Issue No. 280

Beyond the Terror Frame: Understanding the OLA
 

In early February, Kenyan police launched 'Operation Ondoa Jangili' against the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) insurgents in Marsabit and Isiolo counties in northern Kenya, in conjunction with Ethiopian forces. Having signed a security cooperation agreement in August 2024 to combat cross-border threats, both Nairobi and Addis have sought to tie the OLA insurgency to Al-Shabaab, and consequently paint the Oromo nationalist forces as 'terrorists.' But to frame Oromo nationalism and struggle simply through the lens of counter-terrorism obscures a much more complex reality, and does an injustice to the Oromo people.

The Oromo are the largest Cushitic ethnicity in the Horn of Africa, comprising roughly 44 million people, or 35.8% of the population in Ethiopia, predominantly spread across the country's central and southern regions. Within Kenya, the Borana, a sub-group of the Oromo, inhabit the country's northern and northeastern areas of Moyale, Marsabit, Isiolo, Tana River, and Lamu and are estimated to number several hundred thousand. In recent months, the Kenyan elite media and commentators have also framed the OLA as an irredentist movement seeking to carve out a pan-Oromo homeland that incorporates much of central and southern Ethiopia, stretching down to the Tana River in Kenya, as well as incorporating Marsabit and Isiolo. But critically, the Oromo are heterogeneous. Originally nomadic, the Oromo are regionally diverse and dispersed, and distinct cultural and linguistic variations and sub-dialects were subsequently developed in turn. There are also significant variations regarding religion, with the Oromo nearly evenly split between Islam and Christianity, with both Pentecostalism and Orthodox practised. However, several elements among the Oromo endure and stretch across the diverse communities, particularly the social structure and the strong traditional authority vested in the ancient Gadaa system.

Consequently, the starting point of any analysis of Oromo political aspiration, ethno-nationalism, and trends is understanding that the Oromo nation is diverse and not monolithic. The OLA and its militant armed struggle in Ethiopia represent only one segment of Oromo nationalism, albeit an important one. And although the OLA has been portrayed at times as 'secessionist,' it has instead repeatedly advocated for greater self-rule and autonomy within the Ethiopian ethnic federal constitution. During the two rounds of Kenyan-facilitated peace talks in Tanzania in 2023, for instance, the OLA urged for the formation of a national unity and transitional government, demands that were rejected by Addis. But there are several other influential Oromo factions within Ethiopia, including the Oromo Federalist Congress (OFC) and Oromo Liberation Front (OLF). The substantial Qeerroo protest movement, meanwhile, led by Jawar Mohammed, further contributed to the resignation of the Tigray People's Liberation Front's Prime Minister, Hailemariam Desalegn, in 2018. Several of these groupings have lobbied against the historic subjugation of the Oromo people, for the recognition of Afaan Oromo as an official national language, and advocated for Addis Ababa to be renamed 'Finfinne,' the Oromo name for the capital. Rather than monolithic, the various strands of Oromo nationalism in the Ethiopian capital vary significantly from how Oromo nationalism is perceived in Nairobi.

The ties between Oromo forces advocating for greater representation in Ethiopia and communities in northern Kenya date back decades. In Marsabit, during the 1990s and 2000s, many Borana considered the Oromo insurgents as protectors, in part as a counterbalance to other ethnic groups in northern Kenya. However, the popularity and presence of the OLA and its predecessor, the OLF, have fluctuated over the years, peaking during the Daniel Arab Moi years. Under the terms of an old defence pact between Nairobi and Addis, the Ethiopian military is allowed to conduct 'hot pursuit operations' on Kenyan soil against Oromo insurgents, though this repeatedly resulted in accusations of human rights violations. More recently, however, the OLA's influence has diminished since 2018, following the ascension of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, who is of half-Oromo descent, partly on the wave of the Qeerroo political movement that advocated for greater Oromo rights. That same year, a peace was also struck with the OLF, from which the OLA emerged as an armed splinter faction. A more recent rallying of the insurgent group-- led by Kumsa Diriba (Jaal Marroo) and concentrated in western Oromia-- has led to a renewed percolation of the OLA in northern Kenya.

