The Politicised Revival of Mahad Salad at NISA
Over the weekend, Mahad Salad was returned to head up Somalia's National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA). After a 14-month break, the Egyptian-trained former spy chief has returned to the position he held between August 2022 and April 2024. The restoration of Salad, who belongs to the Hawiye/ Habar Gidir/ Ayr sub-clan, comes amid twin threats to Villa Somalia-- the serpentine encroachment of Al-Shabaab on Mogadishu and the massing of political opposition in the capital. Historically lenient towards the jihadist group, Salad is unlikely to afford the same generosity to the government's opposition as the head of NISA, as his predecessor did. Simultaneously, the removal of Abdullahi Mohamed Ali 'Sanbaloolshe,' could seriously undermine the ongoing ma'awiisley operations by his Hawaadle sub-clan against Al-Shabaab in Hiiraan, one of the few forces leading the frontline resistance.
On Monday, Al-Shabaab seized the strategic town of Hawadleey in Middle Shabelle, located between Afgooye and Bal'ad, following the dislocation of Burundian peacekeepers after flooding in their base. Amidst seizing the town, the jihadists also downed an African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) military helicopter. And having captured Hawadleey, Al-Shabaab has now signalled that it intends to seize-- and potentially hold-- Bal'ad in the coming days as part of its latest incursion towards the capital. Just 18 miles from Mogadishu, losing Bal'ad would represent a serious blow to the government. But more than suppressing the opposition and preventing the emergence of Badbaado Qaran 2.0 (National Salvation Forces), some believe that the return of Salad is part of a furtive strategy for opening talks with Al-Shabaab.
During Salad's previous stint in office, there was a concerted lack of kinetic operations against Al-Shabaab, even if there was a relative decline in attacks in Mogadishu in particular. Some have attributed Salad's softer approach to a possible personal affiliation with Mahad Karate, one of the most prominent figures within the group's leadership and head of the much-feared Amniyaat. Whatever the reason, the return of Salad does not suggest a more hardline policy towards the deep penetration of the jihadists throughout Mogadishu, which has enabled Al-Shabaab to conduct several high-profile attacks in recent weeks. Others are concerned that Salad may even be positioned to launch negotiations with the extremist group, perhaps to limit the number of attacks in Mogadishu. Whether these talks take place remains to be seen, but the question remains about why the jihadists would come to the table now, after all these years, and why they would cede ground-- simply because the returned spy chief has been tolerant of the group.
Leaving aside Salad's imminent response to Al-Shabaab, what is far clearer is his attitude towards political opposition as NISA head, having previously repeatedly sought to repress and curtail dissent. The agency remained deeply politicised under his watch, with several attempted attacks on opposition figures ascribed to Salad. But during much of 2023 and 2024, Salad lobbied to position himself for the Galmudug presidency, with the tacit support of Villa Somalia. Amid the schizophrenic military operations against Al-Shabaab in central Somalia, Salad decamped to Dhusamareb in August 2023 and began heavily recruiting from his Ayr sub-clan, deploying hundreds of paramilitaries near Galka'yo. Salad's NISA forces made little discernible contribution to the battlefield but contributed to his deteriorated relationship with Galmudug President Ahmed Abdi Karie 'QoorQoor.' When Al-Shabaab nearly killed QoorQoor in November 2023 in a suicide bombing, the Galmudug leader accused Salad of having prior knowledge of the attempt.
Fast forward to today, it appears that the growing political opposition in Mogadishu precipitated the change in spy chief, not the continued threat of Al-Shabaab to the capital. Last month, dozens of senior opposition leaders established a new alliance under the banner of the 'Somalia Salvation Alliance' (SSA) in explicit opposition to Villa Somalia's unilateral constitutional and electoral agenda. Amongst the cross-clan leaders include ex-President Sheikh Sherif Sheikh Ahmed, as well as former PM Hassan Ali Khayre, Abdi Farah Shirdoon and Mohamed Mursal. Under renewed pressure, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has promised, again, vaguely, that some form of national dialogue will be held in Mogadishu on 15 June, but the details remain unclear.
But with Salad returned to head up NISA, the opposition could soon count the deposed Sanbalooshe amongst their number. Despite his relationship with President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, he refused to wield the spy agency against them for political ends. Instead, the ousted chief has played a central role in mobilising the several thousand Hawaadle ma'awiisley that are currently positioned against Al-Shabaab in central Somalia. Still, there was a spate of major attacks in Mogadishu under his watch while Sanbalooshe was based in Hiiraan, and some believe that the recently dismissed spy chief was agitating for the Hirshabelle presidency. But having been dispatched by Villa Somalia to Hiiraan, Sanbalooshe was also forced to shuttle and scavenge for funds for NISA, including from Iraq, Libya, and the UAE. Conspicuously absent from Sanbalooshe's list of possible donors was Qatar, which he accused of having links with Al-Shabaab in 2020. And while Sanbalooshe can perhaps be charged with refusing to listen to his officers and being deployed to Hiiraan more than Mogadishu, he has not sought to actively undermine Somalia's legitimate political opposition to the degree of his predecessors.
Another reason for Salad's appointment may be an attempt by Mogadishu to smooth over ruffled feathers with Egypt. Salad previously served as an agent of influence for Egyptian intelligence and was rumoured to have been the architect of the security partnership between Mogadishu and Cairo last year. But the prospect of Egyptian military deployment has greatly diminished in recent months, particularly amid Mogadishu's Turkish-negotiated detente with Addis and the continued failure to secure funding for AUSSOM.
Moreover, the return of Salad provides a moment for reflection on the purpose of NISA today. Established in 2013, NISA has gradually degenerated into a parallel security structure, heavily politicised and paramilitary, and seemingly serving its original purpose of internal and external intelligence only sporadically. Salad and, particularly, Fahad Yasin, Qatar's 'man in Mogadishu,' have been culpable for this political erosion of the force by repeatedly wielding it against Farmaajo and Hassan Sheikh's domestic opposition. This has included armed groups other than Al-Shabaab, such as Salad's wielding of NISA against the Sufi paramilitaries Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama (ASWJ), who are antithetical to the jihadists. And other responsibilities held by NISA, such as the Al-Shabaab defectors' programme, have been badly abrogated, resulting in several of those supposedly de-radicalised carrying out suicide bombings and attacks.
It may coordinate drone strikes carried out by international partners, but NISA has also been rocked by scandals ranging from everything to do with extortion to the disappearance of the female agent Ikhran Tahil in June 2021, which remains unsolved to this day but has been widely attributed to Fahad Yasin's leadership. Interestingly, Yasin-- a former critic and rival of Salad-- has welcomed his return, marking quite the about-turn considering his 2023 accusations of Salad of being a paid member of Al-Shabaab, under the command of Mahad Karate and having organised an attempted assassination of an unnamed former Somali PM.
The opposition in Mogadishu has greeted the prospects of talks with Villa Somalia with some understandable degree of scepticism. In recent days, senior opposition figure and former President Sheikh Sherif has once again asserted that Villa Somalia is continuing to weaponise and deploy security forces against members of the SSA. The return of Mahad Salad to NISA is likely to only exacerbate this dynamic, and many opposition leaders may well consider beefing up their own security details. Further, the deposition of Sanbalooshe-- which ironically is likely to undermine the only semi-successful operations against Al-Shabaab-- has little to do with the continued military and security failures of the broader government; if it did, a whole tranche of security leaders would be long gone. As it continues its gradual advance towards Mogadishu, Al-Shabaab, on the other hand, is far more likely to welcome the return of Salad.
The Somali Wire Team
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