Issue No. 848

Published 18 Jul 2025

The M&E Dilemma in Somalia

Published on 18 Jul 2025 18:29 min

The M&E Dilemma in Somalia

Somalia remains heavily-dependent on external aid to fund humanitarian and development projects and plug a huge budget deficit to keep the federal state functioning. In 2025, 67% of Somalia's USD 1.32 billion federal budget was funded by external donors. In 2022, Somalia received over USD 2.2 billion in humanitarian assistance, according to figures released by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) – a record high by sub-Saharan standards, but still far below the requirements with climate change distress and armed conflicts continuing to aggravate living conditions for millions of Somalis.

The dilemma for many external actors engaged in Somalia is how to ensure Somalia has capacity to absorb and put to good use this significant inflow of external resources. Relatedly, the other challenge is how to put in place effective monitoring and evaluation systems to ensure the accountability and integrity of foreign-supported programmes and projects.

The practice of effective Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) in Somalia is profoundly constrained by a set of deeply interwoven challenges. The country's history of protracted conflict has weakened traditional social safety nets, elevating humanitarian aid to the level of a critical and highly contested local resource. Consequently, any M&E framework must be designed with a granular understanding of the complex security, political, and social dynamics at play.

Insecurity is by far the most immediate barrier, creating a chilling ripple effect across all related activities. The presence of armed groups and the persistence of conflict severely curtail physical access for M&E teams. This reality forces most international organisations to remain hunkered down, adopting remote management strategies that rely on local NGO partners. These local actors navigate the treacherous landscape by leveraging the very kinship affiliations that can offer a shield of protection. However, this leads to a stark geographic bias: aid and monitoring efforts inevitably concentrate in more accessible district capitals, systematically creating "aid deserts" in remote, high-risk territories and leaving their populations invisible and their needs unaddressed. In a context where so many disputes are resource-based, the injection of aid can itself become a spark in a tinderbox, inadvertently fuelling the local conflicts it seeks to alleviate.

A less visible, yet equally critical, vulnerability lies in the skill gap among local field teams. A significant number of staff on the front lines lack formal training in robust M&E methodologies. This deficit directly impacts the integrity of the entire data chain, leading to inconsistent collection and analysis that can render findings unreliable. In such a complex environment, field teams ill-equipped with the principles of M&E may struggle to navigate the ethical tightropes and methodological adaptations required. The result is often a reliance on simplistic metrics that fail to capture the true impact of interventions, producing data that is not merely incomplete, but potentially misleading.

This operational reality is further complicated by a dual political landscape. Practitioners must operate within the framework of a "fragile and evolving formal government" often incapable of providing the security or legal enforcement needed for equitable aid distribution. Into the vacuum left by the state steps a deeply entrenched informal system of local power brokers. Here, competition for resources devolves to sub-clan rivalries, where clan elders and other powerbrokers can co-opt the aid process, dictating its distribution to favour their own kin. This capture of the aid flow is a direct consequence of the formal government’s limited reach and authority.

These dynamics are cemented by socio-cultural realities, where lineage-based identity is the primary determinant of power and relationships. The entire aid system is warped by the "need for protection", a service offered not by the state, but by dominant local clans. This forces local NGOs into affiliations that, by necessity, channel benefits towards these dominant groups while systematically marginalising minority clans. International NGOs, despite mandates of neutrality, can become unwitting pawns, perceived as aligned with specific clans through their local partners. When local information is controlled by these same dominant groups, it becomes nearly impossible for donors to get an unfiltered view, masking potential misappropriation and compromising the very integrity of the data collected.

In response to these persistent challenges, humanitarian and development actors have adopted several adaptive M&E strategies, each with distinct advantages and limitations. One prevalent strategy is Enhanced Third-Party Monitoring (TPM), where external entities are contracted to collect data on behalf of donors who cannot access programme sites. This approach provides a crucial window into insecure areas that might otherwise go unmonitored. While it offers a higher degree of verification than remote monitoring alone, TPM is often more effective at verifying if an activity occurred than at assessing its quality or outcomes. It thus strengthens accountability to the donor but not necessarily to beneficiaries, and the monitors themselves are subject to local clan dynamics and security risks that can influence their access and create a risk of data manipulation.

Another adaptive strategy is the increasing use of community-based feedback and accountability mechanisms, such as telephone hotlines or community meetings, to establish direct lines of communication with affected populations. These mechanisms empower communities by giving them a direct voice in the aid process and can provide rapid, nuanced qualitative data often missed by traditional M&E methods. However, these channels face a significant risk of being captured by local elites or dominant groups, which can silence the voices of women, youth, and minority clans. The feedback is also often project-specific and may not provide a comprehensive view of a programme's overall impact.

