In the 21st century alone, Palmyra, Tigray, the Buddhas of Bamiyan, Odessa, and Khartoum, and many more besides, have all borne witness to targeted cultural violence, wiping out centuries and millennia of worship, artefacts, and unique histories that can never be reclaimed. Some have been targeted for theological or religious reasons– such as the ancient sites in Palmyra by Daesh– or part of a broader genocidal attempt to stamp out a civilisation– as was the case in Tigray– or simply greed– like the looting of the Khartoum museums by the Rapid Support Forces. But in many cases, it denotes a rewriting of history, an attempt by a political movement or armed group to coerce and impose their particular vision for the country on the objects, buildings, and cultural identities that comprise it.
Two weeks go by, and at least one new maritime agreement on the Somali peninsula has reared its head, with another retaliatory pact to potentially soon follow. The first was between Taiwan and Somaliland, following Hargeisa's Foreign Minister Abdirahman Dahir Osman's visit to Taipei in late July, during which he secured a cooperation agreement between the coastguards of Taiwan and Somaliland. And the inevitable Beijing-Mogadishu response has now arrived, with the Chinese Embassy in Somalia announcing that it has discussed enhancing "cooperation" with the federal government's Coast Guard. As ever, the officials reaffirmed their commitment to "safeguarding national sovereignty and territorial integrity of China and Somalia."
In December 2023, the final elements of the UN Security Council sanctions regime were lifted on the Somali federal government. Mogadishu's celebrations were rapturous, with President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud declaring that Mogadishu could now "purchase any weapons needed" and that "friendly nations and allies" could hand over the "necessary weapons without any limitations or restrictions." After years of lobbying, the final albatross around the neck of the federal government was to be lifted, and the Somali National Army (SNA) handed the heavy firepower required to conquer Al-Shabaab once and for all. Of course, over 18 months on, quite the reverse has happened, with Al-Shabaab having swept across much of central Somalia since February-- despite the glut of Egyptian and Turkish weapons donated to Villa Somalia in the past year. And Puntland's seizure of the MV Sea World, a Comorian-flagged vessel carrying Turkish arms and armoured vehicles last week, has thrown the question of the lifting of the arms embargo back into the open.
Of any region in the world, the Horn of Africa is home to some of the oldest, richest, and varied religious traditions, featuring sites such as the Masjid al-Qiblatayn in Zeila and artefacts from the ancient Axumite kingdom in Tigray. For centuries, faith has and continues to play an integral part in the daily lives of most within the region, with Islam and Christianity the two dominant religions today. And in turn, spiritual life has naturally shaped the politics of the Horn, with elites having long grappled with how best to accommodate, co-opt, or suppress religious movements and identities. Over the centuries, this has encompassed Muslim leaders couching their fight in the rhetoric of jihad as well as the 'civilising' expansion of the Orthodox Christian Ethiopian Emperors into neighbouring regions in the 19th century.
Another week, and the federal government's destabilising antics have threatened to tip yet more of the country into open conflict. Never mind Al-Shabaab seizing Mokoqori in Hiiraan and routing the Hawaadle ma'awiisley, Villa Somalia's attention remains trained on pressing ahead with its unilateral one-person, one-vote (OPOV) agenda. In recent months, an increasingly central plank of this has become SSC-Khaatumo, the Dhulbahante-dominated administration in the contested Sool region, with its interim president Abdikhadir Ahmed Aw-Ali 'Firdhiye' a prominent member of the new Justice and Solidarity Party (JSP). In exchange, an unconstitutional federal member state-formation process has been accelerated, attempting to 'merge' Sool-based SSC-Khaatumo with a fringe group from the Warsangeli-majority Sanaag region, similarly claimed by both Puntland and Somaliland
With political insecurity and conflict simmering across nearly every country in the Horn of Africa, Nairobi's relative stability —barring the fitful Gen Z protests —is a welcome and necessary change for regional elites, compared to the ruins of Khartoum and the insecurity of Juba and Mogadishu. In prominent hotel bars and restaurants across the Kenyan capital, exiled opposition figures routinely gather to discuss their next moves or commiserate about the state of their country and region. The political elites of Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan, and others have long maintained families and properties in Nairobi's lush neighbourhoods, aware of the need for a potential haven amidst the mercurial politics of their own countries. But with insecurity and political repression rising across much of the Horn, so is the capital flow increasing into Nairobi as growing numbers relocate their wealth-- often illicitly.
Every Thursday, Somalis can tune into Radio Andalus, an Al-Shabaab-affiliated radio station, to listen in to a jihadist commander wax lyrical about their upbringing and commitment to the cause. In one such recent interview with Al-Shabaab's appointed Banaadir Governor, Muse Abdi Arraale, he recounts his life, having grown up in Hargeisa before joining Waxda Al-Shabaab Al-Islamiyya (Islamic Youth Unity group) as a teenager and being imprisoned by the Siad Barre regime. Explicitly tying himself to groups beyond Al-Qaeda proper, such interviews represent an attempt to both position these extremist commanders in Somalia's Islamist history as well as humanise them. Increasingly tapping into discourses of Somali nationalism, Al-Shabaab's prolific propaganda output remains among the most sophisticated of any insurgent group. The London-based Tech Against Terrorism, which monitors extremist online content, assesses that Al-Shabaab is "the largest single producer of terrorist material on the internet."
