How Somalia's South West Vote Went South
On 10 May, the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) unilaterally conducted its contentious 'one-person-one-vote' (OPOV) electoral model in South West State (SWS), directly overriding opposition demands for a negotiated, consensus-based framework. Crucially, the very laws underpinning these OPOV elections are themselves deeply contested: the electoral framework was created following a rushed revision of Somalia’s constitution that many federal member states and opposition groups rejected. The vote, exclusively managed by the National Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (NIEBC), saw localised polling in 13 districts and across 126 poll centres and 276 stations. While 376,212 citizens were registered, actual turnout reached 132,430 voters - a participation rate of approximately 35.2% - with 128,276 valid ballots cast and 4,154 deemed spoilt/invalid. The electoral outcome, unsurprisingly, solidified a decisive mandate for Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s Justice and Solidarity Party (JSP); the governing party secured an absolute majority of 51 out of 95 contested legislative seats, comfortably outpacing its closest rival, Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden’s Ururka Horumarka, which claimed 14 seats.
The limited plebiscite in SWS, no doubt, yields a short-term tactical ‘victory’ for Villa Somalia, but the federal triumph is likely to prove short-lived, not least, because the outcome still remains hotly-disputed, despite a decision by the Supreme Court validating the results on 25 May, some 10 days after the polls closed. Rather than advancing electoral modernisation and democratisation, the FGS’s top-down process appears to have entrenched local divisions, inflamed clan animosities and elevated the immediate risk of conflict and renewed instability. Any assessment of the May vote therefore cannot be separated from the wider legitimacy disputes over the legal foundation on which it rests.
A flawed process
The SWS electoral process highlights the pitfalls of conducting a poll in an environment of deepening fragmentation and where a binding national electoral roadmap is absent. That a combination of systemic procedural flaws, lack of transparency and multiple violations of existing legal frameworks would severely undermine the vote’s credibility comes as no surprise.
The election was carried out without fundamental democratic prerequisites, including a baseline population census and comprehensive civic education. Furthermore, the process violated statutory funding requirements. While existing electoral laws mandate that the Electoral Commission be funded via the 2026 National Budget to safeguard institutional independence, the SWS election budget was entirely omitted from the national fiscal plan. The FGS claimed these operations were funded through domestic resource mobilisation, but it failed to publish verifiable figures, again, in direct violation of fiscal transparency standards.
The NEIBC systematically restricted electoral scrutiny by withholding granular voter registration data. By opting to open the voter register just 24 hours prior to the May 10 polls, and failing to publish station-specific registration lists, the body breached basic transparency norms.
This opacity prevented political parties and independent local observers from verifying voter eligibility at specific locations, rendering it impossible to audit actual turnout or detect multiple voting thereby severely compromising the right to informed suffrage. For example, although the committee cited 1,297 local council and 394 state representative candidates across 13 districts, these metrics were released purely as raw aggregates. The identities, party affiliations, and rankings of these 1,691 individuals were never disclosed to the public, forcing the electorate to vote blindly for party numbers or blank slots.
This concealment breaches Law No. 28 and the Political Parties Law, both of which mandate the timely publication of candidate names to facilitate a formal dispute resolution window. By hiding candidate identities until election day, the committee effectively blocked interested parties and the public from legally challenging candidate eligibility regarding criminal records or dual-citizenship restrictions.
Relatedly, authorities also violated statutory requirements to physically post preliminary results on the exterior walls of each polling station immediately after counting. This weeks-long delay severely compromised the chain of custody, creating opportunities for data manipulation between localised stations and regional tabulation centres.
The operational logistics of the vote strongly indicate possible statistical fabrication or systemic verification bypasses. Funnelling 376,212 registered voters into just 276 polling stations resulted in an unsustainable planned density of 1,303 voters per station - triple the conventional standard democratic benchmark. Processing this volume within the designated 12-hour voting window would require each station to biometrically validate one voter every 31.7 seconds without interruption – a feat many experts would deem unfeasible or practically impossible.
Recent anecdotal field reports corroborate some of these irregularities and suggested voter turnouts in multiple districts may have been inflated, most notably in Waajid, where registered voters were highly disproportionally recorded at 29,984.
Positioning Madoobe for presidency
Securing Baidoa was always a cornerstone of the HSM administration’s OPOV initiative, a proof-of-concept for federal electoral reforms. The overthrow of the regional President Abdiaziz Laftagareen on 30 March was primarily aimed to demonstrate that a limited plebiscite was feasible, beyond the obvious, more partisan consideration of sidelining a recalcitrant regional leader and extending the JSP electoral influence beyond Mogadishu.
In late April, Villa Somalia cleared the path for Adan Madoobe (Rahanweyn/Mirifle/ Hadamo/Shirmoge), the former FGS Lower House Speaker of Parliament to contest the post of SWS President on a JSP ticket. Madoobe, whose JSP won 51 seats out of 95, is certain to be elected president in the coming days
To smooth the path for Madoobe, key rivals were offered top posts, chief among them fellow kinsman and political heavyweight - Hussein Sheikh Mohamed (Rahanweyn/Mirifle/Hadamo). Hussein is another close associate of HSM and a former Chief of Staff at the Presidency. In late April 2026, he was appointed the acting Secretary General of HSM’s JSP. The move was designed to satisfy Hussein Sheikh’s political ambitions and avoid his entry into the SWS presidential contest against Adan Madoobe. Hussein Sheikh is from the Hadamo/Higse, while Adan Madoobe is from the Hadamo/Shirmoge lineage.
Healing rifts
If the federal government’s hope and desired outcome was to use OPOV to stabilise SWS, balance and satisfy competing Rahanweyn/Mirifle sub-clans which dominate SWS political, security and business sectors, that prospect now seems remote. The risk of instability is growing and competition is rife between the Hadamo and Leysan sub-clan lineages - a rivalry that adds an additional layer of volatility to the post-poll political climate. This situation is further aggravated by another problem: a burgeoning insurgency mounted by forces loyal to the ousted former leader, Laftagareen, close to the regional capital, Baidoa. Two senior Somali National Army commanders were killed in recent clashes, a testament to the lethality of this new armed conflict
The FGS’s military intervention in South West State and decision to hold a unilateral poll sets a negative, high-stakes precedent for the FGS's relationship with other Federal Member States, particularly Puntland and Jubaland, but also Galmudug and Hirshabelle. By utilising military means to assert federal dominance, subvert the tradition of consensus politics, and impose leaders using a contested electoral model, Villa Somalia has needlessly increased the risk of renewed instability and fragmentation in the periphery.
The long-term stability of SWS now hinges on whether the FGS can resist handing the JSP absolute monopoly, meaningfully address and correct mounting grievances over the May poll, repair social cohesion and manage the delicate transition in a way that positively fosters inclusivity and enables the emergence of a legitimate and credible administration.
While Somalia’s federal government has shown it can pull off localized voting in secure urban centers, it still hasn't proven it can run a genuinely credible election. For a ballot to carry any weight, the planning, execution, and final results must meet basic democratic standards - and so far, the process has failed to build any real public trust.
