Murder in Laas Aanood: SSC-Khaatumo admits Al-Shabaab presence
Al-Shabaab has reared its head once again in the town of Laas Aanood in the Sool region. On 20 April, Farah Aidid Jama 'Bariis'– an Ethiopian security expert with the Garowe consulate in Puntland– was abducted, tortured, and murdered before his body was dumped the following day in the Gooja'ade valley near Laas Aanood. For the first time, SSC-Khaatumo officials have acknowledged the presence of Al-Shabaab units within the town, having strenuously denied it for over two years. And while details over Bariis's murder remain murky, it comes at an awkward moment for the riven administration, coming so shortly after the much-heralded visit of Somali PM Hamza Abdi Barre to Laas Aanood.
Abdullahi Hirsi, the attorney general for SSC-Khaatumo, stated that Bariis was murdered by "unidentified gunmen" but placed them as suspected Al-Shabaab members. Hirsi further asserted that Bariis was a former Al-Shabaab associate and had been injured in a previous attack by the jihadists. On Monday, Siyaad Mahmoud, the commander of the SSC-Khaatumo Police Forces, went further and confirmed that an investigation into the murder of Bariis was ongoing. Mahmoud himself has been a target of threats from Al-Shabaab for his outspokenness about the jihadist infiltration of SSC-Khaatumo. The leader of the administration, Abdikhadir Ahmed Aw-Ali 'Firdhiye,' further warned him against publicising these concerns but was unable to remove the commander. Meanwhile, other relevant administrations have remained mostly quiet, including the Ethiopian Consulate General Office in Puntland. According to a leaked letter signed by Charge d'affaires Wondwossen Tekele, Bariis had been appointed in mid-January of this year to oversee and support Ethiopian nationals near the contested border areas. In particular, Bariis had worked to free Ethiopian doctors and medical workers who were being held in SSC-Khaatumo territory.
Though much remains unknown, the allegations that Bariis was killed by Al-Shabaab, and most likely Amniyaat operatives, fit squarely into a well-established pattern of the jihadist group carrying out deniable assassinations of Somaliland sympathetic individuals in Sool. It is not a jump to infer that those responsible for Bariis's killing may well be the Al-Shabaab unit behind a string of murders stretching back years, including the bombing of the Somaliland police chief in Laas Aanood in 2009 and the shooting of the region's lead criminal investigator in 2011. Nor is Bariis' murder the first assassination of a foreign national carried out by Al-Shabaab in Somaliland, with the jihadists having murdered four foreign aid workers in 2003-2004 in the group's infancy. But the Amniyaat, the secretive and much-feared intelligence wing of Al-Shabaab, has broadly chosen not to publicly claim responsibility for these killings, preferring to sow confusion and factionalism within the polity.
Having been largely subdued by the Somaliland intelligence services in the 2010s, Al-Shabaab instead sought to stoke disenchantment and accentuate grievances within the Dhulbahante by carrying out deniable assassinations of the clan's politicians, elders, and businessmen. Over 40 individuals were murdered over a number of years, targeting Dhulbahante leaders associated with Hargeisa, as well as those refusing to pay the extremist group's 'zakat' (taxes). This culminated in the murder of Waddani politician Abdifatah Abdi 'Hadraawi Sangub' in December 2022, which many incorrectly attributed to Hargeisa and triggered the chain of events leading to the withdrawal of Somaliland forces from Laas Aanood. Though the pace of the assassinations fell off in 2023 and 2024, the murder of Bariis fits into this pattern, now backed by the confirmation of senior SSC-Khaatumo officials.
The issue of Al-Shabaab's presence in Sool erupted into the open in 2023, when, having been forced from Laas Aanood, Hargeisa clumsily attempted to discredit SSC-Khaatumo by painting the entire administration with the extremist label. Similarly, SSC-Khaatumo and others supportive of Dhulbahante grievances were keen to downplay the presence of Al-Shabaab in the town and their participation in the fighting against the Somaliland army. While Hargeisa perhaps overplayed its hand and the jihadists' presence was far from universally accepted, it did not mean that Al-Shabaab was not in Laas Aanood, as both Amniyaat and 'Jabhat'-- the extremist group's infantry units that fought under the banner of SSC-Khaatumo-- were present.
