Issue No. 817

The NCC That Never Was: HSM Through the Looking Glass

Today should have been the second day of Somalia's National Consultative Council (NCC) in Mogadishu-- now postponed until next week, with little hope of achieving either a quorum or meaningful results. In today's editorial, Sahan explores an alternate reality-- one in which a successful NCC meeting offers a way out of Somalia's worsening crisis.

With Al-Shabaab edging closer to Mogadishu and the risk of Somalia emulating an Afghanistan-style jihadist takeover ever more plausible, Somali political leaders convened yesterday in Kampala for the first full-fledged National Consultative Council (NCC) meeting to take place in well over two years. At the invitation of Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni, the leaders of Somalia's federal institutions, Federal Member State (FMS) presidents, and an array of former heads of state and government set aside their differences in a last-ditch effort to salvage Somalia's creaking political settlement and forestall an Al-Shabaab triumph.

Following his ostensibly conciliatory outreach message on Eid al-Fitr, Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamed (HSM) initially announced that the NCC would convene in Mogadishu in early May. But this gesture was quickly rejected by the presidents of both Puntland and Jubaland, with trust at historic lows and both leaders having suspended relations with the federal government. Rather than a comprehensive 'national dialogue,' HSM's proposed NCC was shaping up as a rehash of the forum of mainly Hawiye politicians that has rubber-stamped his agenda to date, alienating much of the country and incapable of forging a coherent anti-Al-Shabaab coalition. Furthermore, both Puntland President Said Abdullahi Deni and his Jubaland counterpart Ahmed Madoobe expressed legitimate concerns about their personal security if the NCC were to be held in the Somali capital. Even the participation of South West State President Abdiaziz Hassan Mohamed 'Laftagareen,' the only elected, non-Hawiye leader remaining in the NCC, remained in doubt since his return to Baidoa from Abu Dhabi last week. 

Indeed, up until the last minute, Villa Somalia seemed intent on excluding both Deni and Madoobe. HSM's invitation to SSC-Khaatumo leader Abdikhadir Ahmed Aw-Ali 'Firdhiye' to the NCC would have made it politically impossible for Deni to attend by effectively formalising the dismemberment of Puntland between two separate governments. And since Villa Somalia's arrest warrant for Madoobe, issued in late 2024 following the Ras Kamboni debacle, remained in force, the Jubaland president could hardly take the risk of delivering himself into federal custody. Moreover, Villa Somalia demanded that he annul the November 2024 election that saw Madoobe appointed to a third term of office.

With HSM insistent on a stunted – and undoubtedly futile - NCC meeting in the Somali capital, Museveni apparently felt compelled to intervene. Citing the provisions under the newly-established 'TCCs plus Somalia Peer Review Mechanism for Oversight, Accountability, Coordination, Monitoring and Evaluation,' the Ugandan president reprised the role he played towards the end of the Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo administration and browbeat HSM into accepting Kampala as the venue instead. Uganda's elder statesman apparently prevailed upon both Deni and Madoobe by providing assurances of their security and inviting them to table their other objections at the meeting (instead of raising them as preconditions) – although, by neglecting– whether by accident or by design - to invite SSC-Khaatumo to Kampala, Museveni removed one of Deni's primary concerns. 

The participation of several former Somali heads of state and government – notably former president Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Hassan and former PMs Hassan Ali Khaire and Mohamed Hussein Roble – as well as the presence in Kampala of various opposition party politicians, rendered it the most inclusive high-level conference since HSM took office in 2022. Many of these leaders, too, had called for a suspension of recent amendments to the Provisional Constitution and electoral system, citing concerns regarding centralisation and a disregard for the federal model.

Museveni's opening remarks set the tone by reminding the Somali leaders that Al-Shabaab poses a threat not only to Somalia, but to the entire region. He also underscored that Somali leaders should collaborate, both in the fight against Al-Shabaab and in the endeavour of rebuilding a functional Somali state. The latter was understood as a thinly veiled caution to HSM that he could no longer rule by diktat from Villa Somalia and must garner the support of other Somali leaders through consultation and compromise.

