More Guns, Less State in Somalia
At the collapse of the Somali state in the early 1990s, the bloated, corrupt, and clan-riven national army was nevertheless in possession of vast quantities of light weapons. Much of it sourced during Somalia's ill-fated alliance with the USSR and later Western and Arab patrons, government armouries were soon plundered by warring militias across Mogadishu, Kismaayo, Baidoa, and every garrison town as the country descended into chaos, providing the ammunition for the deaths of hundreds of thousands of people. Even today, many of the AK-47 variants wielded by Siyaad Barre's repressive security apparatus remain in deadly use.
Few might need old Soviet-made mortars or Kalashnikovs, though, such is the wealth of arms in the black markets dotted across Somalia. Best known remains the Bakara market, one of the go-to spots for all types of illicit trade in Somalia, be it passport forgery or gun-shopping. And though the price naturally fluctuates with supply and demand, an AK-47 can normally be picked up at Bakara for just a few hundred dollars, and a single round of ammunition for under a dollar. With the political temperature rising once more in Mogadishu following the government's brute 'finalising' of the constitution last week, prices of guns and ammunition have been reported to have climbed in tandem as all prepare for renewed instability in the capital. Conversely, Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) costs in Mogadishu plummeted after thousands of Somali National Army (SNA) soldiers deserted the frontlines and their weapons in early 2025 as Al-Shabaab poured across central Somalia.
But where are these weapons coming from? And where are they ending up? With zero domestic production capacity in Somalia, virtually all SNA weapons are sourced from Mogadishu's foreign partners, with Ankara delivering arms for the Turkish-trained Gorgor forces, for instance. A veritable smorgasbord of weapons and armaments is at the disposal of Somalia's ragtag army, including well over a dozen rifle types, such as the MPT-76 and Chinese AK-103s. But there remain huge gulfs of capacity and access within the SNA as well. At one end of the spectrum is the US-trained Danab, which retains some advanced weapons and equipment, including tactical assault kits, and is now incorporating some drone surveillance tactics onto the battlefield. At the other extreme were the SNA forces at Osweyne in August 2023, which suffered hundreds of soldiers killed, injured and routed by Al-Shabaab after being stranded on the frontlines without fuel and ammunition. Such wide variation, much like the army's non-standardised training, further complicates the enduring struggle for competent logistics within the SNA. The administrations in Garowe and Kismaayo, meanwhile, have their own weapons sponsors in the Emirates, with the Puntland Maritime Police Force-- a quasi-praetorian guard for the Puntland president-- one of the best-armed forces in Somalia.
But 'mundane' weapons for the army, such as standardised assault rifles, are not on the federal government's shopping lists. In December 2023, as one of the government's many diplomatic 'victories', the final remaining UN arms sanctions on Somalia were lifted, supposedly paving the way —as ever —for the imminent defeat of Al-Shabaab. Though the remaining elements were hardly onerous, mostly around reporting of importing heavy weaponry, Mogadishu had long argued that the sanctions remained a shackle in its decades-long struggle for stability. Subsequent drones, tanks, F-16 fighter jets, ATAK helicopters, and more have been injected by the Turks and other foreign allies into the capital in the past year, building up considerable military hardware in Mogadishu. No doubt the injections of lethal aerial capacity have degraded Al-Shabaab positions on a number of occasions, but without a coherent National Security Architecture or security sector reform, any battlefield gains will be inherently limited. Indeed, the influx of sophisticated equipment into an unreformed security sector risks simply layering modern technology onto deeply dysfunctional institutions.
More broadly, the ubiquity of arms in Somalia makes them readily accessible, with virtually every clan and community able to obtain and deploy them when required. A persistent lack of monopoly of violence of the state and subsequent decades of instability have left deep scars on Somali society, and the militarisation of inter-clan disputes routinely erupts during both periods of feast and famine. Clan arsenals—often accumulated over decades of conflict and replenished through smuggling networks stretching across the Horn of Africa and the Gulf—remain one of the most enduring features of Somalia's political landscape. Interspersed with this dynamic, senior government officials and army commanders across the country are routinely implicated in the smuggling and distribution of arms for their own respective clan-based militias-- with Villa Somalia little different. A spate of recent clashes in Baidoa and its environs is a vivid example of this, with forces allied to South West President Abdiaziz Laftagareen warring with a handful of opposition militias linked to federal ministers and Speaker of Parliament Aden Madoobe.
