Issue No. 853

Gedo: the bellwether of Somalia's fragmentation

Gedo has long served as a useful barometer for the health of relations between Nairobi, Mogadishu, and Addis. Straddling the tri-border Mandera Triangle, the Mareehaan-dominated region of Jubaland has been a key staging post for Al-Shabaab's continued infiltration into Kenya and Ethiopia for years. And as such, both Nairobi and Addis have a vested stake in Jubaland as a security buffer zone against the jihadists, developing close ties with key political actors within Gedo and the southern Federal Member State-- which they helped co-establish in 2013. Over a decade later, with Hassan Sheikh Mohamud back at the helm in Mogadishu, the focus has returned to Gedo, as he has resorted to a well-known destabilising playbook by attempting —and failing —to wrest the Mareehaan into Villa Somalia's orbit. But amid the government's months-long campaign to destabilise Gedo, including seizing Garbahaarey and Luuq from control of Jubaland to carve out Darood tents for its rigged elections, Addis has remained silent-- until now. 

It was almost certainly no coincidence that just hours after Ethiopian PM Abiy Ahmed hosted his Somali and Kenyan counterparts at a climate summit in Addis, fighting erupted between Jubaland forces– with the support of allied Ethiopian troops– and a National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) camp in Dollow. With Ethiopian backing, Jubaland troops seized the base on Sunday evening, with at least two soldiers dying in the process and several more arrested, including the commander, who has now been reportedly handed over to Mareehaan elders. Ironically, the Ethiopian intervention on behalf of their Jubaland allies also came on the very same day that Somalia's State Foreign Minister Al Omar Bal'ad stated that all was well between Mogadishu and Addis. If ordered from Addis-- which has conveniently remained silent-- it was to send a clear signal to Mogadishu that Ethiopia's border security will not be compromised for the sake of Villa Somalia's electoral agenda. 

Dollow lies directly on the border with Ethiopia, falling well within its lengthy security buffer, which incorporates a string of clans and administrations, including not just Mareehaan sub-clans but the Hawaadle and Leysan as well, among others. A significant Ethiopian army contingent remains in the Gedo town, training and arming the Jubaland forces present there, while the district commissioner of Dollow is reported to have a close relationship with the Ethiopian military contingent. And playing a central role in resisting Villa Somalia's violent entreats in Gedo, Jubaland Vice-President Sayid Aden—also Mareehaan from the Reer Hassan— travelled to Dollow in the days before the deadly clashes erupted, reportedly meeting with Ethiopian officials there. This is the second recent clash in Dollow, following a similar intervention by Ethiopian troops on behalf of Jubaland against federal forces in December 2024, which occurred just days after the Turkish-negotiated Ankara Declaration. 

Unsurprisingly, the brief interactions in Addis between Ethiopian PM Abiy Ahmed and President Hassan Sheikh at the climate summit on Sunday did not appear particularly cordial. Only afforded a quick photo-op and discussion, the Somali president was reported to have lobbied the Ethiopian PM to withdraw his forces from Gedo-- again-- but was met with a cold shoulder, as was NISA chief Mahad Salad in his meeting with his Ethiopian counterpart, Redwan Hussein. The Somali president has subsequently caught some flak from nationalists back home who have argued the visit and subsequent attack were an attempt to humiliate Villa Somalia. 

Though Addis has remained silent amidst the fighting in Gedo, signs of irritation with Mogadishu have continued. Most recently, Somalia's hawkish Defence Minister Ahmed Moallim Fiqi publicly rejected Ethiopia's planned participation in the East African Standby Force (EASF) maritime manoeuvres in Somalia's waters. And rumours have continued to swirl that Villa Somalia may again seek to work with Cairo to deploy some form of Egyptian military contingent to Gedo, coming amid renewed Cairo-Addis tensions surrounding Ethiopia's announced completion of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD).

