Issue No. 836

We've seen this film before

The ongoing Ugandan-led 'Operation Silent Storm' to dislodge Al-Shabaab from three key bridge towns in Lower Shabelle represents essentially a rehash of the 'Operation Badbaado' (Salvation) campaign, conducted between 2019 and 2020. Coming after the Al-Shabaab Ramadan offensive earlier this year that routed Somali National Army (SNA) positions across Lower and Middle Shabelle, Operation Silent Storm marks the first concerted effort to dislodge the jihadists from their advanced positions toward Mogadishu. And while much has already been made of the intense fighting at Sabiid by Villa Somalia, in reality, the operations are limited in scope and appear likely to repeat the mistakes of its predecessors, even if it disrupts a route for the jihadists into Mogadishu. Re-establishing a string of bunkered Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) in Awdheegle, Bariire, and Sabiid manned by a hollowed-out and demoralised SNA will not turn the tide against Al-Shabaab.

During Al-Shabaab's sweeping Ramadan offensive, the three strategic 'bridge towns' on the River Shabelle were all captured, with Awdheegle and Sabiid seized on 15 and 20 March, respectively, while Bariire was taken after it was abandoned. Without a meaningful counteroffensive in subsequent months, Al-Shabaab has sought to consolidate its position across much of central Somalia, including in the farmlands surrounding these towns and near Afgooye. In Awdheegle, for example, a propaganda video released by the militant group revealed that it had used earth-moving equipment to demolish the Hesco perimeter walls at the SNA base. With Al-Shabaab having dug in, the plan to retake territory in Lower Shabelle is already proving costly in both men and material.

The advent of 'Silent Storm' does not appear to indicate any improvement in the competency or effectiveness of the SNA. Instead, this limited operation is organised and led by the Ugandan People's Defence Forces (UPDF), with forces mostly drawn from the UPDF battle group recently deployed to Mogadishu on a bilateral basis alongside those serving under African Union auspices. Even the name 'Silent Storm' has been ascribed by the UPDF. The plan in Sector 1 to first retake Sabiid, then Bariire, and finally Awdheegle appears to be partially motivated by the imminent rainy season, which may slow the operational tempo on the battlefield and offer somewhat of a reprieve offer somewhat of a reprieve to Somalia’s embattled federal government and its dwindling allies. Yet this is essentially a rehash of the military campaign that has been fought twice before over the past decade for the same stretch of territory between Afgooye and Qoryooley, with little to show for it.

Al-Shabaab continues to exact a painful toll for these minor territorial gains. Earlier this week, the jihadists deployed a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) against advancing UPDF and SNA troops, killing well over a dozen soldiers and injuring several more. Its familiar pattern of asymmetric warfare has further included ambushing government forces and blowing up the Sabiid bridge, rendering it seemingly unusable. Al-Shabaab clearly calculates that the government has more to lose from the destruction of the bridge than it does, with other routes across the Shabelle River still accessible. But it is unlikely that the militants will fight tooth-and-nail for Sabiid, Bariire, and Awdheegle-- as they simply don't have to, with the SNA having only recently proven itself incapable of holding such territory without the continued presence of the Ugandans or other international forces. Following the mass desertions and heavy casualties of recent weeks, as well as enduring politicisation and clan divisions, the SNA remains a shambolic force unable to mount any significant and long-term offensive. 

Rolling back the situation to when Hassan Sheikh came into office and post-Badbaado, these SNA FOBs constituted only siloed enclosures, with troops rarely venturing beyond their confines to conduct clearing operations or aggressive patrolling. Al-Shabaab remained embedded in the rural areas throughout Lower Shabelle, dominating the banana plantations north of the perennial River Shabelle and through villages such as Nuun and Shaan. Such extreme stasis allowed Al-Shabaab to maintain near-complete freedom of movement, which was further accentuated by the drawdown of the Ugandan FOBs as part of the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) withdrawal. If Operation Silent Storm concludes with simply a reprise of Badbaado, as it appears likely to do, the strategic value of recapturing these three bridge towns is negligible, with militants able to continue collecting zakat (taxes) and harassing government forces along the arterial roads. Pushing down towards Janaale may be doable, but-- again-- it is highly improbable that this coalition of forces would be able to hold the town.

Meanwhile, with Somalia's devolved security architecture having been entirely abandoned and coordination with South West State administration for operations within Lower Shabelle seemingly nil, it does not seem likely that Daraawiish paramilitary forces will be used as a holding presence. This partly stems from enduring divisions between a legacy of displacement and land seizures by the Hawiye/ Habar Gidir at the expense of Dir sub-clans such as the Biyomaal in Lower Shabelle in the 1990s and 2000s. As such, Hawiye-dominated authorities in Mogadishu rarely consider Lower Shabelle as part of South West but rather as an extension of Banaadir. Reconciliation efforts between the Habar Gidir, Biyomaal and other Rahanweyne sub-clans remain fitful, limiting the possibilities of a bottom-up security presence by mobilising cross-clan community forces. Instead, multiple SNA battalions-- that have repeatedly proven incapable of holding territory under concerted Al-Shabaab pressure-- will be assigned to simply sit in Awdheegle, Bariire, and Sabiid FOBs and will be unable to be tasked with anything further.

Furthermore, donors are likely to be unwilling to provide the same degree of stabilisation assistance as before, considering the resources that have been squandered and the broader deteriorated security and political context. Al-Shabaab previously destroyed the bridge at Bariire in 2018, which was rebuilt at vast expense. Still, one area where security partners may be able to assist is in supporting the deployment of a forward-positioned brigade commander who can exercise some battlefield control at the local level, something that Badbaado lacked. But these operations should not be taken as evidence that Villa Somalia has somehow rejoined the counter-terror fight, nor that it will significantly degrade Al-Shabaab's entrenched position across Lower Shabelle. It is simply to restore the status quo security posture of when Hassan Sheikh assumed office, which was hardly propitious. And though framed as an offensive move, in reality, these are defensive operations intended to prevent Al-Shabaab from massing its numbers near the capital.

Looking to Middle Shabelle, the SNA continues to be in disarray, with no clear timeline for any offensive, despite the Chief of Defence Forces, Odowa Yusuf Rage, recently visiting Adaale to attempt to negotiate with local clans. Second, the investment of forces down along the River Shabelle means that there remains no apparent plan to open the southern coastal route between Merka and Mogadishu. And in Hiiraan, where the Hawaadle have mounted concerted efforts against Al-Shabaab, frustrations continue to rise with the federal government and Abgaal following the ousting of the spy chief, Abdullahi Mohamed Ali 'Sanbalooshe', amidst a string of significant Al-Shabaab victories.

Though Operation Silent Storm is being framed as the sequel to Operation Badbaado and before that, Operation Leopard Hunt in the battle against Al-Shabaab for control of Lower Shabelle, it is really just a re-run. We've seen this film before, and it doesn't bode well.

The Somali Wire Team