Somalia's Al-Shabaab jihadist armed insurrection has entered its 18th year with no let-up in violence or any sign the conflict is close to a resolution. Indeed, Al-Shabaab is resurgent and remains as lethal as ever, having displayed its continued prowess after sweeping across much of central Somalia in its Ramadan offensive-- and beyond-- earlier this year. But what allows Al-Shabaab to thrive is not solely the ability to project military power or deploy intimidatory violence, but also the often under-reported, extensive and insidious rent-seeking and control of local economies as well.
"We still get men walking up to us and telling us that it's against our culture and religion to try and be men. But we are not trying to be men, you see. We are simply standing up for ourselves as women and asking to be allowed rights which already rightfully belong to us." Zainab Hassan, a Somali women's activist. In the 1970s, Somalia was widely regarded as a kind of cultural Mecca, with 'Swinging Mogadishu' at its heart. Dhaanto music provided a soundtrack to the decade in the country's modern cultural golden age, and one where women were particularly prominent. Plays, music, and art flourished privately and under the state's support, with nightclubs and bars dotted throughout the capital in which men and women mingled freely. The term 'MogaDisco' is sometimes ascribed to the eclectic mix of Somali disco, reggae, soul and funk that was popularised in these years. Tragically, much of this unique Somali cultural identity-- and women's prominent role in it-- has been expunged, a result of the perennial insecurity and hardline Salafist influence in the decades since.
The ongoing Ugandan-led 'Operation Silent Storm' to dislodge Al-Shabaab from three key bridge towns in Lower Shabelle represents essentially a rehash of the 'Operation Badbaado' (Salvation) campaign, conducted between 2019 and 2020. Coming after the Al-Shabaab Ramadan offensive earlier this year that routed Somali National Army (SNA) positions across Lower and Middle Shabelle, Operation Silent Storm marks the first concerted effort to dislodge the jihadists from their advanced positions toward Mogadishu. And while much has already been made of the intense fighting at Sabiid by Villa Somalia, in reality, the operations are limited in scope and appear likely to repeat the mistakes of its predecessors, even if it disrupts a route for the jihadists into Mogadishu. Re-establishing a string of bunkered Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) in Awdheegle, Bariire, and Sabiid manned by a hollowed-out and demoralised SNA will not turn the tide against Al-Shabaab.
The ongoing Ugandan-led 'Operation Silent Storm' to dislodge Al-Shabaab from three key bridge towns in Lower Shabelle represents essentially a rehash of the 'Operation Badbaado' (Salvation) campaign, conducted between 2019 and 2020. Coming after the Al-Shabaab Ramadan offensive earlier this year that routed Somali National Army (SNA) positions across Lower and Middle Shabelle, Operation Silent Storm marks the first concerted effort to dislodge the jihadists from their advanced positions toward Mogadishu. And while much has already been made of the intense fighting at Sabiid by Villa Somalia, in reality, the operations are limited in scope and appear likely to repeat the mistakes of its predecessors, even if it disrupts a route for the jihadists into Mogadishu. Re-establishing a string of bunkered Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) in Awdheegle, Bariire, and Sabiid manned by a hollowed-out and demoralised SNA will not turn the tide against Al-Shabaab.
Somalia's latest plunging crisis has divided not only the usual domestic political actors but the 'international community' as well - if such a thing even exists anymore. Though nominally on the same page in regard to fighting Al-Shabaab, foreign perspectives on the diagnosis of Somalia's ills – and the appropriate remedies -- have proven radically different. And since Al-Shabaab's dramatic territorial advances beginning late February, many of the international responses to the country's escalating political and security emergencies have been working at cross purposes with one another. Meanwhile, Villa Somalia's interactions with foreign partners have continued to vacillate between blatant rent-seeking and hypernationalism.
Over the weekend, Mahad Salad was returned to head up Somalia's National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA). After a 14-month break, the Egyptian-trained former spy chief has returned to the position he held between August 2022 and April 2024. The restoration of Salad, who belongs to the Hawiye/ Habar Gidir/ Ayr sub-clan, comes amid twin threats to Villa Somalia-- the serpentine encroachment of Al-Shabaab on Mogadishu and the massing of political opposition in the capital. Historically lenient towards the jihadist group, Salad is unlikely to afford the same generosity to the government's opposition as the head of NISA, as his predecessor did. Simultaneously, the removal of Abdullahi Mohamed Ali 'Sanbaloolshe,' could seriously undermine the ongoing ma'awiisley operations by his Hawaadle sub-clan against Al-Shabaab in Hiiraan, one of the few forces leading the frontline resistance.
