Issue No. 857

Operation Silent Storm: The Threequel

Sequels are rarely as good as the original movie, and 'threequels' even less so. The ongoing Ugandan People's Defence Force (UPDF)-led and Somali National Army (SNA) offensive in Lower Shabelle is following the same tired plot as its predecessors, and as anticipated, it is playing out in a toe-curling fashion. First, there was the unsuccessful Operation Leopard Hunt-- to dislodge Al-Shabaab from several of the strategic 'bridge towns' of Lower Shabelle, namely Sabiid, Bariire, and Awdheegle, then there was Operation Badbaadho, to again, clear the jihadists from the towns. And now, over five years on Badbaadho, we are seeing the same story play out in Operation Silent Storm, albeit with a greatly demoralised and degraded SNA. With Villa Somalia preferring to waste federal resources by destabilising its political opposition in Jubaland and Puntland, this grinding offensive in Lower Shabelle is still being somehow touted as evidence that the jihadists are on the run and that the federal government is serious about fighting them.

In March 2025, all three key bridge towns along the Shabelle River were lost to Al-Shabaab amidst the jihadist group's sweeping Ramadan offensive that has seen numerous towns and villages across central Somalia fall into their hands. It marked a rolling back of territory to pre-2019 Operation Badbaadho, and reopened a corridor for Al-Shabaab to rapidly mass forces near Mogadishu. But even before these siloed Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) were lost, Al-Shabaab had made its presence keenly felt across much of Lower Shabelle, particularly in the banana plantations north of the River Shabelle, where it collected zakat (tax) and conducted bombings at will. In recent years , the SNA forces bunkered down in the FOBs on the outskirts of Sabiid, Bariire, and Awdheegle rarely conducted clearance or offensive operations against the militant group, with these towns falling back into their hands at nighttime and across the rural areas of Lower Shabelle. Today, even if the UPDF and SNA are able to recapture all three towns—and it is still probable that they will—there remains little indication that Al-Shabaab's presence across Lower Shabelle will be significantly diminished.

So far, though Sabiid was retaken last month, progress has been achingly slow, despite the immense amount of Ugandan men and firepower that have been poured into the operations. The joint forces are now gradually advancing on Bariire, but Awdheegle still remains under the control of Al-Shabaab, while the jihadists are able to navigate the Shabelle River with relative ease due to its current low levels. And on 25 July, Al-Shabaab overran the SNA camp near Sabiid, briefly seizing the town again just a month after it was recaptured by joint Ugandan and Somali forces in June. The jihadists have further mounted heavy resistance in Bariire, having dug in and established strong lines of defence against the sustained bombardments. 

Significant casualties have since been claimed by both sides, including the infamously mercurial Ugandan Chief of Defence Forces Muhoozi Kainerugaba, claiming that over 100 Al-Shabaab had been killed on X. But Al-Shabaab has also invested significant material against the Ugandan-led operations as well, detonating a massive Suicide Vehicle-Borne IED in mid-July that killed 20 Ugandans and several Somali troops. In fighting for Bariire, such intense resistance in dug-outs and engaging in direct combat to hold down territory marks somewhat of a change in Al-Shabaab's tactics, which have typically preferred asymmetric guerrilla warfare and carefully timed raids against poorly defended FOBs. And whether the SNA will actually be able to hold these towns remains highly doubtful if the Ugandans withdraw in the longer term, particularly in light of the heavy losses the military has sustained and its poor morale. 

Even now, the defences at Sabiid are reported to be ramshackle at best and highly vulnerable to another assault from Al-Shabaab. Re-establishing a 'string of pearls' in easily raidable, siloed SNA bases along the Shabelle River for Al-Shabaab to seize will do nothing to turn the tide against the jihadists. For the story in Lower Shabelle to change, there also needs to be an acknowledgement by the Hawiye-dominated federal government that the region is under the authority of South West, rather than simply an extension of the capital's security. This is, in part, a legacy of the displacement of the Dir sub-clans, such as the Biyomaal, in the 1990s and 2000s by Hawiye/Habar Gidir forces, who seized swathes of Lower Shabelle. Since then, any reconciliation efforts have been fitful at best, and there remains no suggestion that any commanders are considering establishing a cross-clan local defence force to better secure the area.

And while progress has been incremental in Lower Shabelle, the security situation across the rest of south-central Somalia remains unremittingly bleak. With Mahaas, Mokoqori and other towns having fallen in eastern Hiiraan in recent weeks, Al-Shabaab is now able to move at will to reinforce its fighters in Lower Shabelle if it so chooses. The collapse of the frontline in Hiiraan, with no genuine prospects of these Hawaadle-majority towns being retaken, was another direct result of the misplaced political and security strategies of Villa Somalia, which refused to arm and support the concerted efforts by the Hawaadle ma'awiisley to resist the jihadists' advance. Instead, the federal government, with the support of Kampala, appears to be engaged in a performative military operation in Lower Shabelle, designed to convince Western donors – especially the US – that the African Union peacekeeping mission is worthy of funding, rather than a genuine assault on Al-Shabaab strongholds. 

For a serious push into the jihadist heartlands and key towns of Jilib, Jamaame, and Buulo Fuulay– the key question remains one of coordination between the federal government, Jubaland and South West. Deploying SNA troops to Kismaayo and Baidoa with coordinated Daraawiish support before pushing into Al-Shabaab's strongholds would force the jihadist group to redeploy its forces away from central Somalia and Mogadishu to protect these areas, easing pressure on the capital as well. But this remains impossible with Villa Somalia disregarding any counter-terror operations in favour of its destabilising attempts to carve up the country on the altar of a rigged 'one-person, one-vote' election. Rather, President Hassan Sheikh is hell-bent on dismembering Jubaland and remains highly suspicious of his supposed Justice and Solidarity Party (JSP) ally, South West President Abdiaziz Laftagareen, vacillating between retaining and ejecting him. In the meantime, Al-Shabaab has been able to dictate the battlefield at will, picking and choosing where to deploy, raid, and overrun next.

Today, the jihadists are now much deeper 'inside the wire' than during past offensives, having moved more fighters and armaments into the Banaadir area than before, so seizing the bridge towns is unlikely to matter as much as it once did. The disappointing threequel is shaping up as expected in Lower Shabelle-- but few people are watching this time around. The government's dangerous political agenda that is splitting the country apart from Gedo to Sool is proving more compelling viewing. And despite his best destabilising attempts, on his current trajectory, it is ever less likely that Hassan Sheikh will get his own 'threequel' as president.

The Somalia Wire Team