Technological solutions are also being integrated, with agencies using tools like high-resolution satellite imagery and Geospatial Information Systems (GIS) to remotely verify physical activities. This provides objective, verifiable evidence of physical outputs, reducing reliance on potentially biased partner reporting. The primary drawback of this method is "context blindness"; a satellite image can confirm a school was built but reveals nothing about its quality, use, or community impact, thereby missing the critical social and political context.

Finally, in line with the global "localisation" agenda, there is a push to support more equitable local partnerships by shifting resources and decision-making power to a wider range of Somali NGOs. This strategy aims to strengthen local M&E capacity for long-term sustainability and leverage the unparalleled contextual understanding of local partners. However, without extremely careful vetting, this approach risks reinforcing the very patterns of aid capture it is meant to solve. Easing partnership criteria to be more inclusive may increase mismanagement risks if not paired with intensive support, and channelling resources to minority-led organisations can make them targets for predatory behaviour from stronger groups.

Improving the efficacy and accountability of M&E in Somalia will require targeted changes to both methodology and mindset. A key strategic shift is the adoption of a mandatory triangulation protocol for projects operating in high-risk environments. Rather than relying on a single adaptive strategy, organisations should be required to use at least three distinct M&E methods to cross-verify results. For example, the construction of a school could be confirmed through satellite imagery, assessed for quality via Third-Party Monitoring interviews, and evaluated for accessibility through focused community feedback. This layered approach combines the objectivity of remote sensing with the depth of qualitative insights, helping to counter human bias while addressing the context-blindness often inherent in remote data collection.

Equally critical is the need to embed a robust analysis of clan and power dynamics into project design. This means going beyond generic risk assessments to conduct a detailed Conflict and Power Dynamics Analysis before implementation begins. Such an analysis should map out the local clan structure, identify key powerbrokers, and highlight groups at risk of exclusion. These findings must then shape decisions around beneficiary targeting and the selection of local partners. Given Somalia’s fluid political environment, this analysis cannot be static – it must be regularly updated to ensure programming remains conflict-sensitive and responsive to shifts in power. Doing so helps pre-empt aid capture, avoid reinforcing existing inequalities, and reduce the risk of inadvertently fuelling inter-clan tensions.

Strengthening accountability to affected populations also demands a redesign of feedback mechanisms. The risk of elite capture of standard feedback channels necessitates moving beyond a single public hotline. Feedback channels must be diversified and made safer for marginalised groups. Organisations should establish multiple, confidential communication lines, such as dedicated hotlines for women and youth staffed by operators from the same demographic to build trust. Additionally, using low-tech, anonymous methods like locked suggestion boxes in safe community spaces or partnering with trusted CBOs representing minority groups as feedback intermediaries can ensure their voices are heard without direct exposure. This approach directly confronts the reality that dominant groups can silence the voices of the most vulnerable, creating safer ways to receive honest feedback on sensitive issues.

Finally, while pursuing the vital "localisation" agenda, organisations must adopt a "protection mainstreaming" approach for local partners. This is crucial because supporting CBOs from minority clans can make them targets for predatory behaviour from more powerful groups. A protection-by-partnership model –pairing these groups with larger, established NGOs – can offer political cover while enabling meaningful participation. This strategy allows organisations to strengthen local capacity while proactively mitigating the significant risks involved, making local partnerships safer and more sustainable.

The Somali Wire Team

To continue reading, create a free account or log in.

Gain unlimited access to all our Editorials. Unlock Full Access to Our Expert Editorials — Trusted Insights, Unlimited Reading.

Create your Sahan account Login

Unlock lifetime access to all our Premium editorial content

You may also be interested in

Issue No. 127
Total War in the Horn of Africa
The Horn Edition

'Give Peace a Chance' was the title of a 1969 single written by John Lennon, recorded during his famous honeymoon 'bed-in' with Yoko Ono. Capturing the counterculture sentiments of the time, it was adopted as an anthem of the anti-Vietnam War movement in the following decade. Thirty years later, a provocative inversion of the title-- 'Give War a Chance'-- was adopted in a well-known Foreign Affairs article by Edward Luttwak in 1999, in which he argued that humanitarian interventions or premature negotiations can freeze conflict, resulting in endless, recurring war. Luttwak contended that war has an internal logic, and if allowed to 'run its course', can bring about a more durable peace.


27:16 min read 30 Apr
Issue No. 954
The Malian Mirror
The Somali Wire

A foreign-backed president, a besieged capital city, and a jihadist movement affiliated with Al-Qaeda-- this time not Somalia, but Mali. Late last week, Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), the transnational Salafist-jihadist group in Mali, stormed across much of the country's north, as well as entering Bakamo and assassinating the defence minister. The coordinated offensive-- in conjunction with the Tuareg separatist movement, the Azawad Liberation Front (ALF)-- has left the military junta reeling, and forced the withdrawal of their Russian allies from a number of strategic towns.


