Issue No. 850

Published 23 Jul 2025

Unlearning the lessons from Ras Kamboni

Published on 23 Jul 2025 14:32 min

Unlearning the lessons from Ras Kamboni

In just a handful of days, Sabiid in Lower Shabelle has fallen back to Al-Shabaab, Turkish arms linked to government-aligned arms traffickers were seized off Puntland's coast, and armed clashes erupted in Beledhawo in Gedo between Jubaland and federal troops. With the immediate threat of Mogadishu falling to Al-Shabaab having passed for the time being, Villa Somalia has returned to its favoured agenda, wielding its security apparatus not against the jihadists but against political opposition. Subsequent violence in Gedo, Sanaag, and the collapse of the Lower Shabelle operations are all emblematic of Villa Somalia reverting to its coercive tactics to attempt to forcibly impose its will on the peripheries. But it is losing-- and badly, having entirely failed to learn the lessons of Ras Kamboni in December 2024 when federal troops were routed by Jubaland.

At the heart of its strategy, Villa Somalia appears to believe that by muddying the waters and carving out enough polling enclaves that can simultaneously destabilise both Jubaland and Puntland, it can make sufficient progress with its electoral agenda to 'legitimise' another term for Hassan Sheikh. Rather than focusing its energies against Al-Shabaab, the government's dangerous schemes have repeatedly triggered clashes with state-level forces across the country, stretching from Sanaag down to Gedo. However, its attempts to impose its will, particularly in Sanaag as part of efforts to co-opt the Warsangeli into the SSC-Khaatumo administration, have floundered, with the government having alienated itself from swathes of the country, particularly the Darood.

One of the government's principal instruments has been the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA), which has been repurposed into a paramilitary force for some time and wielded against Villa Somalia's political opposition. The return of Mahad Salad as spy chief, deposing Abdullahi 'Sanbalooshe' and undermining the Hawaadle ma'awiisley in Hiiraan, and more recently, Abdirashid Janaan as director of intelligence for Gedo, best epitomise this. A highly controversial figure accused of human rights violations, Janaan also hails from Gedo and joins the Mareehaan Minister of Internal Security Abdullahi Sheikh Ismail 'Fartaag' in leading the attempts to wrest Gedo into Villa Somalia's orbit. Neither appears to have learnt the lessons of Ras Kamboni -- that violently attempting to unseat and destabilise the Ahmed Madoobe administration and forcibly coerce a region into one's agenda is doomed to fail. And almost as soon as Janaan arrived in Beledhawo yesterday, deadly violence erupted. Still, though Janaan and federal troops have been pushed out of the town to the SNA 'UK Base,' a moniker and no relation to a British military presence, this is likely just the latest salvo of an extended campaign to install polling stations in Gedo towns to further 'cement' direct Darood participation in another Federal Member State (FMS). Only Al-Shabaab --already spread across much of southern Gedo -- stands to benefit.

Sanaag --the region populated by the Warsangeli and claimed by both Somaliland and Puntland --has been another frontier for Villa Somalia's coercive agenda. Here, both Somaliland and Puntland have cemented their hold over the areas which they control, with Warsangeli elders simultaneously rebuffing the Mogadishu-backed bribery and entreats from the SSC-Khaatumo administration in Laas Aanood. Nevertheless, Villa Somalia and the Dhulbahante politicians aligned with Mogadishu have proceeded with the unconstitutional construction of just the Sool region into an 'FMS,' but it was a pale imitation, considering their initial attempts to bring the Warsangeli onside. And-- much like Gedo-- deadly clashes consequently erupted in Sanaag as militias attacked Puntland-controlled Dhahar last week. Puntland subsequently condemned the fighting, accusing the federal government of involvement and being forced to redirect forces away from vital counter-terror operations to protect its western border. Not only is Villa Somalia disinterested in mounting any concerted resistance to Al-Shabaab, but it is undermining some of the only organic and successful counter-terror operations against violent extremist groups in the country. 

