Issue No. 951

Villa Somalia's triumph in Baidoa may yet turn to ashes. Since the ousting of wary friend-turned-foe, Abdiaziz Laftagareen, in late March, the federal government has ploughed ahead with preparations for state- and district-level elections in South West. Nominally scheduled for next week, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has chosen to reward his stalwart parliamentary ally, Aden Madoobe from the Rahanweyne/Hadaamo, with the regional presidency after some vacillation, naming him the sole Justice and Solidarity Party (JSP) candidate. But Mogadishu's attempts to impose another unpopular regional president in Baidoa are grating amongst the various, unconsulted Rahanweyne factions, with fears of renewed clashes rising in turn.

Despite much sabre-rattling, the ejection of Laftagareen from Baidoa last month proved broadly seamless, with phalanxes of Turkish-trained Gorgor forces and allied Rahanweyne militia pouring triumphantly into the city. It represented a reassertion of centralised power from Mogadishu, a culmination of Villa Somalia's monopolising agenda—and one with Ankara's full-throated support. Ousting Laftagareen is one matter, though he was a deeply unpopular president who clung to the coattails of Villa Somalia until the 11th hour; mediating what comes next is another, particularly with the political space in Baidoa constrained for several years. But while few expected a broad, pluralistic or democratic process—despite the insistence that free and fair elections can somehow be held in just 12 towns next week—the cynical parachuting in of Speaker Madoobe is chafing not only with Laftagareen's sub-clan of the Hariin, but with a wider constellation of Rahanweyne politicians. And so, with initial optimism fading, Baidoa teeters on the edge of a conflict it narrowly avoided the first time.

Though clan intervention in the hours and days after Laftagareen's ousting helped stave off broader violence, Hariin militias and forces have begun withdrawing from Baidoa in the past 48 hours in preparation for conflict. Images from last night showed forces arriving in Berdaale, with their commanders previously warning of advancing on South West's de facto capital and shutting down the airport. The morass of Gorgor and Haram'ad federal forces, meanwhile, are reportedly planning to pursue them, and whilst the city itself remains calm, it may not remain so for much longer. 

It is a family matter for the president as well, having deployed his son—Major Abdifatah Hassan Sheikh Mohamud—to the city with dozens of soldiers under his command at the end of March. Nor has the situation been aided by the shooting of two militiamen from Buurhuukaba and a third from Luuq by unknown assailants on Monday afternoon, killing two immediately and leaving a third who died yesterday morning. Their deaths have further deepened the fraught undercurrent within Baidoa, with some speculating it may be the work of Laftagareen-allied forces. And should these tensions tip into open confrontation, the fragmentation of local forces risks creating precisely the kind of security vacuum that Al-Shabaab has historically exploited across Bay and Bakool.

It is not just the Hariin who are infuriated with the government's bulldozing through intra-Rahanweyne competition, but other influential sub-clans as well. Among them are the Leysaan, who count—among others—Minister of Religion Mukhtar Roobow in their number, and are convening today to chart their opposition to Speaker Madoobe. Others, including the Boqolhore, are expected to follow suit, which could well tip Baidoa's clan balance away from the federal parliament speaker if they decide to take up arms. The Leysaan have been patient; sidelined during and after Laftagareen's violent installation into Baidoa, whilst ex-Al-Shabaab commander Roobow was detained by Ethiopian troops on the eve of the election in 2018. With the threat of widespread conflict bearing down on Baidoa, pleas from the sub-clan for cooler heads fell on deaf ears in Mogadishu, too. The prospect of a Hadaamo candidate being imposed on Baidoa, with the Leysaan putting forward several of their own, is deeply unpopular, let alone factoring in Madoobe's personal disfavour. And though the Eelay and much of the Hadaamo remain allied to the government, the prospect of armed conflict in the city and its outskirts is rapidly rising.

Though Madoobe may carry the legacy of the Rahanweyne Resistance Army (RRA), the militia that defined Rahanweyne political identity through the civil war years, his card has long been marked as a wily, corrupt politician with few scruples. The ink has barely dried on Madoobe's hauling of the constitution through parliament to deliver Hassan Sheikh another year in office and a raft of new powers—and further splitting the country into two. Speaker Madoobe's reward for delivering these changes may be the South West presidency, but it is poor clan calculus on the part of the government, sidelining the crucial Rahanweyne sub-clans from the Bay region. And the opposition to Madoobe's candidacy intersects with another dimension—the informal division within the Rahanweyne sub-clan alliances, known as the 'eight versus nine', with the Leysaan, Hariin, and Jiroon falling on the opposing side to the Hadaamo.

Conveniently for the federal president, though, many of the key Rahanweyne elders are gathering in Mogadishu for the inauguration of a Hawiye/Murosade clan elder, providing Hassan Sheikh an opportunity to discuss the elections and the various positions up for grabs. Among them will be the speaker of parliament post, with several names having been floated to replace Madoobe, including the foreign minister and, increasingly, the second deputy PM, Jibril Abdirashid Abdi. Hailing from the Digil/Garre from Eel Waaq in Gedo, Jibril served as interim state leader since Laftagareen was ousted, but presents another set of dilemmas. As he hails from Gedo, some fear that he would subordinate the Bay region clans—or help facilitate more government adventurism into the Mareehaan-majority region in Jubaland. One name that has faded, however, is that of the federal Ports Minister Abdulkadir Nur 'Jama'. The Jiroon politician—and Turkiye's key conduit in Somalia—has been parachuted into a parliamentary seat, though the government is now insisting-- based upon its constitutional revisions-- that all dual ministers and MPs step down from one of their positions.

Though on the face of it, next week will herald a return to direct democracy at the state and district levels, the processes are being choreographed by the national election commission—handpicked government allies under the Ministry of Interior's auspices—following the sacking of South West election officials. And a handful of garrison and satellite towns are supposed to represent the South West's varied districts, overlooking the fact that Al-Shabaab controls much of Bay and Bakool. Another dimension, though, remains the Ethiopian military, which, in the end, allowed Turkish-trained Somali forces to roll into the city and facilitate the end of Laftagareen's term. Though it is believed that the foreign contingent would prefer another candidate to Madoobe, it is unlikely that Addis will intervene unless the situation markedly deteriorates—at which point, all bets are off.

This is not the first time Villa Somalia has backed unpopular candidates and politicians to advance its interests, be it in Laas Aanood or Gedo. Perhaps Madoobe, with federal support, can maintain a hold on Baidoa, but it will be uncomfortable. But by mid-next week, Hassan Sheikh wants his man in post—and appears to calculate that, if he moves fast enough, the weary international community will not put up any substantial resistance. And as ever, deals can be struck, and with reports of a substantial injection of cash from Ankara—not to mention Turkish armaments—Villa Somalia has a few days to massage the right factions and ease Madoobe into position. 

But much like Laftagareen, Aden Madoobe is no consensus candidate, and the fissures within the Rahanweyne are likely to be only accentuated by a brief opening and shuttering of the political space. And the importance of a smooth transition in Baidoa for Villa Somalia—with just a couple of weeks remaining in Hassan Sheikh's term—cannot be overstated, as the government desperately seeks to show that its electoral and constitutional agenda remains on track. For now, Villa Somalia may have the momentum—but in Baidoa, as so often in Somalia, momentum without legitimacy rarely lasts. And in its rush to secure the city, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud risks proving a familiar lesson, that power imposed quickly is just as quickly contested.