Issue No. 845

Federal Meddling Inflames Sanaag

Another week, and the federal government's destabilising antics have threatened to tip yet more of the country into open conflict. Never mind Al-Shabaab seizing Mokoqori in Hiiraan and routing the Hawaadle ma'awiisley, Villa Somalia's attention remains trained on pressing ahead with its unilateral one-person, one-vote (OPOV) agenda. In recent months, an increasingly central plank of this has become SSC-Khaatumo, the Dhulbahante-dominated administration in the contested Sool region, with its interim president Abdikhadir Ahmed Aw-Ali 'Firdhiye' a prominent member of the new Justice and Solidarity Party (JSP). In exchange, an unconstitutional federal member state-formation process has been accelerated, attempting to 'merge' Sool-based SSC-Khaatumo with a fringe group from the Warsangeli-majority Sanaag region, similarly claimed by both Puntland and Somaliland. Though much remains in flux and despite Villa Somalia's pumping of weapons and cash into Firdhiye's wing of SSC-Khaatumo, the process has floundered in the face of determined countermeasures from Garowe.

This week was intended to hold a historic conference, bringing together the Warsangeli and the Dhulbahante to form the third Darood Federal Member State (FMS) after Puntland and Jubaland, effectively dismembering the former and undermining Somaliland in one fell swoop. But in recent days, Villa Somalia's rushed and clumsy attempts to bring the Warsangeli-- a far from politically monolithic sub-clan-- onboard have stumbled. As a location for the conference, Firdhiye and Villa Somalia initially focused efforts on Eel Buuh in the Erigavo district of Sanaag, with the former Puntland Parliament Speaker Abdirashid Jibril travelling to the town to entreat with the Warsangeli Suldaan Siciid Suldaan Abdisalaan Garaad Mahamuud Ali Shire. Substantial cash was reported to have been offered to and rejected by the Suldaan, though Jibril nevertheless recruited several hundred clan militia to the fury of the Puntland administration. Plans to hold the conference in Eel Buuh triggered immediate and enraged reactions from both Hargeisa and Garowe.

But Jibril has been far from the only individual dispatched by Villa Somalia to rally support for the hurried state-formation process. Commerce Minister Mohamed Ahmed 'Gesood' also travelled to Laas Aanood last week, before planning to reach Dhahar in Sanaag. This prompted a particularly forceful response from Puntland, which dispatched its own forces to the border to quash the federal minister's visit. Clad in camouflage in a significant intervention on 7 July, Puntland President Said Abdullahi Deni consequently rebuked Villa Somalia on several fronts, including its attempts to foment instability in Puntland ahead of its planned Operation Onkod (Thunder) against Al-Shabaab. Garowe subsequently redirected Puntland Maritime Police Forces (PMPF) as well as Daraawiish paramilitaries to Puntland-controlled areas of Sanaag to quell potential unrest and disincentivise any further forays from Villa Somalia. And this week, Puntland's Sanaag Governor, Said Ahmed 'Badmaah', also banned any political meetings without his government's approval, as well as vehicles travelling with Somaliland and SSC-Khaatumo number plates.

Deni has been caught in something of a bind, aware that outwardly opposing the Dhulbahante's federal aspirations could potentially compromise his position amongst their MPs in any future elections. But nor does Puntland want SSC-Khaatumo to be wielded as a proxy vehicle for the federal government's electoral machinations—or as an excuse to slash Garowe's allotted representatives in the Upper House. Rather than genuinely support the Dhulbahante's legitimate aspirations for greater development, it is egregious that Villa Somalia is politicising such a historically complex issue simply as a means to sabotage a probable rival in the 2026 federal elections.

Amidst this tussle, a joint statement on 8 July by senior Warsangeli clan elders from Sanaag and Haylan —including Suldaan Siciid- reaffirmed their allegiance to Puntland, and urged the administration to support their region's development and security. Most importantly, the elders stated that they would not dispatch representatives to the 10 July state-formation conference, which had been relocated from Eel Buuh to Laas Aanood. And though Warsangeli are far from uniform—historically having been pulled in three directions between Mogadishu, Hargeisa, and Garowe—Suldaan Sa'iid's intervention in support of Puntland has been significant. Much of the Warsangeli elite have historically trended towards Puntland due to the influence of trade emanating from Bosaaso's port.

Another key reason Villa Somalia and Firdhiye have sought to accelerate the state-formation process and secure the electoral enclave for 2026 is the forthcoming SSC-Khaatumo leadership elections in August. These are expected to be principally contested by the incumbent, President Firdhiye, against a former Somaliland Speaker of Parliament, Abdirazak Khalif, who has the backing of the Puntland government. Khalif is a strong contender-- hailing from an influential sub-clan of the Dhulbahante, as well as being able to call on personal wealth and influence. He further enjoys significant backing from two influential Dhulbahante sub-clans, the Baharasame and the Ugaadyahan. 

Firdhiye's popularity, on the other hand, appears to be slumping as he is increasingly exposed as a cypher for Villa Somalia, without much genuine local support. Villa Somalia clearly hoped that achieving a 'quick win' by merging the SSC-Khaatumo and Maakhir factions and declaring a tenuous FMS would shore up Firdhiye's fortunes. Instead, the federal government's attempts to bulldoze the process have aggravated rifts within the Dhulbahante and provoked a backlash from the clan's traditional leadership. 

As a result, the much-heralded state formation conference, scheduled to begin yesterday in Laas Aanood, was abruptly postponed amidst political uproar. SSC-Khaatumo's deputy leader, Mohamed Abdi Shiine, had already demanded that the process be consensus-based, rather than stampeded by Firdhiye and his federal allies. And a fist of heavyweight Dhulbahante elders turned away a delegation of Warsangeli politicians from the Maakhir faction on the grounds that they lacked any mandate from the broader clan. The re-emergence of unified traditional leadership amongst the Dhulbahante would be to the benefit of all concerned. Schisms within the clan threaten to boil over into violence, with SSC-Khaatumo remaining a loose coalition of heavily armed militias. Although conflict was narrowly avoided twice in the past week, the potential for miscalculation remains high amidst the steady militarisation of the region.

China's military support for SSC-Khaatumo, channelled through Villa Somalia, is one major destabilising factor. Another is Al-Shabaab, which has been steadily scaling up its presence in the region since 2021, deploying growing numbers of militants from southern Somalia to remote parts of the Sool and Sanaag regions. With increasing support from Yemen's Houthi movement, the jihadist group is consolidating its influence along the Gulf of Aden and aspires to recapture the territory it once held in the Al-Miskaad mountains near Bosaaso – recently vacated by Daesh, which has been dislodged by Puntland's Operation Hilaac (Lightning) since the start of the year. 

Villa Somalia's reckless attempts to manufacture a new FMS in Sool and eastern Sanaag thus threaten to set fire to a tinderbox. Inducing Puntland to redirect forces away from its counter-terror fight against Daesh and Al-Shabaab serves only to embolden Al-Shabaab and the Houthis, while derailing Hargeisa's efforts to stabilise these contested regions through dialogue. For now, at least, cooler heads among local leaders appear to have prevailed. But the chaos of the past week points to the worst instincts of Somalia's federal administration: to pursue its electoral agenda at all costs – regardless of the wreckage it leaves in its wake.

The Somali Wire Team