Issue no. 808

Cheap Talk: No Signs of National Unity

A distinct lack of urgency surrounds Somalia's supposed 'emergency national dialogue.' On the eve of Eid, Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) reluctantly announced a national dialogue process in the face of collapsing security across the Shabelles and the growing threat to Mogadishu from Al-Shabaab. The Hawiye national opposition, Jubaland President Ahmed Madoobe and others have cautiously welcomed the offer, though they have sought greater clarity on a number of points, not least the scope of discussions. In the week since the announcement, however, Villa Somalia seems to have reverted to 'business as usual', exhibiting the same myopic and unilateral behaviour that precipitated the country's current crisis.

HSM's distinctly unserious attitude towards national dialogue seems to reflect his government's longstanding belief that, no matter how crassly they governed, someone else would come to bail them out. This week, apparently, it is Türkiye's pledge to deploy thousands of troops from the SADAT private military company that has induced Villa Somalia to lapse back into lazy, magical thinking. Or perhaps it is also the prodigious sense of relief that Al-Shabaab did not press its offensive into the core of Mogadishu when it seemingly had the chance. Whatever the reason, Hassan Sheikh seems poised to miss what is arguably his last chance to salvage his administration and his legacy.

Looking ahead, there are three principal scenarios that can be sketched out for Somalia in the coming weeks and months. The best of these – which might be described by sports aficionados as a 'Hail Mary' – is sadly also the least likely: Hassan Sheikh belatedly grasps the scale of the threat and, under pressure from domestic opposition and international partners, changes course entirely. He seizes the slim and short-term opportunity presented by the national dialogue process to resuscitate the National Consultative Council (NCC) and build sufficient consensus to mount a joint counter-offensive against Al-Shabaab. 

In contrast with HSM's recent preoccupation with liberating his own Wa'eysle / Abgaal homeland from Al-Shabaab, this would entail staging – as soon as possible - coordinated offensives from Jubaland and South West State towards jihadist strongholds in Lower Juba and Lower Shabelle, relieving the current pressure on the capital. This, in turn, would require dedicated support from Ethiopia and Kenya, whose forces possess offensive capabilities and force multipliers that their local Somali counterparts do not. Likewise, coordinated air strikes from the US, Türkiye, and the UAE would be much better employed in support of such a concerted offensive than to scatter Al-Shabaab fighters in remote parts of Hirshabelle and Galmudug.

At the same time, securing support from within the Hawiye clan would be essential to stabilising Mogadishu and ensuring that Al-Shabaab doesn't pre-empt joint military action by accelerating its infiltration of the capital. This would necessitate accommodating the repeated demands of Hawiye opposition leaders, for example, that Villa Somalia freeze and repeal amendments to Chapters 1-4 of the Provisional Constitution, which introduce egregiously centralising and Islamist text, as well as the unworkable one-person, one-vote (OPOV) plan, which eliminates any prospect of a free and fair vote by awarding election management to the Ministry of Interior. 

These will likely be only the most urgent steps towards longer-term political negotiations, in which HSM would probably have to accept some kind of hybrid electoral model in May 2026 while a new and impartial PM is appointed to oversee the final months of his term. Even more importantly, HSM should announce he will not run again for the presidency, dispelling concerns that he has called for national dialogue only to save his own skin and placate international partners rather than reviving trust in and progress towards a comprehensive political settlement.

The second scenario– and perhaps the most likely– is that Hassan Sheikh makes minimal political and security concessions and reforms as part of this national dialogue process. Only under immense pressure did the president call for the 'unity' talks, but little comprehensive outreach has so far been made to the national opposition and the estranged regional administrations. Further evidence that the president does not want to cede power is the planned trip of PM Hamza Abdi Barre to Laas Aanood in Sool region. Claimed by both Puntland and Somaliland, Barre's visit is a clear affront to both as Villa Somalia hopes to burnish its nationalist credentials by reaching out to SSC-Khaatumo and by destabilising Somaliland to dissuade the Trump administration from boosting its quest for international recognition. 

The second scenario– and perhaps the most likely– is that Hassan Sheikh tries – but most likely fails – to keep on "muddling through". Villa Somalia would continue to privilege optics over substance, entertaining dialogue with the national opposition and the estranged regional administrations without any genuine intention of making concessions or achieving compromise. HSM's offer to hand "exclusive operational control" of Bosaaso to the US government just days before inviting the Puntland president for talks in Mogadishu is emblematic of such a flippant approach. Similarly, the planned trip of PM Hamza Abdi Barre to Laas Aanood in Sool region is a clear affront to both Puntland and Somaliland, suggesting that Villa Somalia continues to assign higher priority to burnishing its nationalist profile than to building bridges with federal member states.

In this scenario, the SNA continues to flounder, unable to repulse Al-Shabaab in Middle Shabelle and becoming further siloed in Lower Shabelle. The jihadists may not take Mogadishu, but they increasingly penetrate the capital by seizing peripheral areas such as Baraawe and stepping up their attacks. The African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM), still beset by funding problems, can only provide Forward Operating Base (FOB) security, bunkered down in a handful of towns and unable to offer significant offensive capacity. With no funding for the latest iteration of the AU peacekeeping mission forthcoming and troop-contributing countries going into arrears, there is a growing risk that it will collapse entirely in mid-2025. 

Unwilling to enact substantive political changes, Hassan Sheikh likely ploughs on with some version of the unworkable OPOV scheme in Mogadishu, alongside a handful of towns in Hirshabelle, Galmudug, and possibly South West State (assuming that South West President Abdiaziz Laftagareen remains within Villa Somalia's camp rather than orchestrating his own re-election). More broadly, relations between the Federal Member States and Mogadishu inevitably deteriorate further, while Hawiye opposition leaders in the capital, including former President Sheikh Sherif Sheikh Ahmed, continue to forsake the polls and mobilise a Badbaado Qaran (National Salvation) 2.0 in the streets of the capital. Mogadishu itself is then carved up between three main factions-- Villa Somalia, the Hawiye opposition, and Al-Shabaab.

The third-- and worst-case scenario-- is that, despite announcing the national dialogue, President Hassan Sheikh makes no political or security reforms. Al-Shabaab tightens its cordon around Mogadishu, seeking to persuade federal leaders and their international partners to abandon the capital without a fight. UN and embassies are evacuated with the support of AUSSOM and other partner military forces. At this point, Al-Shabaab becomes the de facto authority in Mogadishu, leaving the international community with the choice of either recognising the jihadists as the sovereign government or working with a coalition of Somali administrations and factions opposed to the militants.

Sadly, the coming months do not offer much cause for optimism in Somalia-- even if the worst-case scenario can be avoided. HSM may be able to muddle through for the time being militarily, particularly in the event of a Turkish SADAT intervention, but Somalia has a wretched history of foreign troop deployments, and it remains no alternative for sober, cohesive, political and security reform. So, with little time remaining to rescue Somalia's shambolic federal government from itself, two issues must now be immediately prioritised-- HSM withdrawing his candidacy in 2026 and identifying a credible, impartial guarantor to underwrite the outcome of a national dialogue. This may seem like a price too high to meet the demand of Villa Somalia's incumbents, but the cost of dithering will be even higher.
 

The Somali Wire Team