10:18 min read 29 Apr
Issue No. 329
Washington eyes Asmara
The Ethiopian Cable

Last week, a bombshell Wall Street Journal article revealed that Washington was exploring a reset in relations with Eritrea, with US envoy for Africa Massad Boulos having met privately with senior regime officials in Egypt. Any normalisation of ties now appears to be on ice, with the reaction to Boulos's meetings — facilitated by Egypt — having been met with short shrift. But the episode speaks to broader issues about American foreign policy in the Horn and the accelerating reconfiguration of the Red Sea political order, which will not go away simply because this particular overture may have stalled.


0 min read 28 Apr
Issue No. 953
A Coronation in Mogadishu – How Clans Stormed the Citadel
The Somali Wire

Last weekend, the Murusade, a major sub-clan of the powerful Hawiye clan family, staged one of the largest and most colourful coronations of a clan chief in recent memory in Mogadishu. The caleemasarka (enthronement) of Ugaas Abdirizaq Ugaas Abdullahi Ugaas Haashi, the new Ugaas or sultan of the Murusade, was attended by thousands of delegates from all parts of Somalia. Conducted next to the imposing and magnificent Ottomanesque Ali Jim'ale Mosque, on the Muslim day of rest, Friday, the occasion blended the Islamic, the regal and the customary; a restatement of an ancient tradition very much alive and vibrant.


21:22 min read 27 Apr
Issue No. 952
Fishy Business: IUU Fishing in Somalia
The Somali Wire

With all eyes trained on the Strait of Hormuz blockades and their geopolitical convulsions, discussions and concerns, too, have risen about the perils of other globalised chokepoints, not least the Bab al-Mandab. The threats to the stability of the Bab al-Mandab, the Gulf of Aden, and the Red Sea may not arise principally from the escalatory logic that the US, Iran, and Israel have been locked in, but the threats posed from collapse and contested sovereignty offer little relief. Off Somalia's northern coastline in particular, it is transnational criminal networks — expressed in smuggling, piracy, and, less visibly but no less consequentially, illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing — that define the character of offshore insecurity. It is this last phenomenon that provides the foundation on which much of Somalia's maritime disorder is built, and which remains the most consistently neglected.


21:07 min read 24 Apr
Issue No. 126
Russia in the Horn: Opportunism in an Age of Disorder
The Horn Edition

In the past months, a number of unsettling images and videos have emerged from the Russian frontlines in the Ukraine war. Within the horrors of the grinding "kill zone," where kamikaze drones strafe the sky for any signs of movement, yet another concerning dimension has emerged—the use of African recruits by Moscow in the conflict, often under false pretences. Particularly drawn from Kenya, many reportedly believed they were signing contracts to work as drivers or security guards, only to be shipped to the front lines upon arrival. Such activities are illustrative of several issues, including Russia's relationship with countries in the Horn of Africa, one shaped more by opportunistic realpolitik than genuine partnership.


28:23 min read 23 Apr
Issue No. 951
Federal Overreach in Baidoa Faces Pushback
The Somali Wire

Villa Somalia's triumph in Baidoa may yet turn to ashes. Since the ousting of wary friend-turned-foe, Abdiaziz Laftagareen, in late March, the federal government has ploughed ahead with preparations for state- and district-level elections in South West. Nominally scheduled for next week, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has chosen to reward his stalwart parliamentary ally, Aden Madoobe from the Rahanweyne/Hadaamo, with the regional presidency after some vacillation, naming him the sole Justice and Solidarity Party (JSP) candidate


0 min read 22 Apr
Issue No. 328
The TPLF versus the TIA-- again
The Ethiopian Cable

Another showdown over Tigray's political architecture is unfolding, with the future of the Tigray Interim Administration (TIA) once again at stake. For much of this year, fears of renewed war have loomed over Ethiopia's northernmost region, with the federal government mobilising substantial forces to the edges of Tigray.


19:44 min read 21 Apr
Issue No. 950
A City Without Its People
The Somali Wire

In Act III, Scene I of William Shakespeare's tragedy Coriolanus, the tribune Sicinius addresses the gathered representatives and, rejecting the disdain the titular character displays towards plebeians, defends them, stating, "What is the city but the people?" Capturing the struggle between the elite and the masses of ancient Rome, the line has remained politically resonant for centuries--emphasising that a city, democracy, and state rely on the people, not just their leader. Or perhaps, not just its buildings. It is a lesson missed by Villa Somalia, though, with the twilight weeks of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud's term in office — at least, constitutionally — dominated by the government's twin campaigns in the capital: land clearances and the militarisation of Mogadishu.


20:32 min read 20 Apr
Scroll