqi met with his Turkish counterpart, Yasar Guler, signing a deal on the sidelines of a security summit that will provide yet more cash and support for the SNA-- another full-throated endorsement of Villa Somalia. With Puntland and Mogadishu grappling over the constitutionality of the arms seizure, ironic considering the federal government's unilateral centralised rewriting, this saga may drag on for some time to come. The lifting of the arms embargo in December 2023 was heralded by the federal government as part of a new chapter for Somalia —and so it has been, but not in the way it was touted. Villa Somalia has used its newfound privileges to attack its allies and arm its enemies, fulfilling the vision of the great 'philosopher,' Pogo: "We have met the enemy and he is us."
The Somali Wire Team
