Fiddling While Middle Shabelle Burns On Tuesday in Mogadishu, hundreds of people, mostly students, were bussed into Shangani to line up and obtain voter ID cards in a highly choreographed affair. Among the first in line was the mayor of Mogadishu, participating in a stunt that Villa Somalia continues to frame as the next step to achieving the first national one-person, one-vote (OPOV) elections since 1967. But rather than realising the long-thwarted democratic aspirations of the Somali people, it is simply another damaging spectacle, just as PM Hamza Barre's trip to Laas Aanood was, that further diminishes the chance of any positive outcome from the upcoming 'national dialogue' process. With Al-Shabaab having seized Adan Yabaal in Middle Shabelle and a host of other strategic locations this morning, Villa Somalia is fiddling while Rome burns.
Al-Shabaab at the Nexus of Terrorism and Crime The nexus between terrorism and criminal activity has always been hazy. Criminal groups have long deployed violence for a litany of reasons, while at times wielding 'terrorist' tactics to intimidate and coerce. In the late 1980s, for instance, the Colombian Medellin Cartel, headed by the notorious narcotrafficker Pablo Escobar, famously bombed an Avianca passenger jet, killing 107 passengers and crew, as well as a government building in Bogota, in which 57 people were killed and more than 2,200 injured.
Cheap Talk: No Signs of National Unity A distinct lack of urgency surrounds Somalia's supposed 'emergency national dialogue.' On the eve of Eid, Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) reluctantly announced a national dialogue process in the face of collapsing security across the Shabelles and the growing threat to Mogadishu from Al-Shabaab. The Hawiye national opposition, Jubaland President Ahmed Madoobe and others have cautiously welcomed the offer, though they have sought greater clarity on a number of points, not least the scope of discussions. In the week since the announcement, however, Villa Somalia seems to have reverted to 'business as usual', exhibiting the same myopic and unilateral behaviour that precipitated the country's current crisis.
Over the weekend, large groups of Al-Shabaab fighters infiltrated areas close to the Somali capital Mogadishu, the bulk of them in the direction of Afgooye. Local media reported Al-Shabaab (AS) ‘sightings’ two nights in a row in multiple locations such as Ceelasha Biyaha and Sinka Dheer. According to local sources, Al-Shabaab reassured the public it had no intent to trigger fighting and ‘harm civilians’ or ‘change people’s lives’. The aim, Al-Shabaab told the residents of these districts, was to take over Mogadishu and create a ‘just Islamic state based on Islamic sharia.’ It would seem AS’s tactics are partly psyops, the aim being to project soft power, reassure civilians, and demonstrate confidence and reach. However, these types of deep incursions into enemy territory from multiple directions may also signal a far bolder military strategy: to steadily take control of Mogadishu as Somalia’s feckless federal government unravels.
Somalia appears on the brink of another seismic political change. Under growing political strain and losing ground to a resurgent Al-Shabaab, the possibility of Mogadishu's fall or negotiated capitulation to the jihadists in the coming months continues to grow. With Al-Shabaab rapidly taking advantage of the growing political chaos, Somalia's transitional federal project is more imperilled than ever. The country's regression from a fragile state to a failing one seems increasingly inevitable.
Yesterday, Al-Shabaab demonstrated just how potent it remains. Just 18 miles from Mogadishu, Al-Shabaab fighters stormed the town of Bal'ad, which lies on the arterial road from the capital to Jowhar in Hirshabelle. As Ethiopian PM Abiy Ahmed touched down in Mogadishu in the morning, four mortar projectiles were launched by the jihadists toward Aden Adde International Airport, injuring several civilians. Meanwhile, at least 5 South West State soldiers were killed in an IED blast near Huddur in Bakool, and an explosion at a restaurant in Mogadishu's Kahda district wounded several people.
Between 2010 and 2016, over 6,000 Somali children were forcibly recruited into armed groups, and 2,000 in 2018 alone — the highest number recorded globally. Some were as young as 8. Since the collapse of the state in the early 1990s, Somalia has served as an example of how instability and social fragmentation can fuel the exploitation of children in conflict. Today, Al-Shabaab is widely regarded as the most culpable of Somalia's myriad armed forces for their indoctrination and abduction of children into their ranks.
Reports of a government offensive in the Hiiraan region recall the heady days of the 2022 ma'awiisley offensive against Al-Shabaab that left the jihadists bloodied and on the back foot. At that time, community defence forces from the Hawaadle rose up against Al-Shabaab in protest against the group's pitiless 'taxtortion' during a time of brutal drought, and succeeded in dislodging the extremists from significant parts of Hiiraan, Middle Shabelle and Galmudug. Known as the 'ma'awiisley' for the typical 'ma'wiis' (sarongs) that Somali men wear, it was a clan and community-led offensive that the fresh Hassan Sheikh administration eagerly appropriated as a 'success story' for the federal government. Today, once again, scenes of young men with AK-47s battling Al-Shabaab along the Shabelle River valley are being touted as a token of Villa Somalia's counterterrorism zeal.
On 21 November, the next phase of the disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR) of 75,000 Tigray Defence Forces (TDF) soldiers commenced in Mekelle. Over two years have passed since the signing of the Pretoria and Nairobi agreements, with the DDR process intended as one of their central elements, but federally-driven progress to date has been slow.
Since the collapse of Somalia’s central government in 1991, access to justice has been a major challenge, leaving a vacuum that Al-Shabaab has exploited. The militant group operates shadow Islamic courts in territories under its control, ruling on land disputes, contracts and criminal cases. These tribunals are perceived by many Somalis as faster, cheaper and less corrupt than official government courts. While government judicial systems often suffer from delays, backlogs and high legal costs, Al-Shabaab’s courts are accessible, free to file cases and enforce rulings swiftly, albeit under a harsh interpretation of Sharia law. Their perceived impartiality, even toward minority clans, has helped them gain acceptance in some government-controlled areas and even among diaspora communities. In contrast, Somalia’s official judiciary is plagued by corruption, political interference and lack of enforcement capacity. Many Somalis, especially in rural areas, turn to Al-Shabaab’s system for swift resolutions. To counter this influence, Somalia’s federal government must reform its judiciary to be transparent, efficient and accessible. Eliminating reliance on militant courts will require significant investment, professional training and a renewed commitment to justice that serves all Somalis equally.
Last week, Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) flew to Asmara and spent four days in the country in an audacious bid to secure the return of thousands of Somali troops languishing in military camps in the Red Sea state.