Averting Disorder: The Case for External Mediation in Somalia
Somalia is entering one of the most dangerous political periods in its recent history. An unprecedented convergence of unresolved constitutional disputes, contested electoral arrangements, rising tensions between federal and regional actors, and the growing politicisation of state security institutions has pushed the country towards a potentially destabilising impasse.
On the 15th of May, the constitutional mandate of the incumbent federal administration expires without a negotiated electoral framework or an agreed transition mechanism - a departure from the norm - and with no clarity on what comes next. For the first time since Somalia's post-conflict state-building process began in earnest, the country faces a leadership transition without broad political consensus on the electoral model, timeline, or constitutional basis governing the process. Absent an urgent mediated settlement, the country risks re-fragmentation and a protracted political logjam almost certain to directly jeopardise decades of incremental state-building and security gains, besides lowering the threshold for renewed internal conflict.
The stability of the country now hinges on a decisive shift: the introduction of external mediators who possess both the diplomatic leverage and the cross-party credibility to broker a sustainable path forward. Without an impartial referee to navigate these pitfalls and nudge a settlement, Somalia's current political turmoil will only worsen.
Last week, the opposition Somalia Future Council (SFC) alliance managed a feeble symbolic protest in Mogadishu, outmanoeuvred by the federal government. The President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) government pledged to allow the opposition to stage the rally at Eng. Yariisow Stadium, but then reneged and deployed paramilitary units to barricade the homes of opposition leaders, effectively denying them mobility and violating their fundamental rights.
The SFC is now calling for a bigger protest on 16 May, a day after HSM's constitutional term is set to formally expire. Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, the leading figure in the SFC, has meanwhile moved to a district of the Somali capital dominated by his Abgal/Agonyar sub-clan of the Mudulood lineage as a safety precaution. Sharif is also among a handful of opposition leaders selected to meet the international community in Mogadishu this week.
Yesterday, 13 May, HSM met former President Sheikh Sharif, Puntland President Sa'id Abdullah Deni in the presence of foreign diplomats, marking the first tentative step towards a more serious dialogue to find a solution to the electoral and constitutional impasse. This is a positive development, and it is encouraging to see the UK, US and the EU beginning to apply pressure more systematically and in a concerted way on Somali partners.
The Somali opposition exists as a broad but amorphous and disorganised coalition lacking a coherent strategy or a viable alternative electoral model. In April, the SFC vowed and then failed to convene a meeting to draw up plans for a parallel election plan and a transitional government. By tapping into massive public discontent over corruption and recent large-scale land evictions in Mogadishu - which Villa Somalia frames as 'land reforms' - the opposition is able to mobilise the citizenry and garner significant support. But that alone cannot serve as a viable platform for challenging the HSM government. More problematic still, by defending the legacy 4.5 clan power-sharing system and failing to produce a coherent alternative plan, the Sharif camp has enabled Villa Somalia to brand its rivals as anti-reform traditionalists.
For the first time, the duration of Somalia's electoral cycle is contested, with opposing factions divided over four versus five years. The post-15 May transition lacks an agreed poll process, timeline, or electoral model, as the incumbent administration attempts to unilaterally impose direct voting - the so-called one-person-one-vote (OPOV) - and a one-year extension, both divisive and highly contested. Moreover, two competing, parallel constitutional frameworks - the 2012 Provisional Constitution and the 2026 amendments — are being used by opposing factions as points of reference. This absence of a single, binding legal anchor generates a constitutional grey zone that impedes structural dialogue and negotiated settlements. Meanwhile, a highly fractured federal system perpetuates institutional friction between national and sub-national tiers regarding electoral calendars, mandates, terms of office, and preferred voting models.
The outgoing HSM administration continues to weaponise a heavily politicised intelligence, military, and security apparatus alongside a partisan electoral commission to systematically disadvantage political opponents. The use of lethal force to dislodge regional president Abdiaziz Laftagareen in South West State and, last week, the deployment of security forces in Mogadishu against the opposition SFC are emblematic of a coercive strategy increasingly driving state response.
