Issue No. 785

A return to 2022 in Hiiraan?

Reports of a government offensive in the Hiiraan region recall the heady days of the 2022 ma'awiisleyoffensive against Al-Shabaab that left the jihadists bloodied and on the back foot. At that time, community defence forces from the Hawaadle rose up against Al-Shabaab in protest against the group's pitiless 'taxtortion' during a time of brutal drought, and succeeded in dislodging the extremists from significant parts of Hiiraan, Middle Shabelle and Galmudug. Known as the 'ma'awiisley' for the typical'ma'wiis' (sarongs) that Somali men wear, it was a clan and community-led offensive that the fresh Hassan Sheikh administration eagerly appropriated as a 'success story' for the federal government. Today, once again, scenes of young men with AK-47s battling Al-Shabaab along the Shabelle River valley are being touted as a token of Villa Somalia's counterterrorism zeal. 

Despite their initial gains, the ma'awiisley offensive eventually broke down after the Somali National Army (SNA) sought to assume control of the operations, and their political and military direction. The campaign was soon entangled in familiar setbacks like poor logistics and command-and-control, the repeated overrunning of SNA positions by Al-Shabaab and the struggle to hold liberated territory. The security situation in Hirshabelle -- and across central-southern Somalia -- has only deteriorated further since the collapse of the frontline in Mudug. The last major town liberated in the offensive was Haradheere, more than two years ago in January 2023. Today, Al-Shabaab is a far more formidable force than it was during the ma'awiisley uprising, having recruited heavily and secured more weaponry. The jihadists have gradually retaken territory and stoked inter-clan violence, as well as taken revenge against the communities that resisted them, destroying wells and executing elders.

Two and a half years ago, among the central figures who led the Hawaadle ma'awiisley was the firebrand former Hiiraan Governor, Ali Osman Jeyte. He has now returned to the frontlines, promising to (re)liberate territory from the jihadist group in southeastern Hiiraan. Fighting with Al-Shabaab has so far mostly taken place between Beera Yabaal and Ji'ibow along the arterial Shabelle River that runs through Hirshabelle, with some significant casualties reportedly inflicted on the militants. And as was the case in mid-2022, operating alongside the reformed Hawaadle militias, there are SNA and National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) forces. However, the scale is far smaller than the previous offensive, with less ambitious territorial objectives.

The launching of these operations was encouraged by NISA Director-General Abdullahi Mohamed Ali 'Sanbalooshe,' who travelled to Beledweyne in late 2024 to help paper over the widening rift between the Hawaadle and Villa Somalia. Hawaadle-Mogadishu relations took a turn for the worse in mid-2023 after the anti-Al-Shabaab offensive collapsed and Hirshablle President Ali Hussein 'Guudlawe' dismissed Jeyte from his position as governor of Hiiraan. Jeyte's firing triggered the declaration of 'Hiiraan State,' as Hawaadle leaders announced a split from the Abgaal-led Hirshabelle administration in a bid to establish their own Federal Member State (FMS). 

Since then, Hawaadle authorities have administered Beledweyne independently of the Hirshabelle government and have also resisted the federal government. And although Jeyte was appointed 'Coordinator' of the ma'awiisley forces in 2023, Mogadishu provided no serious support. Mogadishu's unilateral insistence that Ethiopian troops withdraw by the end of 2024, with whom Hawaadle communities have a close political and military relationship, and its abandonment of the 'total war' agenda against Al-Shabaab further deepened the rift. Still, Sanbalooshe's negotiations with Hawaadle elders in late 2024 managed to turn things around after the spy chief promised to support the ma'awiisleyefforts to fight Al-Shabaab in Hiiraan. After an extended absence, NISA and SNA were allowed to deploy there in significant numbers for the first time after a prolonged absence.

However, the recent détente between the federal government and Hawaadle ma'awiisley is already looking shaky. Senior federal officials have issued contradictory signals as some claim strategic victories against Al-Shabaab in order to eclipse the major, ongoing Puntland operations against Da'esh in which they have played no part. Yet last week, the head of the military court, Hassan Ali Shute, cited a rise in human rights violations by the ma'awiisley, implying that the federal government could not trust Jeyte's forces. Then, over the weekend, State Minister for Defence Omar Ali proclaimed in an interview that the SNA plans to integrate some ma'awiisley into its ranks since "they deserve it" and that some were already being provided salaries. Registering new SNA recruits from the ma'awiisley without explicit reference to total force strength, budgetary allocations, or a comprehensive security sector reform framework is no recipe for sustainable military gains.

Moreover, the broader disputes over power and resource-sharing remain between the Hawaadle in Beledweyne and the Abgaal in Jowhar. Jeyte and Guudlawe are still unlikely to see eye-to-eye, considering the acrimony of their fall-out in 2023. The 'Hiiraan State' initiative may have been retired for the time being, but questions endure about the political aspirations of those in Beledweyne for another FMS. Nor is the national political situation conducive to comprehensive political talks, with polarisation rising even within the Hawiye due to the federal government's unilateral constitutional and electoral rewrites. These divisions are significant, and the prospect of the SNA being able to extend its operations beyond Hiiraan is remote. 

Meanwhile, Jeyte remains a charismatic motivator of his clan, and his return to the battlefield in Hiiraan has re-mobilised some ma'awiisley, who had disbanded and taken their weapons home. But he is also a controversial figure amongst the more peripheral clans on the east side of the Shabelle River, such as the Ja'jele, where his recent assertion that anyone living in Al-Shabaab-held territory should be considered a "terrorist" was poorly received. Sanbalooshe, as well as Health Minister Ali Haji Hassan, were quick to condemn his remarks. Such indications of persistent inter-clan divisions cast a pall over Sanbalooshe's attempts to unify Hiiraan communities in order to cleanse these areas of their entrenched Al-Shabaab presence.

Meanwhile, the longer Sanbalooshe stays in Hiiraan, the longer his docket in Mogadishu remains unfilled, and his capacity to lead the national intelligence establishment is consequently limited. Some have suggested his presence is partly motivated by aspirations for the Hirshabelle presidency as a figure more amenable to both the Abgaal and the Hawaadle than Jowhar-isolated Guudlawe. But the deployment of the NISA director-general to Hiiraan for weeks on end while the most significant operations against a violent extremist group since 2022 -- the anti-Daesh operations in the Al-Miskaad mountains by Puntland -- suggests a profound misalignment of priorities at the federal level. And while the intelligence chief dawdles in the Shabelle valley, Al-Shabaab has recently deployed drones above the presidential palace in Mogadishu for the first time – apparently mocking NISA's lack of focus and internal disarray. 

Villa Somalia is eager to frame the Hiiraan operations as a return to the 'total war' paradigm against Al-Shabaab, clawing back some of the praise and attention being lavished on Puntland for its ongoing offensive against Islamic State. Minister of Internal Security Abdullahi 'Fartaag,' the architect of Gedo's destabilisation, has bizarrely accused Jubaland President Ahmed 'Madoobe' of preventing anti-Al-Shabaab operations - a perverse suggestion considering it was that SNA troops who withdrew without warning from joint positions in Jubaland last year. As long as the federal government substitutes politicking and posturing for a concerted campaign against Al-Shabaab's main strongholds, backed by the SNA and African Union troops, military victory and political progress will remain out of reach.

The Somali Wire Team