While the situation has now calmed in Dollow, fighting continues to simmer in Beledhawo between Somali National Army (SNA) troops and Jubaland forces. Clashes erupted immediately after the new NISA Gedo chief and controversial Mareehaan politician Abdirashid Janaan was deployed there in mid-July. At least 10 people have been killed, with Jubaland forces having encircled the SNA positions within the ex-UK camp on the outskirts of the town, cutting off electricity and supplies. And thousands of civilians have been displaced, including many into Kenya as a result of the fighting. Despite attempts by local elders to intervene in Beledhawo, both Jubaland and Villa Somalia dispatched reinforcements on Monday– with little indication that the fighting will cease. And across Gedo, the situation remains highly volatile as the federal government continues to exploit the fractious Mareehaan. 

It remains, however, unlikely that Villa Somalia can succeed in seizing the entirety of Gedo, with most of the Darood sub-clan closing ranks behind Jubaland's administration. This is not because of any great love for Madoobe, who controls the presidency as well as rents from the Port of Kismaayo with an iron fist; instead, there remains greater opposition to Villa Somalia's escapades, and those leading them-- Minister of Internal Security Abdullahi Sheikh 'Fartaag' and Janaan are both deeply unpopular. Motivated by the same rationale to cleave out some marginal Darood participation in the contested Sool region, the amount of cash, soldiers and arms now swimming in Gedo makes a highly combustible situation. 

Kenyan President William Ruto and PM Abiy may not have directly addressed the situation in Gedo during their meeting, but for Kenya, Jubaland remains an absolute red line-- and frontline against Al-Shabaab's low-level insurgency in the Northern counties. Gedo is a pipeline for attacks into Kenya for Al-Shabaab, where it continues to sow landmines and conduct intermittent raids on military outposts and government installations. And though Nairobi dithered somewhat in late 2024 over its support for Madoobe after he withdrew from the National Consultative Council, it eventually fell behind the former Ras Kamboni leader. Through the lens of continuity and considering Nairobi's vested interests in Kismaayo, it is likely that they will remain supportive of Madoobe.

But with the federal government deploying NISA and the SNA against Jubaland, in turn having to divert forces from clearing operations near Kismaayo, it is only Al-Shabaab that stands to gain. The jihadist group expanded significantly through southern Gedo in 2019 and 2020 amidst Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo's similar attempts to oust Madoobe and displace his administration from Gedo, then critically with the support of the Ethiopians. A thwarted attempt to deploy Ethiopian commandos to Kismaayo nearly triggered open clashes with Kenyan peacekeeping forces in the port city in 2019. Thankfully, unlike last time, Addis and Nairobi are not at odds regarding Hassan Sheikh's similar machinations in Gedo. Still, Al-Shabaab will likely pick a time and place of its choosing to advance—and there can be little doubt that it will be greedily eyeing the violence in Gedo of recent days. 

With Ethiopia bluntly signalling its support for Jubaland in Dollow, it reiterates a broader dynamic at play-- that to greater and lesser degrees, the authorities in Hargeisa, Garowe, Kismaayo, those in northern Gedo, and the Hawaadle in Hiiraan and others now enjoy a closer relationship with the Ethiopian government than with Mogadishu. For instance, former Hiiraan Governor and national ma'awiisley commander Ali Jeyte met with Ethiopian military officials in mid-July in Godey in Ethiopia's Somali Regional State to request military assistance, which his own government has not provided. And this followed the delivery of ammunition and food by a Somali Regional State commander to the Hawaadle after the fall of Moqokori to Al-Shabaab. Addis has similarly dispatched arms and ammunition for Puntland for its successful operations against the Islamic State-Somalia in the Al-Miskaad Mountains; gains now threatened by the government's antics in Sool and Sanaag.

As a direct result of Villa Somalia's myopic, monopolistic posture, it has both eroded the federation and internal stability, subsequently pushing authorities in Puntland and Jubaland-- and others-- towards Addis for support. Polities and statelets within Somalia are now conducting their own parallel relations and foreign policies, a reflection of just how severe the country's fragmentation has become. And nearly every region that has sought to split from Mogadishu is more stable as a result. In this lens, Gedo is just one part-- albeit unnecessarily violent-- of this wider problem.

The Somali Wire Team