The best-known commander credibly linked to Al-Shabaab is the Dhulbahante militia and senior SSC-Khaatumo leader Ali Hussein Abdi Kamiin, better known as 'Abdi Madoobe.' Though any links to the jihadists have been strenuously denied by Madoobe and others, the commander and other senior figures within his SSC-Khaatumo faction have spent significant time in and around Jilib in Middle Juba, the jihadist stronghold in southern Somalia. It is probable that Madoobe had no operational knowledge of the killing of Bariis if carried out by the Amniyaat, particularly considering he was photographed with the Ethiopian national and Somali Federal Police Commissioner General Asad Diyaano during the visit of Barre to Laas Aanood just days prior.
Regarding Madoobe's faction, though, what began as a quiet percolation initially based out of Buuhoodle has ballooned in the past two years. Having fought in early 2023 for the town, Madoobe's majority Dhulbahante/ Ali Gheri forces remain the best-armed and trained single faction within SSC-Khaatumo today and have participated in several notable clashes with Habar Je'elo militia and the Somaliland army in the past 18 months. At the end of October 2024, during the build-up to Somaliland's elections on 13 November, Madoobe forces attacked Somaliland positions in southern Togdheer, resulting in intense fighting that left dozens dead over several days, including Abdigani Sulub, one of his deputies. This, too, matched another historical pattern-- Al-Shabaab attempting to wield violence to discredit Somaliland elections.
Coming only a few days after the visit of PM Hamza Abdi Barre to Laas Aanood alongside dozens of federal ministers and parliamentarians, the murder of Bariis reflects and may further accentuate schisms within the town over Mogadishu's relationship with SSC-Khaatumo. One possible motive behind the murder of Bariis could be an attempt by Al-Shabaab to smear Barre's trip to Laas Aanood, the first in decades by a sitting Somali PM to the town. At several points, Al-Shabaab has been reported to be furious at the ties between Firdhiye and Villa Somalia.
However, simmering tensions have also been growing within the major factions of SSC-Khaatumo, particularly between Madoobe and Firdhiye, which have nearly erupted into open violence on several occasions. This, in part, stems from Madoobe repeatedly flexing his military superiority in Laas Aanood in 2024, parading through town with dozens of heavily armoured vehicles to the displeasure of the Firdhiye faction. In May, Madoobe's forces seized several captive Somaliland soldiers with the intention of executing them outside of the city– only a last-gasp intervention by clan elders stayed their hand.
With the reforming of the SSC-Khaatumo administration and its anticipated 'elevation' to Somalia's 6th Federal Member State, the jihadist-linked Madoobe has now been appointed to oversee security. But with Firdhiye anticipated to travel to Mogadishu to the contrived National Consultative Council (NCC) meeting, the killing of an Ethiopian official in Laas Aanood is certain to take the glow out of his sudden ascension. Firdhiye's invitation to the NCC was merely a cynical ploy by Villa Somalia to ensure some nominal Darood representation and attempt to spike the attendance of Puntland President Said Abdullahi Deni. Whether the murder of Bariis reignites the divide between Firdhiye and Madoobe will have to be seen, but the confirmation that Al-Shabaab is present in Laas Aanood by SSC-Khaatumo itself should not be downplayed.
Hargeisa may understandably feel vindicated that the presence of the jihadists has now been accepted by elements of the very administration that denied its presence for months. And it is not the only authority that has a vested security interest in Laas Aanood. The city has long been a political faultline between Somaliland and Puntland, with the latter also likely to be disturbed by the admitted presence of Al-Shabaab in the town. As Puntland's Operation Hilaac against Islamic State-Somalia (ISS) in the Al-Miskaad Mountains enters its final stages, regional security officials have signalled that they will begin pivoting to countering the Al-Shabaab presence in the Federal Member State. While Garowe has vacillated on its position regarding SSC-Khaatumo, the infiltration of the group in Laas Aanood under the Dhulbahante-majority administration's banner will nonetheless be of major concern.
Much needs to be clarified about the murder of Bariis, but the public attribution of his death to Al-Shabaab by SSC-Khaatumo could mark an important sea change in the acceptance of the jihadist presence in Laas Aanood. Whether that goes as far as looking towards Madoobe's own ties to the jihadists is more complex, though, with the Dhulbahante commander occupying such a senior position within the town. Still, Villa Somalia's short-sightedness in recognising such a divided administration with jihadist ties for quick political expedience already appears to be a foolhardy decision.
The Somali Wire Team
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