Issue No. 254

OPOV or not OPOV? That is the Shakespearean question upon which Somalia's political future would depend. But is it really? The question has consumed the country and commentators for months, but the very term itself-- 'one-person, one-vote' (OPOV)-- does not begin to reflect the situation today. President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud's (HSM) professed commitment to conduct OPOV elections for the federal parliament in May 2026 is both a disingenuous misnomer and a deft gesture of political sleight of hand. For a host of reasons, it is by now apparent to all concerned that an OPOV poll in Somalia is inconceivable under present circumstances. Even HSM has privately acknowledged as much. So why are we still talking about it?

Sequels are rarely as good as the original movie, and 'threequels' even less so. The ongoing Ugandan People's Defence Force (UPDF)-led and Somali National Army (SNA) offensive in Lower Shabelle is following the same tired plot as its predecessors, and as anticipated, it is playing out in a toe-curling fashion. First, there was the unsuccessful Operation Leopard Hunt-- to dislodge Al-Shabaab from several of the strategic 'bridge towns' of Lower Shabelle, namely Sabiid, Bariire, and Awdheegle, then there was Operation Badbaadho, to again, clear the jihadists from the towns. And now, over five years on Badbaadho, we are seeing the same story play out in Operation Silent Storm, albeit with a greatly demoralised and degraded SNA.

In the 21st century alone, Palmyra, Tigray, the Buddhas of Bamiyan, Odessa, and Khartoum, and many more besides, have all borne witness to targeted cultural violence, wiping out centuries and millennia of worship, artefacts, and unique histories that can never be reclaimed. Some have been targeted for theological or religious reasons– such as the ancient sites in Palmyra by Daesh– or part of a broader genocidal attempt to stamp out a civilisation– as was the case in Tigray– or simply greed– like the looting of the Khartoum museums by the Rapid Support Forces. But in many cases, it denotes a rewriting of history, an attempt by a political movement or armed group to coerce and impose their particular vision for the country on the objects, buildings, and cultural identities that comprise it.

Last week, a new Somali federal state entitled "North Eastern State of Somalia" (NES) (Dowlad Goboleedka Waqooyi Bari Soomaaliya) was proclaimed and endorsed by Villa Somalia. The culmination of a months-long project directed by the Ministry of Interior, the transformation of the Laas Aanood-based SSC-Khaatumo administration into a supposed 'federal state'-- the first since Hirshabelle-- is being hailed by Somali nationalists as a victory against the 'secessionism' of Somaliland and Puntland's independence from Mogadishu. Though not in full control of either, NES is meant to encompass both Sool and Sanaag, and has been finally bulldozed into existence in the face of public opposition from Puntland, Somaliland, and much of the Warsangeli that the new state claims to represent. The cynical electoral politics of Mogadishu are pushing northern Somalia and Somaliland to the brink of conflict once again.

Two weeks go by, and at least one new maritime agreement on the Somali peninsula has reared its head, with another retaliatory pact to potentially soon follow. The first was between Taiwan and Somaliland, following Hargeisa's Foreign Minister Abdirahman Dahir Osman's visit to Taipei in late July, during which he secured a cooperation agreement between the coastguards of Taiwan and Somaliland. And the inevitable Beijing-Mogadishu response has now arrived, with the Chinese Embassy in Somalia announcing that it has discussed enhancing "cooperation" with the federal government's Coast Guard. As ever, the officials reaffirmed their commitment to "safeguarding national sovereignty and territorial integrity of China and Somalia."

Gedo has long served as a useful barometer for the health of relations between Nairobi, Mogadishu, and Addis. Straddling the tri-border Mandera Triangle, the Mareehaan-dominated region of Jubaland has been a key staging post for Al-Shabaab's continued infiltration into Kenya and Ethiopia for years. And as such, both Nairobi and Addis have a vested stake in Jubaland as a security buffer zone against the jihadists, developing close ties with key political actors within Gedo and the southern Federal Member State-- which they helped co-establish in 2013. Over a decade later, with Hassan Sheikh Mohamud back at the helm in Mogadishu, the focus has returned to Gedo, as he has resorted to a well-known destabilising playbook by attempting —and failing —to wrest the Mareehaan into Villa Somalia's orbit. But amid the government's months-long campaign to destabilise Gedo, including seizing Garbahaarey and Luuq from control of Jubaland to carve out Darood tents for its rigged elections, Addis has remained silent-- until now.

It is now official: Somalia’s National Security Adviser (NSA) Hussein Sheikh Ali, aka “Hussein Ma’alin’ has stepped down. On his X (formerly Twitter) handle, Hussein described himself as “former” NSA. On Sunday evening, the Office of the Prime Minister put out a short statement to say Mukhtar Mohammed Hassan has been appointed acting National Security Adviser. Mukhtar is not well-known and the assumption of many is that he will be a placeholder until a suitable replacement is found. Both Hussein and Villa Somalia remain reticent in explaining what exactly happened and why the changes are being made.

In December 2023, the final elements of the UN Security Council sanctions regime were lifted on the Somali federal government. Mogadishu's celebrations were rapturous, with President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud declaring that Mogadishu could now "purchase any weapons needed" and that "friendly nations and allies" could hand over the "necessary weapons without any limitations or restrictions." After years of lobbying, the final albatross around the neck of the federal government was to be lifted, and the Somali National Army (SNA) handed the heavy firepower required to conquer Al-Shabaab once and for all. Of course, over 18 months on, quite the reverse has happened, with Al-Shabaab having swept across much of central Somalia since February-- despite the glut of Egyptian and Turkish weapons donated to Villa Somalia in the past year. And Puntland's seizure of the MV Sea World, a Comorian-flagged vessel carrying Turkish arms and armoured vehicles last week, has thrown the question of the lifting of the arms embargo back into the open.

In just a handful of days, Sabiid in Lower Shabelle has fallen back to Al-Shabaab, Turkish arms linked to government-aligned arms traffickers were seized off Puntland's coast, and armed clashes erupted in Beledhawo in Gedo between Jubaland and federal troops. With the immediate threat of Mogadishu falling to Al-Shabaab having passed for the time being, Villa Somalia has returned to its favoured agenda, wielding its security apparatus not against the jihadists but against political opposition. Subsequent violence in Gedo, Sanaag, and the collapse of the Lower Shabelle operations are all emblematic of Villa Somalia reverting to its coercive tactics to attempt to forcibly impose its will on the peripheries. But it is losing-- and badly, having entirely failed to learn the lessons of Ras Kamboni in December 2024 when federal troops were routed by Jubaland.