Last weekend, the Murusade, a major sub-clan of the powerful Hawiye clan family, staged one of the largest and most colourful coronations of a clan chief in recent memory in Mogadishu. The caleemasarka (enthronement) of Ugaas Abdirizaq Ugaas Abdullahi Ugaas Haashi, the new Ugaas or sultan of the Murusade, was attended by thousands of delegates from all parts of Somalia. Conducted next to the imposing and magnificent Ottomanesque Ali Jim'ale Mosque, on the Muslim day of rest, Friday, the occasion blended the Islamic, the regal and the customary; a restatement of an ancient tradition very much alive and vibrant.
The ritual of coronation is elaborate; the new hereditary ruler of the Murusade sat on a stool as is the custom, looking solemn but relaxed. He wore a long-sleeved white shirt, a shaal (a light woollen brown shawl intricately embroidered with floral patterns thrown around his shoulders) and a macaawis (sarong; wraparound); the 'shaal' is a symbol of patriarchal authority and generally worn by influential men. Ugaas Abdirizaq sat under a tree branch with green, healthy leaves (which is where the phrase 'caleemasarka' originates), denoting harvest, hope, and abundance. Fellow clan chiefs poured a gourd of fresh camel milk over him, again stressing the symbolism of good health, material well-being, success, and progress. Milk is central to pastoral nomadic life and is a sacred food. "Wiil iyo caano" is a popular phrase of blessing when a couple weds, meaning "may you have a son, and milk."
The spectacle was televised and livestreamed to millions of Somalis. Images and clips were widely shared on social media by excited and proud Somalis. For a moment, the event looked unreal; staged, even. Garaad Jama Garaad Ali, a Dhulbahante clan chief from Laas Aanood, joked in his speech that the south has now learnt how to 'elevate' and give a proper caleemasaar. The powerful display of Somali unity, the ecumenical spirit at the ceremony, all belied the reality of a deeply fragmented state.
But to frame the event as purely cultural, a piece of entertainment, is to miss a bigger point. What, in fact, the Murusade have done – almost certainly at the behest of all Somali clan chieftains – is to mount a grand guerrilla political protest right at the centre of state power. While the organisers of the coronation called on speakers to steer clear of politics, politics was the key theme; in fact, the only theme – subtle, understated, obliquely referenced, repressed sometimes with gritted teeth. Every speaker bemoaned the terrible state of Somali affairs; the disunity, the political disarray, the pain of ordinary Somalis and the growing uncertainty about the future.
The President of Somalia, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, sat through the proceedings poker-faced. If he was uncomfortable, he gave little away, with his speech being laudatory of the clan system. Undoubtedly, the powerful, indirect message from all Somali clans reached the federal president. Nor was the timing of the Murusade coronation a coincidence. It comes barely three weeks before Hassan Sheikh's term ends, at a time of acute national distress, breakdown of dialogue between the president and the opposition, growing unrest in the periphery as Mogadishu uses coercive tactics to bring down regional states not in its fold.
A key organiser of the event was Hassan Ali Khaire, former PM and a prominent member of the Murusade, whose extended family hails from the Galmudug region of south-central Somalia. Khaire is a presidential candidate and almost certainly stands to gain some credit if, as reported, the clan delegates intend to stay in Mogadishu and work towards a national agreement between the government and the opposition. The Murusade are important as well for their influential history in the capital, being among the oldest settlers of Mogadishu, with roots stretching back centuries along the Banaadir coast and the Lower Shabelle valley. Anthropologist I.M. Lewis documented their pastoral and mercantile presence in the region in the mid-20th century, and during the tumultuous civil war years of the 1990s, the clan played a central role as well.
Ahead of the coronation, the government initially sought to seize control, concerned perhaps that it might be used to 'advance an opposition agenda.' However, Khaire and his team pushed back, insisting the clan maintain autonomy over the logistics and planning of the event. But to incentivise Villa Somalia's approval, the president was invited as one of the keynote speakers, given a seat at the front, and promised full respect and protocol priority. At no time was he booed or humiliated, even though the bulk of the audience would likely have been hostile, aggrieved by his politics, style and leadership.
Moreover, the event represented a much-delayed reaction from the clans —which undergird all parts of Somali politics — against the president's putative one-person, one-vote (OPOV) scheme. Many consider the ploy an attempt to disempower particular clans, replacing their authority with that of party bosses from the ruling Justice and Solidarity Party (JSP). The president's supporters assert that 4.5 is a relic of clan identity politics, and must be jettisoned in the name of 'progress.' But whilst the south has struggled to evolve the formula —which no doubt has serious flaws —into a Guurti-style structure to institutionalise clan authority, the government's proposed OPOV scheme is no better an alternative. Villa Somalia's plan to artificially dismantle the carefully negotiated clan identity politics can only spell trouble. Still, as seen over the weekend, clan politics might yet still be harnessed to enhance the greater good, and with the traditional international community shirking its political role in Somalia, the mechanism of clan-based dispute resolution remains far superior.
The Murusade have done Somalia a tremendous favour by wielding the coronation to give the incumbent government good counsel, pile the pressure on President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud to correct course at a moment of acute national crisis. This is the type of pressure no Somali leader can easily withstand.
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