Kenyan police have cited "arms, drug and human trafficking, illegal mining, instigating tribal conflicts and kidnapping for ransom" as part of the rationale for Operation Ondoa Jangili. But it was the abduction of two South Korean missionaries in northern Kenya in August 2024, believed to have been facilitated by Al-Shabaab's Amniyaat intelligence wing and attributed to the OLA, that triggered the first round of joint operations against the group. Following a meeting between Kenyan and Ethiopian intelligence last year, Ethiopia's National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) accused the OLA of having "direct ties" with Al-Shabaab. The Oromo insurgents, however, have firmly rebuffed any such claims. In a statement in February 2025, the OLA denied any links to "criminal activities," asserted that it "fully respects Kenya's sovereignty and territorial integrity," and "over 95% of our Southern Command forces operate deep within Oromia." It further offered to "cooperate with Kenyan authorities in addressing criminal elements along the border." 

Despite Addis's best attempts to lump the OLA and Al-Shabaab together, no formal link exists between the leadership of the two groups. Still, while their ideologies are starkly different, Al-Shabaab has nevertheless long been interested in destabilising Ethiopia and seeking to radicalise its Muslim communities, particularly in Oromia and the Somali Regional State (SRS). The jihadists routinely disseminate their propaganda in Afaan Oromo through their Al-Kataib Media Office, established an armed Ethiopian wing known as Jaysh al-Habash, and conducted a large-scale incursion into the country in 2021. So, too, has Al-Shabaab quietly penetrated the Bale Mountains and established a number of training camps in the remote range since 2019. At times, the jihadists have sought to use the cover of the OLA as a means to avoid scrutiny or provocation from communities where they would be unwelcome. In Al-Shabaab's second training camp in Oromia, for instance, the jihadists deployed the OLA's flag rather than their own distinct black emblem. While high-level cooperation may not exist, the Oromo insurgent force is also not immune to infiltration, and Al-Shabaab has further sought to surreptitiously insert itself at the fringes of the franchised insurgency.

Another issue for the OLA's core leadership is that some of its peripheral elements operate much like a business cartel or transnational criminal syndicate, including kidnapping civilians for ransom. While this helps finance the fighting that continues to rage in western Oromia, the economic sector of the OLA in other parts of Ethiopia and northern Kenya has developed more independently and poses a threat to both the insurgency's legitimacy and the communities in which they operate. Still, the attribution of the heightened kidnappings and extortion in Oromia to the OLA is often exaggerated by Addis for political reasons. 

Kenya's peace diplomacy and credibility as a mediator in Ethiopia could be seriously jeopardised if Nairobi wholeheartedly adopts Addis Ababa's narrative that OLA is a terrorist organisation. Even if there is some minor penetration of the group, Kenya should be aware that Addis has its own clear interests in depicting the insurgent movement as jihadists-- not least that it is seeking to divide the national Oromo opposition. Instead, a realistic policy option for Kenya is to maintain a degree of pragmatism and agency to promote a viable peace settlement in Ethiopia instead of succumbing to pressure from Addis. Assuming there is a significant 'OLA problem', and worse, inflating it and manufacturing a new cross-border terrorism problem would be counter-productive. Moreover, the Borana regions of northern Kenya remain important vote baskets, with a new counter-terrorism campaign that targets OLA almost certain to inflame local sentiment. This could yet produce a wider unintended negative fallout, something with potentially unwelcome political consequences for the ruling Kenya Kwanza government.

Despite intermittent turmoil on both sides of the border, Kenya and Ethiopia have largely maintained an enduring bilateral strategic alliance, with their defence and security ties serving as the linchpin. Ensuring these robust structures and mechanisms for security cooperation are sufficiently inoculated from political influence, and pressure is critical. Kenya, too, has a vested interest in a peaceful and stable Ethiopia, not least because it is now the single largest African investor in its neighbour. Safaricom has become a partner of Ethiotel and is increasingly a major player in the telecom sector, while Kenyan banks are eyeing entry after recent financial sector deregulation, and Nairobi remains eager for Ethiopia to use the port of Lamu. But to be a trusted ally of the Ethiopian people, Kenya will need to gingerly sidestep the current pressure to criminalise and delegitimise the OLA through an extremist framing. One of the lessons from the Tigray War was that Kenya can be most effective in its back-channel peace diplomacy when it can fend off pressure to act as a neutral, honest broker and mediator.