Issue No. 854

Taiwan, Somaliland, and the Era of Illiberal Globalisation

Two weeks go by, and at least one new maritime agreement on the Somali peninsula has reared its head, with another retaliatory pact to potentially soon follow. The first was between Taiwan and Somaliland, following Hargeisa's Foreign Minister Abdirahman Dahir Osman's visit to Taipei in late July, during which he secured a cooperation agreement between the coastguards of Taiwan and Somaliland. And the inevitable Beijing-Mogadishu response has now arrived, with the Chinese Embassy in Somalia announcing that it has discussed enhancing "cooperation" with the federal government's Coast Guard. As ever, the officials reaffirmed their commitment to "safeguarding national sovereignty and territorial integrity of China and Somalia." 

Since establishing respective representative offices in 2020, Taiwan has steadily increased its support for Somaliland in various fields, including medical and humanitarian assistance, as well as infrastructure development. Just last month, construction was completed on a main road running through Hargeisa, and in late July, it was further agreed that Taipei would help construct new airport buildings in the Somaliland capital. Including the UAE and Ethiopia, Taiwan has become one of Hargeisa's closest allies, sharing some key elements– democratic, US partners and surviving in the strange realm of the cracks of the international system. The latter is naturally the most important, with few other political, cultural or social similarities tying Taiwan and Somaliland together. And their latest cooperation agreement involves Taiwan pledging to provide training and support for the Somaliland Coast Guard, with plans to develop the polity's blue economy as well.

There is hardly a dearth of issues for the Somaliland Coast Guard to attend to, not least with the Iranian-backed Yemen-based Houthi movement continuing to make inroads with disenfranchised clans, helping to train and arm both Al-Shabaab and Islamic State-Somalia. Arms trafficking across the waterway to Yemen remains a major problem. Last month, Puntland seized the MV Sea World, a Comoros-flagged vessel surreptitiously transporting Turkish weapons for Somalia's federal government. Somaliland protested the transporting of heavy weaponry aboard a disguised civilian ship, again questioning the wisdom of having lifted the remaining UN arms sanctions on Mogadishu back in December 2023. And the threat of illegal fishing to Somaliland's economy by unmarked 'grey' vessels-- particularly Yemeni, Chinese, and Iranian-- remains significant as well.

As anticipated, the Taiwan-Somaliland deal has triggered the usual protestations from Mogadishu and Beijing. Officials in Hargeisa have sought to assuage Beijing's concerns, arguing that such a deal that can better secure the arterial waterways off the Somali peninsula is a boon for all. Taiwan's statement was strong on the other hand– rejecting the "bullying" attempts by Beijing and calling upon the Chinese Embassy in Somalia to "cease actions that seek to undermine regional peace and stability." But it is hardly the only deal-- and not the most significant-- that Hargeisa is hoping to clinch in the coming months, with reports surfacing that Somaliland has again offered territory on the Bab al-Mandab Strait to the US for a military base, as well as a resource deal based on lithium. Though Somaliland President Abdirahman Irro has said that these deals are irrespective of whether Washington recognises the polity, it is clearly a transparent attempt to try and entice the resource-focused, highly transactional manner in which the Trump administration has approached its foreign policy. America has looked to divest its military investments on the Red Sea away from Djibouti, the location of its only permanent military base, due to the presence of the rival Chinese installation.

Mogadishu and Beijing, on the other hand, have become ever closer, with officials continuing to proclaim their respective support for 'One Somalia' and 'One China' policies, and particularly in the fallout from the Ethiopia-Somaliland Memorandum of Understanding in 2024. This has been to the displeasure of many of Somalia's Western allies, and the anti-China Republican hawks in Congress and the Senate. Several have increasingly lobbied against Mogadishu this year, arguing that Washington has sunk billions into the country with little to show for it, as it develops ties with Beijing. Causing distinct consternation was one of the final acts of Ahmed Fiqi as Foreign Secretary, banning those travelling on Taiwanese passports in Somalia-- though this has since been rescinded. At the time, Fiqi said that the planned trip of the Taiwanese Foreign Minister had pushed Mogadishu to "take new measures" and that it was seeking to "isolate and strangle Somaliland by any means necessary." But Mogadishu hardly helped engender trust either in the returned Trump administration by having attempted to offer it Berbera and Bosaaso ports, among other infrastructure it does not control, earlier this year.

It suits Beijing to insist upon the tenets of sovereignty and territorial integrity when it pleases, but in the same breath, it seeks to undermine and lambast the international system upon which states are built. Not only that, but China– through the federal government– has aggressively sought to destabilise Somaliland, funnelling arms into SSC-Khaatumo in Laas Aanood. The proxy of the Dhulbahante-dominated administration is far from a stable one, however. The now-complete attempts to bring together a new 'Federal Member State' (FMS) proved both laborious and extremely tense, with most of the Warsangeli disengaging from the process and siding with Puntland. Both Somaliland and Puntland —celebrating the anniversary of its formation this week —have heavily protested Villa Somalia's pumping of arms and cash into Laas Aanood to coerce the Warsangeli, in a thwarted attempt to fulfil the two-region stipulation for FMS creation.

It is important not to read too much into a minor coastguard cooperation agreement between Taiwan and Somaliland, which is more symbolic of the growing ties between the polities, if anything else. The two are small actors in a much more violent pond, with the competition over the western Indian Ocean, Gulf of Aden, and Red Sea all having soared in the past years. Several countries are heavily dependent on the Red Sea trade, including not only European nations but also the UAE, India, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and China. And much of the Gulf regards the Horn as an extension of its political-security spheres of interest and has subsequently violently competed to secure its contrasting agendas in recent years. Israel is another that is looking to aggressively shape the future of the region.

Intersecting with this, Ethiopia is agitating to invade Eritrea to seize the port of Assab, and with such heightened tensions, many anticipate that war could break out at any moment. Even amid the conflict in Sudan, its lengthy stretch of coastline —currently held by the Sudanese army —has been an enticing prospect for Moscow, Ankara, and others intent on securing and developing new footholds on the Red Sea. And in Mogadishu, Türkiye has developed a near-incestuous relationship with Villa Somalia, pledging to rebuild its non-existent navy in exchange for the spoils of billions of barrels of offshore hydrocarbons. 

A decade ago, one might have talked about 'Great Power' competition in Africa, with the US and China vying for the upper hand-- and in relation to Somalia and Somaliland, there are certainly some echoes of this period. However, the 'Red Sea Arena' has become one of the frontlines in the global shifting world order, moving away from the decades of Pax Americana, underwritten by the world's largest economy and military, to a form of geopolitics that is more explicitly transactional amid emaciated multilateralism. Some have termed this emerging era one of 'illiberal globalisation.' Hargeisa was right to note that empowering its coastguard is a boon to countering some of the maritime insecurity plaguing the polity, but it is also just one actor of many in the increasingly securitised lens through which the 'Red Sea Arena' is regarded. Mogadishu and Beijing, meanwhile, would do well to expend their energies on countering the threats that genuinely threaten the lives and livelihoods of the Somali peninsula —not a minor coast guard pact between Taipei and Hargeisa.

The Somali Wire Team