With relations plumbing fresh depths between the Darood-majority FMS and Mogadishu, Puntland seized the stationary Sea World Comoros-flagged vessel carrying Turkish armoured vehicles and weapons off Bareeda last week. Much remains unknown, but one individual implicated so far is Abdi Nasir Ali Mahamud 'Adoon', a well-known arms trafficker and a close ally of the president. Adoon has already been sanctioned by the US for his role in financing the Iranian-backed, Yemen-based Houthi movement-- whose growing tendrils into Somalia the federal government has shown no interest in countering. The undocumented nature of the arms shipment has generated significant furore in Puntland, as well as Somaliland, with many questioning the presumptiveness of having lifted the final elements of the arms embargo on the government in December 2023. And it has left Garowe in a bind, reticent to hand over yet more weapons to Villa Somalia that it could deploy against Jubaland or Puntland.

After several days of silence, the federal government finally cracked and responded to the seizure of the Sea World vessel this morning. Revisionist in the extreme, it insists that the weapons were destined for Mogadishu Port as part of the bilateral defence agreement between Türkiye and Somalia, and were intended for the TURKSOM military base. Most extraordinary though, the federal government has insisted that Puntland taking charge of the vessel is both a "direct violation of the Provisional Constitution"-- which Mogadishu has taken a sledgehammer to-- and "constitutes an act of piracy." The federal government has further warned it is ready to take the necessary steps to ensure maritime security "against maritime zones and coastal landing sites that serve as hubs for acts of piracy." Considering Villa Somalia cannot even secure Sabiid, just 40km from the capital, and without a navy, it is nonsensical to suggest it can somehow secure its own seas, not least against the Puntland Maritime Police Force, which has demonstrated a robust counter-terror capacity in combating Daesh in recent months. But Mogadishu does have well-armed proxies as well as the federal military to call upon, and appears set on continuing to violently undermine any polity or individual that resists its rigged OPOV agenda. 

Meanwhile, while military equipment has been deployed to Gedo and Laas Aanood, the feebleness of the corroded army was evidenced again by their withdrawal from Sabiid and Anole in Lower Shabelle in recent days. Even while supported by a major contingent of bilateral Ugandan People's Defence Forces (UPDF) troops, it is highly alarming that the SNA have been unable to recapture the 'bridge towns' of Sabiid, Bariire, and Awdheegle, all lost to Al-Shabaab in Mastrategic rch, and points to just how severe the deterioration of the force has been. The UPDF, meanwhile, also suffered multiple high-casualty incidents in 'Operation Silent Storm' in Lower Shabelle in recent weeks, including a suicide bombing that reportedly killed over a dozen Ugandan soldiers. It appears that the jihadists have already retaken the areas from which the SNA and UPDF pulled out, restoring a route through which Al-Shabaab can mass forces near Mogadishu again. And in Middle Shabelle, government-led attempts to establish cohesive operations against Al-Shabaab to retake some territory have repeatedly stalled, with Villa Somalia's attention seemingly wholly consumed by its own political machinations.

The government's arms and soldiers deployed against Jubaland could have been better utilised in Hiiraan, supporting the Hawaadle ma'awiisley in their desperate need of assistance before key towns, such as Moqokori, fell to Al-Shabaab. But that would require a government that cares about the counter-terror fight, and not simply about claiming others' successes and attracting weapons and equipment to prop up loyalist Abgaal sub-clan militias. The grim scenes at Ras Kamboni last December were a shambles, symptomatic of the myopic and dangerous agenda of Villa Somalia. But rather than draw a line in the sand, Villa Somalia has doubled down on repeating these mistakes ad nauseam in its attempts to coerce and cudgel Somalia's peripheries. A violently centralised state in Somalia did not work over three decades ago, and nor can it work today.

The Somali Wire Team 

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