Issue No. 812

Published 16 Apr 2025

Fiddling While Middle Shabelle Burns

Published on 16 Apr 2025 16:16 min

Fiddling While Middle Shabelle Burns

On Tuesday in Mogadishu, hundreds of people, mostly students, were bussed into Shangani to line up and obtain voter ID cards in a highly choreographed affair. Among the first in line was the mayor of Mogadishu, participating in a stunt that Villa Somalia continues to frame as the next step to achieving the first national one-person, one-vote (OPOV) elections since 1967. But rather than realising the long-thwarted democratic aspirations of the Somali people, it is simply another damaging spectacle, just as PM Hamza Barre's trip to Laas Aanood was, that further diminishes the chance of any positive outcome from the upcoming 'national dialogue' process. With Al-Shabaab having seized Adan Yabaal in Middle Shabelle and a host of other strategic locations this morning, Villa Somalia is fiddling while Rome burns.

Perhaps it was too much to hope that President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud would understand the severity of how far his shortsighted, unilateral agenda has pushed the country and try to salvage his legacy by announcing he wouldn't run again in 2026. But to continue to pursue the direct polls to the express resistance of the Hawiye opposition, Puntland and Jubaland, as well as international partners, reflects just how bunkered the small coterie of advisors within Villa Somalia has become. Refusing to pause the process, as well as the government's centralising constitutional agenda, and allowing for negotiations may doom the 'national dialogue' talks on 1-2 May in Mogadishu before they have even begun. Clearly, the proper sequence would have been to negotiate a broad political settlement before attempting such an endeavour at a later point. Instead, Hassan Sheikh has perversely flipped this order, but events may yet overtake his persistent attempts to constrict and coerce Somalia's fragile political space.

The more information that seeps out about the scheduled meeting, the more it is apparent that Villa Somalia does not intend to actually wield the forum to forge the requisite anti-Al-Shabaab coalition. Instead, the usual placeholders are expected to participate in the 1-2 May dialogue: the regional presidents of Galmudug, Hirshabelle, and South West-- leaders that have generally remained within Mogadishu's camp in the past year, as well as Abdikhadir Ahmed Aw-Ali 'Firdhiye' as the leader of SSC-Khaatumo. This essentially reduces the first salvos of the 'national dialogue' to the rump 'Hawiye+' National Consultative Council (NCC), which Villa Somalia has repeatedly co-opted to lend a veneer of legitimacy to its constitutional and political machinations in the past year. But even this characterisation is generous, since senior Hawiye opposition figures, such as former President Sheikh Sherif Sheikh Ahmed and Abdirahman Abdishakur, are still uninvited. By refusing to expand its scope, the NCC will remain a heavily compromised body that cannot mobilise sufficient forces against Al-Shabaab nor begin resolving the broader disintegration of Somalia's political settlement. 

There had been conflicting reports over whether Puntland President Said Abdullahi Deni would participate, but Barre's visit to Laas Aanood and the invitation extended to Firdhiye make it improbable. Put simply, Deni and Firdhiye cannot both be at the same NCC table, because they assert mutually exclusive claims to control over Sool region. HSM is well aware of this, and so the invitation to Firdhiye is likely designed to secure some northern and nominal Darood representation while ensuring that Deni, a probable contender for the 2026 presidency, does not attend. Moreover, the promised 'elevation' of SSC-Khaatumo as the 6th Federal Member State (FMS) abrogates several constitutional requirements for its formation, not least that it does not fully control the two regions of Sool and Sanaag that will presumably 'justify' its creation. Mogadishu's threatening of broader conflict with Somaliland and undermining of Puntland further underscores that HSM's call for a national dialogue is merely an attempt to placate international partners rather than revive the NCC as a genuine forum for federalism and consensus-building.

Nor has Jubaland's long-serving leader Ahmed Madoobe been invited, with Villa Somalia seemingly still stung by the humiliation of the Ras Kamboni debacle and the various lurid attempts to undermine Madoobe's administration since. Troublingly, Hassan Sheikh reportedly insisted that he would only drop the farcical Interpol Red Notice on Madoobe if Jubaland annuls its November 2024 election and agrees to Villa Somalia's electoral timetable – another implausible precondition that amounts to sabotage. Perhaps an emergency dialogue aimed at mobilising anti-Al-Shabaab forces can take place without Puntland, with the northern FMS unable to divert significant troops away from its anti-Islamic State-Somalia (ISS) operations, but the absence of Jubaland is distinctly nonsensical.

Jubaland remains absolutely critical, with its Darawiish capable of advancing towards the rear of Al-Shabaab in Lower Juba. That would force the jihadists to divert reinforcements away from Lower Shabelle to shore up their position to the south and quickly relieve some pressure on the capital. Similarly, the twin failure to invite the Hawiye opposition leaves the security of Mogadishu in the hands of a ragtag coalition of police, the custodial corps, badly demoralised federal troops, and perhaps some Turkish special forces. Abgaal and other Hawiye militias may not fight to save the distrusted and unpopular HSM administration, but they might be stirred to do so if the president assured them of influence over the country's future. But Villa Somalia is instead still intent on suppressing dissent, detaining Shabelle Media journalists, opposition politicians, and those demonstrating in the funeral procession for General Sheegow, the Bantu military commander who died in government custody. These actions hardly signal a government interested in forging national unity, whatever it attempts to portray otherwise.

Al-Shabaab's capture of Adan Yabaal, Aboorey, Yaasomaan, and other key locations in Abgaal-majority territory is another potent reminder of the still-growing threat of the jihadists to Mogadishu. The government's apparent hope that the immediate danger to the capital has receded is premature, and the need to rapidly form a coalition able to resist Al-Shabaab is more urgent than ever. While a national dialogue may have been a good idea weeks ago, the latest jihadist advance may simply be moving too fast. Either way, Somalia's incumbent president must prepare to 'exit stage left'-- either to make room for a genuine government of national unity or at the point of the jihadists' guns.

The Somali Wire Team

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