Issue No. 855

A New Fait Accompli In The Volatile North

Last week, a new Somali federal state entitled "North Eastern State of Somalia" (NES) (Dowlad Goboleedka Waqooyi Bari Soomaaliya) was proclaimed and endorsed by Villa Somalia. The culmination of a months-long project directed by the Ministry of Interior, the transformation of the Laas Aanood-based SSC-Khaatumo administration into a supposed 'federal state'-- the first since Hirshabelle-- is being hailed by Somali nationalists as a victory against the 'secessionism' of Somaliland and Puntland's independence from Mogadishu. Though not in full control of either, NES is meant to encompass both Sool and Sanaag, and has been finally bulldozed into existence in the face of public opposition from Puntland, Somaliland, and much of the Warsangeli that the new state claims to represent. The cynical electoral politics of Mogadishu are pushing northern Somalia and Somaliland to the brink of conflict once again.

After weeks of delay, over 400 clan delegates from the Dhulbahante and some Warsangeli politicos gathered in Laas Aanood in late July. Spearheaded by Interior Minister Ali Hosh, the meeting had to be repeatedly postponed due to the refusal of senior Warsangeli elders to participate and enduring rifts within the Dhulbahante. It has proven a politically torturous and even violent process as Villa Somalia sought in vain to bribe and cajole the Warsangeli, who predominantly reside in Sanaag, to nominally meet the two-region constitutional criteria for member state formation. 

Still, despite the arms and cash flowing through Laas Aanood, most of the Warsangeli have generally sided with Puntland-- in part because of their historic business ties with Bosaaso. Eventually, though, some Warsangeli political figures, claiming to represent the fanciful 'Maakhir State,' joined with SSC-Khaatumo. As part of the negotiations for the new administration and parliament, 45 seats have been allocated to the SSC-Khaatumo wing and 38 to the Maakhir faction. But this is a manufactured and unstable consensus, awarding Maakhir the presidency and a disproportionate share of seats within the parliament to give the impression of greater Warsangeli buy-in. In theory, the presidency will now alternate between the clans, but as seen in Hirshabelle, this kind of precarious clan balancing act can quickly break down. 

In the immediate term, the federal government, in collusion with SSC-Khaatumo leader Abdikhadir Ahmed Aw-Ali 'Firdhiye' - a card-carrying member of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud's (HSM) Justice and Solidarity Party (JSP) - has now begun the process of selecting parliamentarians. However, this is generating further churn, even within SSC-Khaatumo, with a coalition of senior Dhulbahante figures publicly condemning Villa Somalia's involvement and insisting that it carry out the process independently of Mogadishu. Among those resisting the MP selection process is Abdirazak Khalif, a former Somaliland Speaker of Parliament, who enjoys the support of Puntland, hails from an influential Dhulbhante sub-clan, and is personally wealthy. Khalif also represents the strongest threat to Firdhiye's position within the SSC-Khaatumo, with the leadership elections initially scheduled for tomorrow likely to be postponed. Meanwhile, many contend that Villa Somalia seeks to install a Warsangeli politician as NES president in order to cement its claim to both Sool and Sanaag regions.

Villa Somalia and its nationalist base are celebrating the 'sixth' Federal Member State as a tactical and strategic victory in the north, handing greater legitimacy to SSC-Khaatumo and strengthening the unionist Dhulbahante hand. In one fell stroke, Mogadishu has sought to counter both Somaliland's enduring quest for recognition and Puntland's drift towards confederalism. But NES is more than just about threatening or instigating conflict with Villa Somalia's political opponents in the north. One of the federal government's principal goals remains carving out electoral zones in Darood-majority areas to establish polling centres for its risible plans to conduct direct polls in May 2026. 

In a further affront to Hargeisa and Garowe, both of which have held genuine democratic votes in recent years, the National Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (NIEBC) plans to dispatch election materials and officials to Laas Aanood in the coming weeks. Again, the NIEBC -- led by close allies of the president-- falls squarely under the auspices of the Interior Ministry. If Mogadishu can establish such an electoral footprint and demonstrate that its disingenuous 'one-person, one-vote' project has support beyond the Hawiye-dominated regions of south-central Somalia, it will all but cement HSM's ambition to anoint himself Somalia's president for a third term.