Türkiye is not a passive bystander in the ongoing intra-Somali standoff. As its strategic footprint has expanded over the last year - through military cooperation, infrastructure investment, security training, and energy agreements - Ankara appears to be doubling down on its support for HSM, aligning its bilateral consolidation imperatives with the current administration. The well-choreographed military and political campaign to remove Laftagareen in South West State would have been inconceivable without Ankara's support. On Sunday, Turkey scrambled its F-16 jets over parts of South West State where voters were casting their ballots in a poll organised by Villa Somalia, ostensibly to bolster election security.
Ankara's increased clout mirrors and complements another dynamic: a shift in Somalia's state-building paradigm towards a centralised, hard-state model that directly undermines the inclusive, consensus-driven traditions that have underpinned Somali politics since 2000.
In the last four years, Villa Somalia has pursued a policy of aggressively reclaiming full sovereignty and dismantling what it perceives as international tutelage and external meddling. In 2024, the UN Mission to Somalia transitioned to UNTMIS with a reduced political mandate; in October 2026, the entire mission is set to transfer its remaining functions to a small UN country team. The diminished system of multilateral checks and balances and the dissolution of the C6 oversight mechanism have collectively reduced Western leverage, granting the incumbent administration unprecedented latitude for unilateral manoeuvre. The federal government also continues to deploy the issue of Somaliland's recognition as a powerful nationalist narrative; invoking it as an existential threat allows the administration to enforce domestic unity, suppress opposition, and advance controversial reforms with limited scrutiny.
The Way Forward
Somalia has reached a critical juncture with the presidential mandate expiration coinciding with a fractured political landscape. With opposition factions signalling they will no longer recognise the legitimacy of HSM after 15 May, the risk of a return to armed conflict is no longer theoretical.
The increasing reliance on state security apparatuses to resolve constitutional disputes threatens to dismantle decades of fragile institutional progress. To avoid a descent into fragmentation, the federal government and its partners must push for a mediated, inclusive roadmap that balances democratic aspirations with the realities of the current security environment.
International partners must nudge parties to accept third-party mediation and consider making financial, diplomatic, and security assistance explicitly contingent on Villa Somalia's commitment to inclusive electoral dialogue and the cessation of coercive actions against federal states.
Beyond external mediation, diplomatic efforts should seek to prioritise resurrecting a structured and credible negotiation platform between the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and opposition groups. The immediate objective must be a minimum political settlement governing elections and constitutional amendments - not maximalist political victory for any side, but a consensus agreement that prevents institutional collapse and preserves national stability. To this end, international actors should engage directly with HSM to dismantle the unviable OPOV framework and take concrete steps towards a realistic, sequenced, or hybrid model achieved through consensus rather than unilateral imposition.
There is a need to actively engage Türkiye and other security partners to ensure that foreign-supplied drones, rotary-wing assets, and elite military training are not drawn into internal political disputes.
Partners must press Villa Somalia to cease state-led intimidation of the opposition and respect their freedom of movement and assembly. Any targeted actions against opposition-aligned security personnel or clan structures must invite immediate, unified diplomatic censure.
International monitors must enhance early-warning mechanisms targeting state-level interference, with immediate focus on countering FGS manoeuvres in Puntland, Jubaland's Gedo region, South West State, Hirshabelle, and Galmudug to pre-empt localised armed conflicts.
Donors and partners need to quietly coordinate policy responses to manage a post-May deadline scenario, mitigating the risks of parallel authorities, competing claims to legitimacy, and institutional collapse.
Finally, international support for operations against Al-Shabaab and ISIS/Daesh must be robustly protected from domestic political dynamics. Clear institutional safeguards are required to prevent the diversion of elite, foreign-trained security forces into intra-Somali political contests. Somalia's fragile progress over the last two decades was built through negotiation, compromise, and gradual consensus-building.
Attempting to force transformational political change without broad agreement risks undoing those gains entirely.
