A Resurgent Al-Shabaab Raids Bal'ad
Yesterday, Al-Shabaab demonstrated just how potent it remains. Just 18 miles from Mogadishu, Al-Shabaab fighters stormed the town of Bal'ad, which lies on the arterial road from the capital to Jowhar in Hirshabelle. As Ethiopian PM Abiy Ahmed touched down in Mogadishu in the morning, four mortar projectiles were launched by the jihadists toward Aden Adde International Airport, injuring several civilians. Meanwhile, at least 5 South West State soldiers were killed in an IED blast near Huddur in Bakool, and an explosion at a restaurant in Mogadishu's Kahda district wounded several people.
These latest strikes, as well as the rise in attacks in Middle Shabelle in recent weeks, suggest this is not simply the usual ebb and flow of warfare but signals broader intent. Last year, Al-Shabaab diminished its offensive operations considerably, preferring to consolidate its grip on the interior of the country and recruit heavily. There were some notable attacks, such as the Lido Beach bombing in August 2024, but the operational tempo of the jihadist group diminished, not wishing to offer any reason for the African Union peacekeeping mission draw-down to be further delayed or troops to be ramped up. With the structure of the African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) now falling into shape after significant delays, Al-Shabaab appears ready to commence its varied insurgent tactics once again.
The wishful thinking of the federal government and proclamations that the extremists were near defeat in Hiiraan should have been blown away by yesterday's series of attacks. In particular, the timing of the mortar strikes suggests that Al-Shabaab has long possessed this ability but chose a moment for maximum impact. The arrival of Ethiopian PM Abiy Ahmed to cement his detente with President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and the accompanying pledges of renewed friendship and security were undercut by further evidence of Al-Shabaab's persistent presence in the capital. In the longer term, however, the brief seizure of Bal'ad will likely prove more consequential for security of Somalia's capital.
The threatened capture of Bal'ad had been coming for some time, particularly as Middle Shabelle had been increasingly penetrated by Al-Shabaab. Last June, two Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) under the command of the Ugandan military were transferred to the Somali National Army (SNA) as part of the AU peacekeeping reduction. Much of the capital's perimeter security around Bal'ad was subsequently handed to the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA), essentially paramilitary forces, and a combination of some SNA units and police. A wave of attacks by Al-Shabaab in mid-2024 highlighted just how vulnerable the area around Bal'ad was to infiltration, but little was changed.
This year, with SNA forces having been positioned towards southeastern Hiiraan to support the ma'awiisley operations against Al-Shabaab, accompanied by NISA Director-General Abdullahi Mohamed Ali' Sanbaloolshe,' an emphasis on securing Mogadishu has been far from the priority. And SNA and NISA have been further distracted from protecting the capital by recklessly politicised attempts to unseat Jubaland President Ahmed Madoobe's hold on his Federal Member State. Another possible motive for Al-Shabaab to escalate attacks in the Shabelle Valley in particular the imminent approved deployment of 1,000 Egyptian troops under AUSSOM to the region, offering new targets in the coming months, including the construction of a new base and airfield.
Now, however, the immediate crisis in Middle Shabelle cannot be ignored, as it coincides with the growing political dysfunction within the Abgaal. Senior Abgaal politicians, including President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, Hirshabelle leader Ali Abdullahi Hussein Guudlawe, and former President and key opposition leader Sheikh Sherif Sheikh Ahmed, are all working cross-purposes, divided on a number of issues, not least Villa Somalia's unilateral electoral agenda. Without a degree of cohesiveness within the Abgaal political leadership, securing the Shabelles from a resurgent Al-Shabaab becomes far more complex.
Yet the narratives from the federal government that yet another Al-Shabaab attack has been "repelled" remain. This fundamentally misrepresents the jihadists' modus operandi, however, as Al-Shabaab conducts raids across Middle Shabelle not with the aim of holding territory but solely to disrupt the governance and security of these areas. In Bal'ad, the militants withdrew from the town having achieved their main objectives-- overrunning an SNA base and freeing prisoners from the town's jail – not because they were 'repelled' by SNA troops. Al-Shabaab had no intention of holding Bal'ad and would have withdrawn whether government forces counterattacked or not.
Moreover, Al-Shabaab does not need to hold Bal'ad to make life difficult for the federal government. If the SNA now intends to secure the arterial town critical for Mogadishu's security, it will now likely have to redeploy forces away from various frontlines to protect the Main Supply Route to Jowhar and prevent Bal'ad from being seized repeatedly by Al-Shabaab. This will further stretch the presence of government troops across central Somalia, opening space elsewhere for Al-Shabaab to manoeuvre. Moreover, with Al-Shabaab located on the outskirts of Bal'ad, it can strike convoys heading to Jowhar, extort the town's population, and prevent concerted clan mobilisation in the surrounding areas by pinning down the SNA.
The rhetoric and assertions that dozens of jihadists have been killed in every skirmish is part of a broader pattern of military double-speak by senior government officials unmoored from reality. If Al-Shabaab had truly been repelled, attacks would not be edging closer and closer from the peripheral areas to key towns and cities. SNA spin-doctors similarly refer to Al-Shabaab 'hideouts' across southern Somalia, which is patently ludicrous given that the jihadists control much more of the area than the government does. Pro-government propagandists like to characterise every Al-Shabaab commander killed or captured as 'senior,' regardless of whether they led a small squad of fighters or headed a two-man taxation team.
Recent weeks have highlighted just how quickly Al-Shabaab can ramp up operations in several locations simultaneously. The reduction in peacekeeping troops will stretch the SNA thinner, with international forces unable to do much more than hold onto major towns and watch the tides of war ebb and flow around them. With Villa Somalia still refusing to acknowledge the realities of a resurgent Al-Shabaab, the coming months appear set for further jihadist gains.
The Somali Wire Team
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