But while the Security Council lifted the weapons sanctions regime in 2023, monitoring and reporting requirements under subsequent UN resolutions remained in place precisely because of persistent concerns over the government's ability to manage its stockpiles. With the Amniyaat-- Al-Shabaab's much-feared security service-- having penetrated the SNA and the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA), the jihadists are highly adept at raiding caches of weapons almost at whim in south-central Somalia. Images and videos of hundreds of rifles and thousands of rounds of ammunition are subsequently plastered across Al-Kataib Media Foundation, Al-Shabaab's prolific propaganda arm. At the same time, other reports suggest that a substantial quantity of weapons from deserting or absentee soldiers similarly end up on the black market.
The occasional raid on SNA bases is far from the only source of weapons for Al-Shabaab. More complex is the intersection of arms trafficking with the centuries-old smuggling and trade networks along the Gulf of Aden and western Indian Ocean. Small vessels and dhows have long plied people, spices, cargo, and contraband between the Arabian Peninsula and modern-day Somalia. Since the mid-2010s, though, Yemen's descent into armed conflict has driven a substantial influx of weapons into Somalia as well, not least Iranian weapon supplies intended for the Houthis. Organised by a complex intersection of smugglers and financiers-- including those linked to the Puntland and federal governments--weapons and contraband typically make landfall on sequestered beaches in Bari, Nugaal, or Mudug regions of Puntland, as well as the contested Sanaag region, where Al-Shabaab has massed well over 1,500 fighters in the Cal-Madow Mountain range.
Here, too, are the growing linkages between Al-Shabaab and the Houthis becoming readily apparent. Though theologically incongruent, Al-Shabaab and the Houthis have rapidly developed their cooperation in the past two years, with the Yemen-based militants supplying their Somali allies with a host of SALW. More concerning-- and of particular Al-Shabaab interest-- has related to the expanding arsenal and sophistication of kamikaze drones, with the jihadists known to have tested various payloads under Houthi supervision. In several known workshops in southern Somalia, Al-Shabaab explosive experts are simultaneously developing their explosive capabilities with the support of the Yemen-based movement as well.
Above all, the government is an active and willing participant in the smuggling of weapons into Somalia. Despite the lifting of the arms sanctions in 2023, Mogadishu continues to swim in the murky world of weapons smuggling, exploiting both the country's permeable borders and the levers of government to their own self-interest. In fact, the incumbent Hassan Sheikh administration has established a particular notoriety for arms smuggling, sourced by a coterie of Hawiye weapons dealers charged with mobilising forces loyal to the president. Among the most influential is Liban 'Shuluq', a politician and arms trader from Galmudug, best known for his role in the debacle over the smuggling-- and subsequent looting-- of two weapon-laden trucks into Galgaduud in July 2024. Even today, Shuluq remains one of the favourites to be installed as Galmudug president if incumbent president Ahmed 'QoorQoor' strays too far from the government line.
For much of the past year, Villa Somalia has insisted that all forces and militias active in Mogadishu be demobilised and disarmed, supposedly in the name of security. But Somalia's arms proliferation crisis is driven less by external supply than by the absence of a functioning state monopoly over violence. In this vein, the federal government is just one actor — albeit the most prominent — with access to licit weapons flows from Yemeni arms markets, Ankara, and Arab allies. But more often than not, the federal government's comparative advantage in access to weapons has been wielded against its domestic opposition rather than Al-Shabaab. And for decades, foreign partners too often bought the line from Mogadishu that arms deliveries could somehow serve as a shortcut to stability, with better-armed forces eventually able to defeat Al-Shabaab and consolidate the state. Modern drones and helicopters might help tilt the battlefield, but Somalia's jihadists have proven infinitely adaptable. And as Siyaad Barre learned to his ruin, even a formidable national arsenal is no substitute for political authority and legitimacy - especially if it ends up in the hands of insurgents.
The Somali Wire Team