Meanwhile, in Hargeisa, Somaliland's Cabinet met over the weekend to discuss the new development and strategise a counter-response. Technically, the new state eats into territory Somaliland historically considers its own 'sovereign' land by hiving off Sool and Sanaag from Hargeisa. Somaliland has based its administrative borders on the boundaries of the British Somaliland Protectorate, while Puntland has vested its authority genealogically, asserting control over the Darood/Harti clan family within a federated Somalia. 

There is intense domestic pressure on President Abdirahman 'Irro' to consider a strong military response, particularly from those who believe it could jeopardise Somaliland's aspirations for recognition. But with Irro slated to visit the US in the coming weeks -- and expected to pitch a location for an American military base and access to critical minerals -- the president would prefer to visit Washington with Somaliland at peace. It would seem that Mogadishu and its SSC-Khaatumo allies are determined to make things as difficult as possible for Irro. Fomenting renewed unrest and violence in the contested regions of Sool and Sanaag is one way that Mogadishu can actively work to undermine the prospect of international recognition.

Puntland has continued to voice its displeasure with SSC-Khaatumo and the federal government. Puntland Interior Minister Abdi Farah Juha on 2 August accused the president of being "the greatest enemy of the Somali state-building process," while others have lamented the violence at the hands of the federal military and wild misuse of resources in the targeting of Gedo and Sanaag. Reports over the weekend appeared to show the creation of a new SSC-Khaatumo militia, armed and supported by the federal government, as part of the Somali National Army (SNA). Such antics already triggered deadly clashes in Dhahar with Puntland troops in mid-July and forced Garowe to divert its forces away from operations against Islamic State-Somalia. And consequently, as part of its preparations for Operation Onkod (Thunder) against the Al-Shabaab presence in the Al-Miskaad Mountains, Garowe is eyeing a new Puntland Maritime Police Force (PMPF) base in Laas Qoray on the Sanaag coastline. Puntland will not cede areas of Sanaag lightly, nor will Somaliland, which has administrative control over Eerigaabo.

The type of 'federalisation' in the north marks a departure from how Somalis have typically established federal states, with the process to create NES top-down, narrow, highly partisan, and driven by electoral calculations. The establishment of NES does not prove a recommitment to the federal project-- quite the opposite, it constitutes a dangerous and cynical manipulation of federalism to render it irrelevant. In this light, senior federal officials--including the PM in a recent speech-- have increasingly condemned the federal model as a foreign project, and one imposed on Somalis that cannot work. Such attitudes align with Villa Somalia's plan to orchestrate a centralised state with token, feeble decentralised structures that will not be sustainable in the long run.

And such reckless cleaving off of the Dhulbahante and parts of the Warsangeli into a new state paradoxically mirrors another process of federal atomisation - breaking up existing federal states into small, single-clan components. In Mareehaan-dominated Gedo as well, the federal government is attempting to wrest the region from the Ahmed Madoobe government and establish a parallel administration that is subservient to its direct voting agenda. And there are numerous others that could be spawned from forcing through NES, including resurrecting the Hawaadle's ambitions for a 'Hiiraan State' with Beledweyne as capital. By claiming the entirety of the Sanaag region for NES, the federal government has also asserted authority over Isaaq territory —a highly dangerous precedent. If the trend continues, we are likely to see a renewed clamour by some clans to claim new status or assert sovereignty over the lands of others– a development almost certain to trigger wider conflict in a country pockmarked by competing claims. 

The long-term viability of NES is in deep question. How can a new state, patently an adversary of and sandwiched between two powerful polities, function? NES will have no port rents, cannot rely on subsidies from Mogadishu and as a traditional transit trade corridor will have to be reliant on the goodwill of a furious Garowe and Hargeisa. But that matters little for Mogadishu, whose myopic 'win' signals only further damage to the federal project in the only part of the Somali peninsula-- barring Laas Aanood-- that has enjoyed a vestige of peace in the past 20 years.

The Somali Wire Team