Apparently, HSM was listening. In a brief speech reminiscent of Charles de Gaulle's famous 1958 proclamation in Algiers, "Je vous ai compris!" ["I have understood you!"], the Somali president announced that he would not run for re-election, dispelling widespread concerns that he would hijack any NCC agreement to bolster his own prospects for a third term. HSM further pledged that he would appoint, in consultation with the assembled leaders, a new Prime Minister capable of overseeing the 2026 political transition -- a courteous tribute to former PM Roble, who had played such a role under ex-President Farmaajo. He averred that last year's amendments to the Provisional Constitution and centralising electoral laws would be suspended pending the formation of the next government in 2026. And, in another symbolic gesture, HSM instructed his attorney general to withdraw the arrest warrant and farcical Interpol Red Notice on Madoobe.

HSM's intervention was silent on a number of critical issues, however, including the need for dramatic and urgent measures to unify the national security architecture, enabling assistance to flow directly to FMS security forces, and harnessing their efforts in a joint campaign against Al-Shabaab. Nor did he explicitly abandon his Panglossian vision for one-person, one-vote (OPOV) elections by May 2026, or pronounce on whether the National Independent Electoral Commission (NIEC) – whose putative "independence" is a non-sequitur since it operates under the auspices of the Ministry of Interior - should still have a role to play in the 2026 electoral process. But the president appeared to concede that district-level elections scheduled to take place in Mogadishu in June were open for negotiation.

More substantive discussions on these and other issues are expected to kick off on day two of the NCC, but HSM's initial intervention already offers a way out of the stalemate that has paralysed Somalia's state-building progress and enabled Al-Shabaab to advance to the outskirts of Mogadishu. Hawiye political leaders who had been vacillating between mobilising militias to confront Al-Shabaab or to unseat HSM are now free to concentrate on a joint defence of the capital. Likewise, FMS leaders can start planning more determined offensive action against Al-Shabaab, with the support of the Somali National Army, in the confidence that they will receive some of the arms, equipment, and training that had previously been monopolised – and squandered - by the federal government.

Major challenges still remain. AUSSOM's financing is deeply uncertain, and it is far from clear how many troops might remain under bilateral agreements if the overall mission is terminated – nor whether Türkiye or other foreign governments might step up to fill the gap. The Trump administration has yet to announce whether it will retain US forces in Somalia and whether support for the Danab special forces will be extended. Arrangements for overseeing the joint Al-Shabaab offensive, too, need to be agreed, but participants were unanimous in their belief that the gnomish Defence Minister Ahmed Fiqi and Villa Somalia would have to relinquish their proprietary and politicised control of the security forces. The overall direction of Somalia-- both politically and militarily-- would now fall under an NCC-related mechanism and the transitional PM rather than any individual ministers.

Al-Shabaab also gets a vote on the way forward. The militants' encroachment on Mogadishu has so far been cautious and incremental, suggesting that they would prefer to avoid a costly pitched battle for the capital. But if they assess that a rejuvenated NCC could thwart their plans and possibly even roll back their gains to date, then they may choose to escalate and accelerate their advance. An uptick in security assistance from the TCCs or an injection of significant numbers of bilateral troops from Türkiye may also provoke Al-Shabaab to fast-track its offensive operations.

Somalia's partners should be heartened by the progress so far; they will be watching closely to see whether agreements reached in Kampala can be sustained and built upon in the coming days and weeks ahead. Yet negotiated political settlements in Somalia have a fraught history, and without careful guardrails to prevent reneging upon deals, Villa Somalia may well attempt to backtrack on the critical concessions it has made if pressure eases on the capital. And while the meeting may produce some tangible progress, it is at most a band-aid to prevent the fall of Mogadishu to the jihadists and keep Somalia's frayed political settlement on life support until the next set of elections in 2026. 

But there is insufficient trust or time for the NCC to tackle the Provisional Constitution, the architecture of the federation, including a more devolved security sector, or the design of a new electoral system - all issues that will have to be addressed under the next central administration. In the interim and beyond, international partners will have to stay the course and remain focused on these more fundamental, long-term objectives and not be swayed by the sporadic bouts of optimism that mark Somalia's political cycles alongside its current troughs. The predicament facing the country today has much to do with a lingering idealism of 2022, and an inability to see clearly the current crises hurtling towards the government. If they lose patience with the cyclical nature of Somali politics, then HSM's second term may be the last negotiated political cycle Somalia experiences for a long time to come.

The Somali Wire Team