The NCC That Never Was: HSM Through the Looking Glass Today should have been the second day of Somalia's National Consultative Council (NCC) in Mogadishu-- now postponed until next week, with little hope of achieving either a quorum or meaningful results. In today's editorial, Sahan explores an alternate reality-- one in which a successful NCC meeting offers a way out of Somalia's worsening crisis. With Al-Shabaab edging closer to Mogadishu and the risk of Somalia emulating an Afghanistan-style jihadist takeover ever more plausible, Somali political leaders convened yesterday in Kampala for the first full-fledged National Consultative Council (NCC) meeting to take place in well over two years. At the invitation of Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni, the leaders of Somalia's federal institutions, Federal Member State (FMS) presidents, and an array of former heads of state and government set aside their differences in a last-ditch effort to salvage Somalia's creaking political settlement and forestall an Al-Shabaab triumph.
The NCC That Never Was: HSM Through the Looking Glass Today should have been the second day of Somalia's National Consultative Council (NCC) in Mogadishu-- now postponed until next week, with little hope of achieving either a quorum or meaningful results. In today's editorial, Sahan explores an alternate reality-- one in which a successful NCC meeting offers a way out of Somalia's worsening crisis. With Al-Shabaab edging closer to Mogadishu and the risk of Somalia emulating an Afghanistan-style jihadist takeover ever more plausible, Somali political leaders convened yesterday in Kampala for the first full-fledged National Consultative Council (NCC) meeting to take place in well over two years. At the invitation of Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni, the leaders of Somalia's federal institutions, Federal Member State (FMS) presidents, and an array of former heads of state and government set aside their differences in a last-ditch effort to salvage Somalia's creaking political settlement and forestall an Al-Shabaab triumph.
Silent Killers: Counterfeit Drugs in Somalia While the global trade in counterfeit, falsified, and adulterated pharmaceuticals has proven difficult to trace, it has been estimated to be worth as much as USD 200 billion annually. Produced en masse and smuggled through complex transnational criminal networks, the majority of the world's counterfeit drugs are believed to originate in China and India before dispersing across the globe. The issue is especially acute in Africa, where falsified and substandard medicines have been estimated by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime to contribute to up to 500,000 deaths in the sub-Saharan region every year. And Somalia, in particular, faces a grim confluence of problems stemming from the lack of regulation in its pharmaceutical industry, a partial legacy of the collapse of the state in the 1990s. But with the sector intimately connected to transnational smuggling, attempts to tackle the booming trade have toiled in the face of entrenched corruption, porous borders, and weak regulatory oversight.
Beyond the Terror Frame: Understanding the OLA In early February, Kenyan police launched 'Operation Ondoa Jangili' against the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) insurgents in Marsabit and Isiolo counties in northern Kenya, in conjunction with Ethiopian forces. Having signed a security cooperation agreement in August 2024 to combat cross-border threats, both Nairobi and Addis have sought to tie the OLA insurgency to Al-Shabaab, and consequently paint the Oromo nationalist forces as 'terrorists.' But to frame Oromo nationalism and struggle simply through the lens of counter-terrorism obscures a much more complex reality, and does an injustice to the Oromo people.
Kampala Redux as TCCs Assert Control Over the weekend, a video recorded in 2021 began circulating. In it, then-an opposition leader, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM), warns incumbent President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo that if he failed to negotiate destabilising domestic tensions within the Afisioni Tent, he would end up in Kampala and with foreigners deciding Somalia's future. And that is precisely what happened- Farmaajo was diplomatically frog-marched to Kampala, forced to relinquish control over the political transition and appoint a new PM to oversee the process that returned HSM to Villa Somalia. Fast forward to today, and it is essentially Somalia redux. Having failed to heed his own advice from 2021, HSM travelled to Uganda last week, where African Union peacekeeping troop-contributing countries (TCCs) announced they would assume a leading role in Somalia's political and military affairs. Spearheaded by Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni, the TCC's proposed political mechanism is intended to oversee Somalia's national security portfolio and, between the lines, to advance the domestic reconciliation that Villa Somalia has shunned.
For a government whose slogan was "not one inch" just a few months ago, it might have been more apt to have adopted "not that inch." On 22 April, last year's secret bilateral Somalia-Türkiye oil and gas deal emerged after its submission to the Turkish parliament, revealing that Mogadishu had ceded immense potential profits and sovereignty for pennies. Signed during the geopolitical fallout of the Somaliland-Ethiopia Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) and harried through Somalia's parliament, the agreement points to further political and economic vandalism by the current federal administration and its desire to monopolise Somalia's sovereign rents and national resources. While insisting that Addis would have "not one inch" of Somali coastal territory, Mogadishu has offered every centimetre of the country to foreign powers.
Murder in Laas Aanood: SSC-Khaatumo admits Al-Shabaab presence Al-Shabaab has reared its head once again in the town of Laas Aanood in the Sool region. On 20 April, Farah Aidid Jama 'Bariis'– an Ethiopian security expert with the Garowe consulate in Puntland– was abducted, tortured, and murdered before his body was dumped the following day in the Gooja'ade valley near Laas Aanood. For the first time, SSC-Khaatumo officials have acknowledged the presence of Al-Shabaab units within the town, having strenuously denied it for over two years. And while details over Bariis's murder remain murky, it comes at an awkward moment for the riven administration, coming so shortly after the much-heralded visit of Somali PM Hamza Abdi Barre to Laas Aanood.